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INTRODUCTION 
There can be no disagreement on an initial premise: [Television] pro-
grammers and [television] operators engage in and transmit speech, 
and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press provi-
sions of the First Amendment. Through "original programming or by 
exercising editorial discretion over which ... programs to include in 
its repertoire," [television] programmers and operators "see[k] to 
communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide vari-
ety of formats." 
-Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Fee• 
It is urged that motion pictures do not fall within the First Amend-
ment's aegis because their production, distribution, and exhibition is 
a large-scale business conducted for private profit. We cannot agree. 
That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for 
profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose 
liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail to see why 
operation for profit should have any different effect in the case of mo-
tion pictures. 
-Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson2 
We can surely agree that no one can raise a cry of deprivation of free 
speech if he is compelled to prove that there is something more than 
naked commercial selfishness in his purpose. 
-Then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover3 
Commercial television broadcasters have been subject to a 
range of regulations restricting their freedom to present pro-
gramming to the viewing public. Those restrictions have in-
cluded the Prime Time Access Rule,4 the Children's Television 
Act of 1990,s and the Fairness Doctrine.6 Indeed, the funda-
1. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (citations 
omitted) (Turner I). 
2. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (footnote 
omitted). 
3. Speech by then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover at the Na-
tional Radio Conference (Nov. 9, 1925), quoted in Harry Kalven, Jr., Broad-
casting, Public Policy, and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & ECON. 15, 16 
(1967). 
4. In the Matter of Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and 
Regulations With Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Tele-
vision Broadcasting, 23 F.C.C.2d 382, 384 (1970). The rule prohibited the 
broadcast of more than three hours of programming produced by or for televi-
sion networks in any of the top fift;y markets during the four "prime-time" 
hours of the day-i.e., 7 p.m. to 11 p.m. Id. The FCC intended to protect the 
viability of non-network produced syndicated programming. Id. at 385-87. 
5. Pub. L. No. 104-437, 104 Stat. 996 (1990). Congress directed the FCC 
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mental requirement that broadcasters serve the "public inter-
est" in order to retain their licenses from the FCC itself im-
pinges programming discretion. 7 Cable television outlets have 
been subjected to the Must Carry Rule.8 Today, some propo-
nents of campaign finance reform seek to compel television 
broadcasters to provide free time to candidates for political ad-
vertising.9 
Every effort to regulate television programming decisions 
has been opposed on both constitutional grounds and policy 
grounds. Dominant among policy objections are the notions of 
market efficiency that underlie a broader opposition to govern-
ment regulation of economic relationships. Social welfare is 
maximized, the argument goes, when freely-bargaining actors 
can agree upon transactions that enhance the self-defined wel-
fare of each participant. Some have argued, for example, that 
regulations of broadcast television programming should be 
evaluated according to whether "they interfere with the free 
market's ability to maximize consumer satisfaction or to pro-
mote most effectively consumer sovereignty."10 They suggest 
that "telecommunications goods and markets" should be 
treated as are "most other goods and markets."11 
Accompanying these policy objections to the regulation of 
television programming decisions are arguments that invoke 
the First Amendment's prohibition of laws that "abridge the 
freedom of speech." If the government tells CBS that it may 
not present more than three hours of network-created pro-
gramming during primetime hours or that it must present at 
least a minimum amount of children's programming, the net-
work's freedom to choose its preferred programming is re-
stricted. If the government were to tell the networks to provide 
to consider whether stations had provided programming "specifically designed 
to serve the educational and informational needs of children." Id. § 103(b)(2), 
104 Stat. at 997. 
6. See infra Part I.A. 
7. The Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 
(1934), requires that broadcast licensees operate "in the public interest" and 
empowers the FCC to grant and renew licenses according to the needs of "the 
public convenience, interest, or necessity." Id.§ 307(a), 48 Stat. at 1083. 
8. Such rules require cable television providers to carry local broadcast 
network affiliate stations. See infra Part LB. 
9. See infra Part IV.A. 
10. THOMAS G. KRA'ITENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING 
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 45 (1994). 
11. See id. at 49, 277-96. 
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free air time to political candidates, the freedom to choose their 
preferred programming would be restricted. Broadcasters ar-
gue that this freedom to choose programming is "editorial dis-
cretion" or "journalistic discretion" protected by the First 
Amendment. It amounts to the freedom to say what one wants 
to say and not to say what one wishes to refrain from saying.12 
The free-market policy argument against regulation has 
not persuaded everyone-whether as a general matter or in its 
particular application to television-though it today has a 
stronghold in political debate. 13 It is nearly universally ac-
cepted, however, among judges, politicians, bureaucrats, and 
scholars, 14 that the programming decisions of television broad-
casters and cable providers are exercises of "editorial discre-
tion" protected by the First Amendment.15 This presumption of 
constitutional privilege has inhibited political experimentation. 
The FCC repealed the Fairness Doctrine in part because of 
these constitutional concerns. Proposals to mandate free tele-
vision time for political candidates have foundered in part be-
cause of concerns about intruding on the constitutionally pro-
tected "editorial discretion" of television broadcasters. And; of 
course, the presumption of constitutional privilege threatens 
judicial invalidation of those experiments that the political 
process manages to enact into law. 
Should television programming decisions continue to be 
viewed as a core part of "the freedom of speech" protected by 
the First Amendment? Should the First Amendment be 
deemed to supplement, and sometimes to supersede, the range 
12. "[W]e reaffirm unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial judg-
ment. . . . [A] compulsion to publish that which reason tells [newspapers] 
should not be published is unconstitutional." Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255-56 (1974) (quotations omitted). 
13. "It [is] time to move away from thinking about broadcasters as trus-
tees. It [is] time to treat them the way almost everyone else in society does-
that is, as businesses. [T]elevision is just another appliance. It's a toaster 
with pictures." Then-FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, justifying the repeal of the 
fairness doctrine regulations, quoted in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND 
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 49 (1993) (footnote omitted). 
14. See, e.g., LILLIAN R. BEVIER, Is FREE TV FOR FEDERAL CANDIDATES 
CONSTITUTIONAL? 33-34 (1998); id. at 46 (arguing that requiring broadcasters 
to "provide free TV time would restrict their speech-or at least their editorial 
discretion"); KRATI'ENMAKER & POWE, supra note 10, at 235; RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 672-74 (1992); SUNSTEIN, supra note 
13, at 103-05; Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 
1101, 1105 n.8 (1993). 
15. See infra Part LB. 
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of policy arguments for, and against, regulation of television 
programming decisions? Conventional wisdom, from the right 
to the left, barely acknowledges these questions.16 The task of 
this Article is to explore them. 
Policy arguments against the regulation of television pro-
gramming decisions have relied on an economio model that 
views television broadcasters as producers and sellers acting in 
a normative context of "consumer sovereignty." Constitutional 
arguments have relied largely on a political model that views 
television broadcasters as speakers exercising editorial discre-
tion in a normative context of citizen sovereignty and "the free-
dom of speech." Those who have critiqued the regulation of 
programming decisions by invoking both the constitutional and 
policy perspectives see a consistency-even a synergy-between 
them. 
Forty years ago, for example, Ronald Coase argued that the 
FCC's power to grant and renew broadcast licenses conditioned 
on whether a licensee serves the "public interest, convenience, 
or necessity'' involves oversight of the applicant's programming 
decisions and, therefore, clashes with the First Amendment.17 
From this perspective, he argued that the FCC's power to li-
cense broadcasters was as much an intrusion on the First 
Amendment as licensing newspapers would be. At the same 
time, Coase viewed broadcasters as commercial actors, moti-
vated by the same forces that shape the decisions of other pro-
ducers and merchants. From this perspective, he suggested 
that the allocation of broadcast licenses, like the allocation of 
other resources, "should be determined by the forces of the 
market rather than as a result of government decisions."18 
Thus, he argued that broadcasters should be treated under the 
First Amendment as are other speakers (that is, free to exercise 
editorial discretion)19 and should be treated under market the-
ory as are "other businessmen"20 (that is, largely free to make 
whatever production and distribution decisions they wish).21 
16. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. 
17. See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 7-12 (1959). 
18. Id. at 18. 
19. See id. at 7. 
20. Id. at 30. 
21. Indeed, more recently, Coase has made a stronger and more radical 
claim: government should be restricted in its power to regulate the market for 
goods and services as it has been restricted in its power to regulate the market 
for ideas, because no persuasive justification exists to distinguish the impor-
2000] SELLING THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE 457 
Following Coase, Thomas Krattenmaker and Lucas Powe 
have argued that a free-market economic analysis of program-
ming discretion supports a finding of protection by the First 
Amendment: "[A] focus on [economic] markets reveals that di-
rect regulation of programming is virtually always an unneces-
sary intrusion into broadcasters' rights of free speech, and that 
the [Federal Communications] Commission can attain truly 
sensible goals without overseeing stations' editorial deci-
sions."22 
This Article suggests that there is no synergy between 
viewing programming decisions as properly governed by mar-
ket forces in a regime of consumer sovereignty and viewing 
them as protected by the First Amendment's freedom of speech. 
Indeed, the two models of television broadcasting on which op-
ponents of regulation have simultaneously relied are incom-
patible. Rather, to the extent that, and because, commercial 
television programming decisions are economically driven by a 
desire to satisfy market demand, they should not be viewed as 
protected by the First Amendment's freedom of speech. 
Part I describes the prevailing presumption, both in poli-
tics and law, from the right23 and from the left,24 that the pro-
gramming decisions of television broadcasters and cable pro-
viders are exercises of "editorial discretion" protected as part of 
the First Amendment's "freedom of speech." 
Part II examines decisionmaking by television network ex-
ecutives. It distinguishes among decisions made by the series 
of actors involved in the creation, production, and dissemina-
tion of such programming, and considers the extent to which 
such programming decisions flow from the pursuit of profit. It 
concludes that Coase, Posner, and other market theorists are 
quite right in suggesting that much-indeed, most, if not all-
of such programming decisions involve creating programming 
that will generate profits by satisfying consumer demand. 
Part III analyzes the constitutional significance of the 
proposition that commercial television programmers behave as 
tance of free speech from that of free trade in goods and services. R.H. Coase, 
Aduertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-8, 13-15 (1977). 
22. KRA'ITENMAKER & POWE, supra note 10, at 283 (emphasis added). 
23. Id. at 235. 
24. Weinberg, supra note 14, at 1114 ("Broadcasting is speech."). 
Weinberg develops his critiques of First Amendment doctrine and broadcast-
ing by "[r]elying on insights developed by authors associated with critical legal 
studies." Id. at 1109. 
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do other entrepreneurs in responding to market incentives. 
Part III begins by distinguishing two categories of message that 
people might choose to disseminate. The actor who chooses to 
construct the content of a message by referring to the beliefs 
and values of an anticipated audience, and who does so because 
he believes that the message will be popular, or that the con-
sumer will buy it, or that it will produce profits, has created the 
market-driven message. The actor who constructs the content 
of a message by considering what she, herself, believes has cre-
ated the speaker-driven message. 
Part III also describes three categories of motive for dis-
seminating messages. A person might disseminate messages 
with no concern about persuading people about the worth of the 
idea, but simply as a product to be sold for profit; or might dis-
seminate an idea to persuade people of the merits of the idea. 
This section posits that an actor might choose to profit by sell-
ing a market-driven message-in other words, to sell; or might 
endeavor to persuade others with a market-driven message-in 
other words, to pander; or might endeavor to persuade others 
with speaker-driven self-expression-in other words, to 
enlighten. 
Part III then considers whether an actor's choice to sell the 
market-driven message, as contrasted with an actor's choice to 
enlighten with speaker-driven self-expression, should be 
deemed protected by the First Amendment. Having raised this 
agenda, Part III recognizes that the flow of discussion may be 
interrupted by the reader's objections. Few people speak in a 
way that reflects pure self-expression or in a way that reflects a 
pure pursuit of economic profit. Given the complexities of real-
ity, what is the point of exploring the implications of two cate-
gories of purpose-a purpose to enlighten through self-
expression and a purpose to profit through the sale of a market-
driven message-that, in their pure forms, must be so rare? 
In response, Part III suggests that by exploring the impli-
cations of categories that are theoretically pure, but perhaps 
rare in reality, one has a basis for distinguishing the constitu-
tional significance of more complex human choices that are, in 
fact, common. A television programming executive like Rupert 
Murdoch, for example, may seek primarily to create a television 
program lineup that will attract large audiences but secondar-
ily-reluctantly-may choose to forgo potentially popular (and 
profitable) programming that excessively offends his own sen-
sibilities. An artist like Michelangelo, for example, may pri-
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marily seek to create his vision of truth but secondarily-
grudgingly-placate his patron's conflicting preferences. Both 
act with a mixture of purposes-to communicate in a way that 
expresses his own values and to profit from market demand. 
But a Murdoch might strike quite a different balance than 
would a Michelangelo. Should the difference be deemed consti-
tutionally significant? Should the entrepreneur and the artist 
be understood as warranting equal entitlement as a participant 
in the freedom of speech? Without exploring the normative 
significance of opposing poles that might be pure and rare, one 
cannot explore the normative significance of the far more com-
mon varieties of mixed motives lying in the continuum between 
them.25 
Thus, Part III explores the constitutional significance of 
choices to enlighten with speaker-driven self-expression and 
choices to profit from the sale of a market-driven message from 
the perspective of four normative frameworks relevant to the 
freedom of speech. The first two normative contexts rest on the 
proposition that the freedom of speech is constitutionally pro-
tected because it is necessary for democratic self-government.26 
25. Motive and purpose are legally relevant in many contexts. Where the 
law has made motive and purpose relevant, those who make and interpret the 
law must confront the problem of mixed motives and purposes and, indeed, 
have done so. In the area of Equal Protection, for example, the Supreme Court 
has determined that laws enacted because of purposes reflecting racial preju-
dice are unconstitutional. In giving doctrinal shape to this principle, the 
Court has decided that "[r]arely can it be said that a legislature ... made a 
decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a single purpose 
was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977). Thus, one who challenges a 
facially neutral law on grounds of unconstitutional racial discrimination must 
prove that an impermissible racially discriminatory purpose was "a motivating 
factor in the decision." Id. If a challenger meets that burden, the state must 
show "that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible 
purpose not been considered." Id. at 271 n.21. This is not to suggest that this 
sort of "but for" principle is appropriate for determining whether one who 
seeks to sell a market-driven message should be deemed protected by the First 
Amendment. It is to suggest, however, that the law has made motive and 
purpose dispositive in many contexts, and the task of defining the extent to 
which a motive or purpose must have influenced a decision in order to be le-
gally significant is in no way novel. 
26. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever dif-
ferences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is 
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was 
to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."); ALExANDER 
MEIBLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNMENT 26-27 
(1948) ("The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of 
the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the 
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Democracy is a theme on which there has been a range of nor-
mative and practical variations. Thus, Part III considers the 
constitutional status of decisions to sell the market-driven mes-
sage and decisions to enlighten with speaker-driven self-
expression from the perspective of two conceptions of democ-
racy prominent in our constitutional history: republicanism and 
pluralism. The analysis from the perspective of pluralism is 
the more difficult. Because pluralism better reflects American 
political practice than does republicanism, it also provides the 
more important analytical framework. 
The third normative context rests on the proposition that 
the freedom of speech is constitutionally protected because it 
contributes to personal autonomy and fulfillment. The fourth 
normative context is provided by Congress's copyright power 
and its implications for the First Amendment's prohibition of 
laws abridging the freedom of speech. 
Consistent with conventional doctrinal notions that certain 
categories of expression are of high value warranting the fullest 
constitutional protection (such as a dissident's speech about 
public policy) and other categories of expression are of low 
value warranting little or no constitutional protection (such as 
obscenity, defamation, and fighting words), this section con-
cludes as follows: in each of these normative contexts, efforts to 
enlighten by disseminating speaker-driven self-expression are 
fundamentally valuable and warrant full protection under the 
First Amendment. In contrast, there is serious reason to ques-
tion whether entrepreneurial choices to sell the market-driven 
message as a product-in the way that many television broad-
casters might treat their programming decisions-warrant spe-
cial constitutional protection as speech. 27 Indeed, this section 
suggests that choices to create programming by anticipating 
audience tastes and to disseminate such programming for eco-
abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public is-
sues shall be decided by universal suffrage."); SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at xvii 
("My goal in this book is to evaluate the current system in light of the relation-
ship between political sovereignty and the free speech principle."); Robert H. 
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 
26 (1971) (arguing that only "explicitly and predominantly political speech" is 
entitled to constitutional protection). 
27. Cass Sunstein has addressed similar questions concerning whether 
the speech disseminated by profit-seeking broadcasters should be deemed pro-
tected by the First Amendment. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 17-19. Sun-
stein limits his analysis to a republican framework. For a discussion of Sun-
stein's analysis, and its limitations, see infra notes 175-83 and accompanying 
text. 
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nomic profit-like any other entrepreneurial production deci-
sion in a regime of "consumer sovereignty''-should be deemed 
beyond "the freedom of speech" and, therefore, unprotected by 
the First Amendment. 
Along the way, Part III confronts the most extreme argu-
ment made by proponents of laissez faire. Aaron Director and 
Ronald Coase, for example, have argued that no adequate con-
ceptual distinction can be made between the marketplace of 
ideas and the marketplace for products to justify the very dif-
ferent constitutional status accorded to individual liberty in 
each context.28 There is, they argue, a "parity'' of markets-in 
speech and property.29 Richard Epstein has built on this notion 
and has suggested that courts should just as vigorously protect 
property under the Fifth Amendment from regulation as they 
protect speech under the First Amendment.30 These are not 
arguments that transactions in the economic marketplace 
should be protected by the First Amendment as speech but that 
the liberty to engage in property transactions should be deemed 
to have the same foundational status as has the freedom of 
speech. 
These views depart radically from conventional wisdom 
about constitutional law. Conventional wisdom holds, in large 
part, that speech has been constitutionally protected because it 
is necessary for democratic self-government, that Madisonian 
majoritarianism is foundational, and that rules governing 
property are largely derivative of those democratic processes. 
Thus, transactions in property are not speech under the First 
Amendment, nor is the Fifth Amendment's protection of prop-
erty rights as rigorous as is the First Amendment's protection 
of speech rights. In short, the conventional wisdom holds that 
Lochner v. New York was fundamentally wrong, while New 
York Times v. Sullivan is essentially correct. These proposi-
tions of constitutional law span the views of scholars who oth-
erwise have very different perspectives, from Frank Michel-
man31 and Cass Sunstein32 to Raou.J Berger33 and Robert 
28. See Coase, supra note 21, at 2-8, 13-15; Aaron Director, The Parity of 
the Economic Marketplace, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-10 (1964). 
29. See Director, supra note 28, at 6. 
30. See Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 42 (1992). 
31. See Frank I. Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional 
Method, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 91, 114 (1992). Michelman sees arguments about 
the parity of speech and property arguments as "failing to take account of 
relevant differences among the ways in which various classes of liberties func-
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Bork.34 Yet, an inseparable element of this conventional wis-
dom has been the largely unexamined notion that the pro-
gramming choices of commercial television corporations should 
be protected as "editorial discretion" under the First Amend-
ment. 35 
In directly confronting this notion of broadcaster privilege, 
Part III concludes that the market theorists such as Director, 
Coase, and Epstein are correct in viewing the behavior of com-
mercial television programmers as rational profit maximizers 
in a regime of consumer sovereignty. They are wrong, however, 
about the constitutional significance of this fact. Not only is it 
true, as they acknowledge, that economic production is not 
speech under the First Amendment, but beyond this, there is 
no constitutional parity of markets. On the other hand, while 
the constitutional theorists such as Michelman and Sunstein-
as well as nearly a century of Supreme Court decisions-are 
tion in American society and what they signify." Id. 
32. Arguing that concentrations of private power in speech have changed 
the context in which the traditional dangers of government regulation of 
speech were conceived, Sunstein has suggested that government should be 
deemed free to regulate television programming, "so long as [such regulations] 
do not intrude on anything that is properly characterized as a right." 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 73. He has failed, however, to address the broad-
caster claim that their "editorial discretion" to construct and select program-
ming does amount to a right. For more on Sunstein's views about the relation-
ship between consumer sovereignty and the First Amendment, see infra note 
136; text accompanying notes 175-83. 
33. See RAOUL BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 266 (1977). Berger has 
called the Court's decision in Lochner and similar cases "usurped power in the 
economic sphere." Id. at 287. 
34. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 44-49, 168-69 (1990). On Lochner, Bork noted, 
In his 1905 Lochner opinion, Justice Peckham, defending liberty from 
what he conceived to be a "mere meddlesome interference," asked 
rhetorically, "[A]re we all ... at the mercy of legislative majorities?" 
The correct answer, where the Constitution is silent, must be "yes." 
Being "at the mercy oflegislative majorities" is merely another way of 
describing the basic American plan: representative democracy. 
Id. at 49 (footnote omitted). On Sullivan, Bork suggested that while the par-
ticular rules developed by the Court might be questioned, the general "enter-
prise" making it more difficult for public figures to maintain defamation ac-
tions was legitimate. Id. at 168-69; see Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993, 
995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Bork, J., concurring). 
35. Bork, however, might argue that commercial television programs are 
not protected, since most do not convey "expressly political" speech. See Bork, 
supra note 26, at 20. For an argument that Bork too narrowly conceives the 
definition of speech that is relevant to self-government, see infra text accom-
panying note 168. 
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correct in viewing the freedom of speech as constitutionally 
foundational, and property rights as politically derivative, they 
have failed to explore the implications of this dichotomy for the 
question of whether the programming decisions of profit-
seeking media corporations should be deemed part of "the free-
dom of speech" protected by the First Amendment. They have 
erroneously assumed that the programming decisions of com-
mercial television executives qualify as "editorial discretion" 
protected by the First Amendment. 
Precisely because product design, manufacture, and sales 
decisions in the commercial marketplace do not constitute "edi-
torial discretion" protected by the First Amendment, the pro-
gramming decisions of commercial television corporations 
should be deemed to be something quite other than "editorial 
discretion" protected by the First Amendment. 36 Thus, propo-
nents of the parity of markets should press for constitutional 
protection of commercial television programming decisions in 
the same way they press for constitutionally protecting the 
production and sales decisions of other entrepreneurs-that is, 
as a property interest under the Fifth Amendment, rather than 
as speech protected by the First Amendm~nt. 
Furthermore, those who embrace the conventional wisdom 
that denies a constitutional parity between the marketplace of 
ideas and the marketplace for products should recognize the in-
consistency in treating decisions to sell the market-driven mes-
sage as protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, from all 
four normative frameworks relevant to the First Amendment-
republican self-government, pluralist self-government, personal 
fulfillment, and Congress's copyright power-the reasons that 
Coase and Director are wrong about the constitutional "parity" 
of the marketplace of ideas and the marketplace for products 
underlie the reasons that commercial television programming 
36. This argument is unlikely to persuade the market theorists that there 
is no parity of markets. It should, however, persuade them that they are 
wrong to employ the conventional notion that television programming deci-
sions should be protected as "editorial discretion" under the First Amendment. 
Rather, these market theorists should follow through with their recognition 
that liberties in speech and in property-though of equal value-are not the 
same. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 30, at 46-47 (noting that while there are 
many issues common to both speech and property, important differences exist 
in the areas of compensation and economic concerns). Though there may be a 
"parity" of markets, the marketplace of ideas and the marketplace for products 
surely are distinguishable. Thus, their arguments for protecting the pro-
gramming discretion of commercial television corporations should be rooted in 
Fifth Amendment property, rather than in First Amendment speech. 
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decisions should be understood as ordinary property rights, not 
part of "the freedom of speech." 
Part N explores how a denial-or dilution-of protection 
for the entrepreneurially motivated dissemination of the mar-
ket-driven message might, despite real difficulties, be imple-
mented. For example, how could a court adjudicate a challenge 
to a measure requiring broadcasters to provide free television 
time to political candidates? Should an actor who disseminates 
material for mixed purposes-partially entrepreneurial and 
partially pedagogical-be deemed protected by the First 
Amendment? How could a court determine whether an actor 
disseminated material primarily as a market-driven message 
for sale or a speaker-driven message for enlightenment? This 
section cautions that a court should not lightly conclude that 
one who claims the protection of the First Amendment was, in 
fact, engaged in market-driven entrepreneurial activity and, 
therefore, is not entitled to constitutional protection of his "edi-
torial discretion." Rather, the government should bear a heavy 
burden of proving that a First Amendment claimant was acting 
predominantly as an entrepreneur in selling a market-driven 
message. The section suggests five indicia for proving this fact 
in the television programming context. 
Part V explores the implications of the "market-driven 
message principle" for regulations of violence and "indecency" 
in commercial television. If decisions to sell the market-driven 
message are deemed not part of "the freedom of speech," should 
the government be deemed free to engage in content-motivated 
regulation of such entrepreneurial activity?37 This is an impor-
tant question, and the answer here is a contingent no.38 
37. Part V also addresses broader cultural critiques of commercial televi-
sion and the First Amendment. See, e.g., RONALD KL. COLLINS & DAVID M. 
SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 205-16 (1996) (discussing a "cultural ap-
proach" to the First Amendment that discards "deliberate lies" and "Madison-
ian principles" for the unrestrained conventions of popular culture); Ronald 
Collins & David Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers, 68 
TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (1990) (noting that "[p]ublic discourse is increasingly 
taking a distinctive and aestheticized form consistent with the look and feel of 
commercial television"). For further discussion of the Collins and Skover cul-
tural critique, see infra Part V.B. 
38. Indeed, the import of my analysis concerns the propriety of asserting 
personal rights under the First Amendment's freedom of speech-the right to 
exercise "editorial discretion." If the government requires a commercial televi-
sion station to provide air time for a politician to express her views, or for a 
concerned member of the community to express his, should one view the sta-
tion's rights to engage in the freedom of speech as having been infringed? 
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Unlike current doctrine, the analysis presented in this Ar-
ticle does not depend on physical characteristics (such as 
bandwidth scarcity) of the technologies for transacting com-
merce in entertainment--whether broadcast television, cable 
television, the internet, or technologies yet to be developed. 39 
Rather, the analysis focuses on the nature of human choices.40 
Should such a regulation be deemed to violate the Supreme Court's prohibi-
tion, laid out in Buckley v. Valeo, against laws that "restrict the speech of some 
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others"? 424 
U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam). A regulation displacing one actor's commercial 
activity with another actor's speech-for a content-neutral purpose of promot-
ing the freedom of speech-would be permissible. In contrast, a regulation 
displacing one actor's market-driven message motivated by governmental dis-
approval of the ideas contained in that message would be impermissible-not 
because the regulation intrudes on the personal First Amendment rights of the 
regulated entrepreneur but because of prophylactic concerns about govern-
mental domination as a participant in the marketplace of ideas. See discus-
sion infra Part V .A. 
39. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-400 (1969) 
(upholding the bandwidth scarcity rationale for distinguishing electronic and 
print media in First Amendment analysis); see also COLLINS & SKOVER, supra 
note 37, at 73-81 (focusing on differences in \:Ommunication by picture versus 
communication by written word). 
Furthermore, unlike other critiques of doctrines that accord First 
Amendment protection to the broadcast media, this Article's analysis does not 
depend on making value judgments about the quality of ideas disseminated on 
television or through other media. Cf. Collins & Skover, supra note 37, at 
1097-104; Martin H. Redish, Killing the First Amendment with Kindness: A 
Troubled Reaction to Collins and Skover, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1147, 1149-50 (1990) 
("[M]uch of television's programming is not designed to 'appeal to the viewer's 
higher intellectual interests. But for almost every My Mother the Car there 
has been a Masterpiece Theater . ... mf a governmental body were to under-
take such a screening process of the content of the electronic media, no logical 
grounds would exist for failing to give identical treatment to the print me-
dia."). Rather, this Article's analysis is concerned with whether an actor has 
intended to persuade others with his own ideas or simply to sell to others that 
which they desire. 
40. In this regard, technologies for dissemination might be legally rele-
vant not as categorical determinants of regulatory discretion, but as contex-
tual indicia that a First Amendment claimant was, or was not, predominantly 
engaged in entrepreneurial choices to sell market-driven messages. Further-
more, the technologies used by the disseminators, and the consumption habits 
of the public, may serve as contextual indicia of whether particular govern-
mental attempts to regulate "editorial discretion" are undertaken for permis-
sible purposes or simply to censor ideas that regulators find offensive. 
Commercial television, whether broadcast or cable, may be unique, both 
in the extent to which programming decisions can be proved to be rooted in 
entrepreneurial motives to sell market-driven messages, and in the extent to 
which it represents a context in which government may well have legitimate 
reasons for intruding upon "editorial discretion." The viewing habits of the 
public render television (at least for now) the best means of effective commu-
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Indeed, although this Article focuses on the constitutional 
status of commercial television programming decisions, its en-
terprise rests on more fundamental concerns. It reflects con-
cerns that the freedom of speech not be obscured and over-
whelmed by an increasingly pervasive commerce in 
entertainment-that our constitutional law identify and main-
tain clear principles to distinguish choices and activities that 
warrant special constitutional protection as "speech" from those 
which, superficially, might look like "speech," but have a fun-
damentally different nature. This is important not only for law 
itself but also for maintaining a clearer cultural sense of the hi-
erarchy of values in the American constitutional tradition. 
Legal categories require definition. This is no less true for 
the First Amendment's category of "speech" than for any other. 
The unexamined assumption that anything spoken, anything 
written, anything painted, photographed, recorded, or filmed, 
whether or not distributed, and no matter why distributed, is 
entitled to special constitutional solicitude as speech obscures 
essential distinctions that ought to be made. This is a time in 
which Americans are so much more engaged in the consump-
tion of products than they were when the First Amendment 
was framed. It is also a time in which Americans, having un-
precedented leisure time, are more than ever engaged in the 
consumption of products for entertainment. Because we are 
thinking beings, much of our entertainment involves words, 
pictures, and other vehicles for triggering thoughts that the 
consumer wishes to experience. With this demand for enter-
tainment comes entrepreneurial choices to respond-to provide 
the products that people want. 
In suggesting that like other entrepreneurial choices, deci-
sions to sell market-driven messages do not warrant vigorous 
protection as part of "the freedom of speech," this Article does 
not argue that commercial television programs are necessarily 
unworthy, or dangerous, or that they should be subject to any 
particular sort of regulation. From the perspective of the 
healthy respect accorded to free and vigorous commerce 
throughout our political history, the profit-motivated choices 
that producers make to satisfy market demand are generally to 
nication. Regulations displacing commercial programming with speech by 
candidates or other concerned members of the public can well be understood 
as pursuing the legitimate purpose of enhancing the freedom of speech by in-
creasing the amount of speech available to the public. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 267-70. 
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be celebrated. Those who argue that media corporations should 
remain free to make whatever programming decisions they 
wish, to maximize viewer utility in a regime of consumer sover-
eignty, would remain fully free to make this policy argument, 
and to win the day in political competition. 
But from the more demanding perspective that must iden-
tify choices warranting special constitutional protection, the 
Article suggests that decisions to sell the market-driven mes-
sage-like other entrepreneurial choices in the regime of con-
sumer sovereignty-do not .warrant protection as speech. In-
deed, the worth of commerce in entertainment comprised of 
pictures or words-like the worth of commerce in other prod-
ucts-should be more freely debated, and determined politi-
cally, by people engaging in speech that is of special constitu-
tional significance-the expression and exchange of their 
personal views for the purposes of forging agreement, identify-
ing disagreement, and providing mutual understanding. 
I. TELEVISION PROGRAMMING DECISIONS AS PART OF 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S "FREEDOM OF SPEECH": 
THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW 
A. IN CONGRESS AND THE FCC: 
"EDITORIAL DISCRETION" AND THE "FAIRNESS DOCTRINE" 
The fairness doctrine consisted of two components. First, 
broadcasters were required to present discussion of public is-
sues. Second, the discussion of public issues presented was to 
be balanced.41 Television broadcasters opposed the require-
ments by arguing that their programming decisionmaking in-
volves the exercise of "editorial discretion" protected by the 
First Amendment.42 During the mid-1980s, when the FCC was 
considering whether the fairness doctrine should be repealed, 
broadcasters repeated arguments they made twenty years ear-
41. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 378 (1969). 
42. In Red Lion, broadcasters challenged the fairness doctrine on the 
grounds that 
the First Amendment protects their desire to use their allotted fre-
quencies continuously to broadcast whatever they choose, and to ex-
clude whomever they choose from ever using that frequency. No man 
may be prevented from saying or publishing what he thinks, or from 
refusing in his speech or other utterances to give equal weight to the 
views ofhis opponents. 
Id. at386. 
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lier in Red Lion. The FCC noted that ''broadcasters perceive 
that the fairness doctrine involves significant burdens"43-in 
particular, intrusions on the broadcasters' programming discre-
tion.44 
Minority voices within the FCC had long decried the doc-
trine's intrusion on the editorial discretion of broadcasters and 
the resulting abridgement of First Amendment values. In 
1964, for example, the FCC scrutinized a local television sta-
tion in Oregon for failing to provide for "balanced program-
ming." Two Commissioners objected to the inquiry: 
The Commission is clearly making a choice between competing in-
terests and values. Presumed quality and "balance" of television pro-
gramming is one choice and preservation of a wider area of freedom of 
expression for the broadcaster is the other .... mfthe principle is es-
tablished that the Commission has the right and power to prescribe, 
either directly or indirectly, the kind and quality of programs that 
must be carried by broadcast licensees, then the vital interests of so-
ciety, the nation, and perhaps the world, in the fullest freedom of 
communications and the expression of ideas, in whatever form, may 
be compromised .... A lack of satisfying programs on television would 
be a small price to pay for the maintenance of the fullest freedom of 
communications and the unimpaired vigor of those private rights 
which thinkers from Milton, Jefferson, and Mill to the present Su-
preme Court have declared to be fundamental to the existence and 
preservation of a free and democratic society.45 
These dissenting views prevailed in the 1980s as the FCC 
justified repeal of the fairness doctrine in significant part be-
cause of concerns for the "editorial discretion" of broadcasters. 
Although the FCC expressed concern about both prongs of the 
doctrine, it was more concerned with the requirement that 
broadcasters provide balanced coverage of public issues than 
the obligation to present discussion of public issues. The re-
quirement of balanced coverage could inhibit the choice to pre-
sent discussion of controversial public issues, on the supposi-
tion that some broadcasters would prefer to say nothing about 
43. Report, In the Matter of Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commis-
sion's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obli-
gations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 159 (1985) (emphasis omit-
ted, citations omitted, capitalization altered) [hereinafter Report]. 
44. See id. at 163-64 ("[U]pon a finding that a licensee has violated the 
fairness doctrine, we order the broadcaster to provide additional program-
ming .... Since broadcast time is a valuable resource, such a requirement im-
poses costs upon the licensee. In order to avoid these costs, a broadcaster may 
be inhibited from presenting more than a minimal amount of controversial is-
sue programming."). 
45. In re Lee Roy McCourry, 2 R.R.2d 895, 907 (1964) (Loevinger, J., dis-
senting). 
2000] SELLING THE MARKET-DRNEN MESSAGE 469 
a public issue than to provide a balanced presentation of that 
issue. "A licensee may be inhibited from presenting controver-
sial issues of public importance by operation of the fairness doc-
trine even though the first prong of that doctrine affirmatively 
requires the licensee to broadcast such issues."46 
The FCC was less concerned about the requirement to dis-
cuss public issues, but only because this obligation had never 
been vigorously enforced. "[W]ith respect to the affirmative ob-
ligation to cover controversial issues of public importance, '[a] 
presumption of compliance exists.' ... Indeed, a United States 
Court of Appeals has characterized this requirement as one 
which is 'not extensive and [can be] met by presenting a mini-
mum of controversial subject matter.'"47 The FCC explicitly re-
jected more vigorous enforcement of the affirmative coverage 
requirement as a solution to the "chill" caused by the balanced 
coverage requirement, because the resulting intrusion on the 
"editorial discretion" of broadcasters would be exacerbated: 
We do not believe that more stringent enforcement of the first prong 
would be an appropriate remedial response to the existence of a "chill-
ing effect[.]" Indeed, such an approach increases the severity of major 
detriments associated with the fairness doctrine. For example, con-
trary to the principles of the First Amendment, a stricter regulatory 
approach would increase the government's intrusion into the editorial 
decision making process of [broadcasters]. 48 
It is important to note the type of "editorial discretion" af-
fected by each prong of the fairness doctrine. The obligation of 
balanced coverage intrudes on broadcasters' discretion when 
they do choose to present discussion of public issues. It affects 
how a broadcaster chooses to cover a public issue. The obliga-
tion of affirmative coverage intrudes on the programming dis-
cretion of broadcasters only if they otherwise would not present 
discussion of public issues.49 It affects whether a broadcaster 
chooses to present discussion of a controversial public issue or 
to present another type of programming. Thus, in rejecting a 
more stringent application of the affirmative requirement to 
cover public issues, which could have been imposed without the 
requirement of balanced coverage, the FCC elevated as consti-
tutionally protected "editorial discretion" a .decision whether to 
46. Report, supra note 43, at 159. 
47. Id. at 160 (citations omitted). 
48. Inquiry into §73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations 
Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 
58 R.R.2d 1137, 1152 n.66 (1985). 
49. Id. at 1151. 
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present a program discussing the state of inner city schools or 
to present a soap opera or a situation comedy. 
Although both houses of Congress voted to codify the fair-
ness doctrine in The Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987,50 
concerns about the "editorial discretion" of broadcasters ulti-
mately prevailed. President Reagan vetoed the bill. In his veto 
message, the President said that the fairness doctrine amounts 
to the "content-based regulation by the Federal Government" of 
speech and is, therefore, "antagonistic to the freedom of expres-
sion guaranteed by the First Amendment."51 He viewed the 
doctrine as an effort to "polic[e] the editorial judgment of jour-
nalists" that would be "unthinkable" if applied "[i]n any other 
medium besides broadcasting'':52 
[W]e must not ignore the obvious intent of the First Amendment, 
which is to promote vigorous public debate and a diversity of view-
points in the public forum .... History has shown that the dangers of 
an overly timid or biased press cannot be averted through bureau-
cratic regulation, but only through the freedom and competition that 
the First Amendment sought to guarantee. S. 742 ... is, in my judg-
ment, unconstitutional. Well-intentioned as S. 742 may be, it would 
be inconsistent with the First Amendment and with the American 
tradition of independent journalism.53 
This point presupposes that a decision to produce and broad-
cast an episode of Bosom Buddies rather than an expose on 
malpractice in breast cancer detection involves the exercise of 
journalistic discretion in a context of public debate. 
B. IN THE SUPREME COURT: 
"EDITORIAL DISCRETION" AND ''MUST-CARRY" REQUIREMENTS 
In Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, the Supreme Court con-
sidered a challenge to portions of the Cable Television Con-
sumer Protection and Competition Act of 199254 requiring cable 
broadcasters to carry certain local broadcast stations. Cable 
system operators claimed that these "must-carry rules" in-
fringed their freedom of speech by intruding on their protected 
"editorial discretion" and "journalistic discretion" to decide 
50. S. 742, lOOth Cong. (1987). 
51. President's Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the 
Fairness in Broadcasting Bill, 1 RONALD REAGAN, PUB. PAPERS 690, 690-91 
(June 19, 1987) (1989). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 690-91. 
54. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992). 
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what speech is carried through their lines and what speech is 
not. 
The controversy first reached the Supreme Court when the 
Turner Broadcasting System appealed the District Court's de-
cision granting the government's motion for summary judg-
ment. The Court vacated the District Court's judgment in 
Turner 155 on the ground that issues of material fact remained 
unresolved in the record and remanded the case for further 
proceedings. 
The controversy next reached the Supreme Court after the 
District Court again granted the government's motion for 
summary judgment based on additional fact finding. In Turner 
JJ56, the Court found that summary judgment for the govern-
ment was appropriate and affirmed the district court's decision. 
In both cases, members of the Court disagreed about 
whether the challenged provisions of the Act were content-
neutral or content-based and, therefore, about the appropriate 
burden of proof under the First Amendment. Although the 
government ultimately prevailed, all members of the Court did 
agree that the regulations in question intruded on the cable 
broadcasters' "editorial discretion" protected by the First 
Amendment and, therefore, imposed on the government a spe-
cial burden of justification. 
In Turner I, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, 
Thomas, and Ginsburg, stated the following: 
There can be no disagreement on an initial premise: Cable program-
mers and cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are 
entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the 
First Amendment. . . . Through "original programming or by ex-
ercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to in-
clude in its repertoire," cable programmers and operators "see[k) to 
communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide vari-
ety of formats." By requiring cable systems to set-aside a portion of 
their channels for local broadcasters, the must-carry rules regulate 
cable speech in two respects: The rules reduce the number of channels 
over which cable operators exercise unfettered control, and they ren-
der it more difficult for cable programmers to compete for carriage on 
the limited channels remaining.57 
55. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
56. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
57. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 636-37 (1994) (citations omitted); see also 
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991) ("Cable television provides to its 
subscribers news, information, and entertainment. It is engaged in 'speech' 
under the First Amendment, and is, in much of its operation, part of the 
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These Justices rooted their view of First Amendment rights 
largely in the notion that speech is protected because it is es-
sential for democratic self-government. ss 
Justice Stevens did not join this part of the Court's opinion 
in Turner I, but not because he disagreed with the premise that 
a broadcaster's decisions about what programs to carry are con-
stitutionally protected as part of the freedom of speech. He 
noted, 
[t]he must-carry obligations may be broader than necessary to protect 
vulnerable broadcasters, but that alone would not be enough to dem-
onstrate that they violate the First Amendment. Thus, for instance, 
to the extent that §§ 4 and 5 obligate cable operators to carry broad-
casters they would have carried even in the absence of a statutory ob-
ligation, any impairment of operators' freedom of choice, or on cable 
programmers' ability to secure carriage, would be negligible.59 
Stevens thus implicitly acknowledges that when the regulation 
does require a cable operator to carry programming it other-
wise would not carry, the government would be intruding on 
the operator's "freedom of choice" protected by the First 
Amendment. 
Justice Breyer was not involved in Turner I. In Turner II, 
however, he stated, 
I do not deny that the compulsory carriage that creates the "guaran-
tee" extracts a serious First Amendment price. It interferes with the 
protected interests of the cable operators to choose their own pro-
gramming; it prevents displaced cable program providers from obtain-
ing an audience; and it will sometimes prevent some cable viewers 
from watching what, in its absence, would have been their preferred 
set of programs. This "price" amounts to a "suppression ofspeech."60 
Breyer viewed these interests of the cable providers, and the 
interests of the local broadcasters that Congress was seeking to 
protect, as rooted in a policy that "seeks to facilitate the public 
discussion and informed deliberation, which . . . democratic 
'press.'"). Although the Court was talking about cable programmers and 
broadcasters in particular, it is clear that it views the programming and 
transmission activities of television broadcasters as "speech" protected by the 
First Amendment. 
58. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641 ("At the heart of the First Amendment 
lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the 
ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our 
political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal."). 
59. Id. at 673 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (emphasis added). 
60. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 226 (1997). 
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government presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to 
achieve."61 
As the Court found the "editorial discretion" of cable opera-
tors protected by the First Amendment, it has found the pro-
gramming decisions of broadcast television stations and net-
works to be part of "the freedom of speech" as well. In CBS u. 
FCC,62 for example, the Court considered whether the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) violated congressional in-
tent or the First Amendment by ordering television broadcast 
networks to carry, against their will, a paid political advertise-
ment for President Carter's reelection. All three major televi-
sion networks argued that the FCC had "violate[d] the First 
Amendment rights of broadcasters by unduly circumscribing 
their editorial discretion."63 In particular, the networks were 
concerned about the "disruption of regular programming" 
caused by the Carter-Mondale campaign request and "the po-
tential equal time requests from rival candidates."64 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court accepted that 
the broadcasters had a constitutionally protected interest in 
exercising "editorial discretion" over programming decisions, 
but reasoned that such rights had to be weighed against com-
peting public interests which themselves had constitutional 
magnitude. He noted that "[a]lthough the broadcasting indus-
try is entitled . . . to exercise the widest journalistic freedom 
consistent with its public [duties], ... it is the right of the view-
ers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is 
paramount."65 Because broadcast media are characterized by a 
61. Id. at 227. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Ginsburg, began with the premise that "[t]he must-carry requirements ... 
burden an operator's First Amendment freedom to exercise unfettered control 
over a number of channels in its system, whether or not the operator's present 
choice is aligned with that of the Government." Id. at 250; see also Leathers v. 
Medlock, 499 U.S. at 444 ("Cable television provides to its subscribers news, 
information, and entertainment. It is engaged in 'speech' under the First 
Amendment, and is, in much of its operation, part of the 'press.'"); City of Los 
Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) 
("Through original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over 
which stations or programs to include in its repertoire, respondent seeks to 
communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety of 
formats."); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979) (stating that 
cable operators have "a significant amount of editorial discretion regarding 
what their programming will include"). 
62. 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
63. Id. at 394. 
64. Id. at 393. 
65. Id. at 395 (quotations and citations omitted). 
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physical scarcity that precludes many who wish to speak from 
doing so, and because some regulation of the use of broadcast 
frequencies is necessary to prevent chaotic cacophony, the 
Court has held that Congress has greater discretion to impinge 
upon the protected rights of broadcasters than it does with re-
spect to other speakers66_including, for example, cable televi-
sion operators. 67 Whatever the merits of the analysis based on 
the physical characteristics of broadcast media, 68 the important 
point for present purposes is the Court's point of departure: 
when television broadcasters make programming decisions, 
they are exercising "editorial discretion" or 'journalistic discre-
tion" protected by the First Amendment.69 
66. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969). 
67. See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
68. The free-market theorists have lodged a devastating attack on the 
proposition that broadcast television should be subject to different First 
Amendment rules than are other media based on physical characteristics of 
the broadcast spectrum. See, e.g., BEVIER, supra note 14, at 21-28 (arguing 
that scarcity "does not support the broad proposition for which it is most com-
monly advanced"); KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 10, at 203 (noting that 
the Court's distinctions between broadcasting and print media are criticized 
extensively by modern commentators); POSNER, supra note 14, at 672-74 (de-
scribing the Court's scarcity justification for distinguishing between broadcast 
and print media as "economic nonsense"); Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitu-
tionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1007-28 (1989) (ex-
amining and criticizing the various rationales that have been posited for pro-
viding less First Amendment protection to broadcasters than to print media). 
The Court might well find that the circumstances of broadcast technology to-
day are so different from those prevailing when Red Lion was decided that it 
would no longer invoke the notice of spectrum scarcity for evaluating the con-
stitutionality of new intrusions on the programming discretion of broadcast-
ers. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
69. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. u. Tornillo, the Court invalidated a 
Florida statute that imposed criminal penalties on newspaper editors who 
failed to provide a right of reply to candidates for public office after attacking 
the "personal character" of those candidates. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Court 
said that "we reaffirm unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial judg-
ment .... Any such a compulsion to publish that which reason tells [newspa-
pers] should not be published is unconstitutional." Id. at 255-56 (quotations 
omitted). Furthermore, 
[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions 
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and 
treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or un-
fair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has 
yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial 
process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees 
of a free press as they have evolved to this time. 
Id. at258. 
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Justice White, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, 
dissented from the Court's decision upholding the FCC's intru-
sion on the programming preferences of the three major broad-
cast networks. Justice White was convinced that Congress had 
not intended to authorize the FCC to impose on broadcasters' 
discretion in this way. In his view, Congress wished '"to leave 
broad journalistic discretion with the licensee."'70 "'[T]he policy 
of the Act [was] to preserve editorial control of programming in 
the licensee."'71 White found these congressional policies rooted 
in the First Amendment itself: 
These policies have been so clear and are so obviously grounded in 
constitutional considerations that in the absence of unequivocal leg-
islative intent to the contrary, it should not be assumed that 
§ 312(a)(7) was designed to make the kind of substantial inroads in 
these basic considerations that the Commission has now mandated.72 
Thus, expressing concern with the potential for a "substantial 
disruption of regular programming,"73 Justice White found 
that the FCC's regulation of the programming discretion of 
television broadcasters intruded upon their constitutionally 
protected "journalistic discretion" and that Congress had not 
intended to authorize the FCC to tread around or beyond these 
boundaries of constitutional permissibility.74 
C. DOCTRINAL CONSEQUENCES OF VIEWING TELEVISION 
PROGRAMMING DECISIONS AS NOT PART OF "THE FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH": A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION 
Turner and CBS indicate that even if programming deci-
sions are viewed as "editorial discretion" protected as part of 
the "freedom of speech," the government is not entirely pre-
cluded from requiring television networks to carry materials 
they otherwise would not present. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the matter is without doctrinal significance. CBS 
was decided within the Red Lion framework. Broadcasters' 
protected editorial discretion was subordinated to the rights of 
the audience, which the Court deemed to be amplified by the 
scarcity of available broadcast frequencies. Yet, the scarcity ra-
70. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 400 (1981) (quoting CBS, Inc. v. 
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973)). 
71. Id. at 401 (quoting FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 705 
(1979)). 
72. Id. at 402. 
73. Id. at 415. 
7 4. See id. at 418. 
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tionale for according a different constitutional status to the 
regulation of broadcasters has itself come under withering at-
tack. 75 Turner was decided by a Court that had not yet deter-
mined-as it still has not-whether the speech interests of ca-
ble television providers are more like those of television 
broadcasters or newspaper publishers or, for that matter, 
whether broadcasters will continue to be accorded a different 
constitutional status than are newspaper editors. 
Indeed, the Court has invalidated regulations requiring 
newspapers to carry content contrary to their own editorial 
preferences. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, a 
newspaper challenged a Florida statute requiring it to publish 
a response from a political candidate whose "personal charac-
ter" the newspaper had attacked. Florida endeavored to justify 
the statute based on arguments similar to those underlying the 
fairness doctrine.76 
The Court determined that this statute intruded into the 
"editorial judgment" of the newspaper,77 which is at the core of 
the First Amendment's protections. Chief Justice Burger's 
opinion for the Court declared that any "compulsion exerted by 
government on a newspaper to print that which it would not 
otherwise print"-any compulsion "to publish that which rea-
son tells them should not be published"-is unconstitutional.78 
Burger found this principle determinative regardless of 
whether the regulation had the effect of displacing material the 
newspaper otherwise would have published or of requiring the 
newspaper simply to print more material than it otherwise 
would have published. 
Assuming the first scenario, not only is the newspaper re-
quired to carry what it does not want to carry, it is prevented 
from presenting material that it does want to present. Assum-
ing the second scenario, "[e]ven if a newspaper would face no 
additional costs to comply with a compulsory access law,"79 it is 
simply the right of a speaker not to speak that is infringed. 
Chief Justice Burger and the Court determined that this aspect 
75. See supra note 68. 
76. Florida argued that newspapers broadly influence public opinion, that 
they have become big business controlled by relatively few wealthy corpora-
tions, and that access to these vehicles for effective communication is severely 
restricted. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247-255 (1974). 
77. Id. at 256. 
78. Id. (quotations omitted). 
79. Id. at 258. 
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of constitutionally protected "editorial discretion" was suffi-
ciently significant to warrant invalidation of the Florida stat-
ute: 
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, 
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a news-
paper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and con-
tent of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-
whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and 
judgment.80 
In contrast with such solicitous concern for a newspaper's 
right not to publish "that which reason tells them should not be 
published," the Court has been virtually dismissive of the claim 
that property owners who were engaged not in speech, but in 
commerce, have a right protected by the First Amendment to 
exclude speakers from their property. In Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robins,81 shopping mall owners challenged an inter-
pretation of the California Constitution requiring them to per-
mit access for those who wish to engage in "speech and petition-
ing." The property owners argued that their freedom of speech 
under the First Amendment had been abridged because they 
had been "forced by the State to use [their] property as a forum 
for the speech of others."82 They based their argument, in part, 
on Tornillo. The Court rejected this argument out of hand, not-
ing that Tornillo "rests on the principle that the State cannot 
tell a newspaper what it must print .... The statute was found 
to be an 'intrusion into the function of editors.' These concerns 
obviously are not present here.''83 
The Court has been struggling to determine whether cable 
television providers should be treated more like television 
broadcasters (that is, pursuant to Red Lion, subject to more 
regulation of editorial discretion under a broadcast spectrum 
scarcity rationale) or like newspaper publishers (that is, pursu-
ant to Tornillo, subject, at most, to de minimus regulation of 
editorial discretion under a traditional speaker's discretion ra-
tionale). Indeed, three members of the Court have declared 
that cable television should be accorded the First Amendment 
rights of newspapers. 84 Justice Thomas, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia finally resolved for themselves 
80. Id. 
81. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
82. Id. at 85. 
83. Id. at 88 (quoting Tomillo, 418 U.S. at 258). 
84. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 
814 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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the status of cable television providers and aligned their First 
Amendment rights with those of newspapers: 
The Red Lion standard does not apply to cable television. . . . In 
Turner, by adopting much of the print paradigm, and by rejecting Red 
Lion, we adopted with it a considerable body of precedent that gov-
erns the respective First Amendment rights of competing speakers. 
In Red Lion, we had legitimized consideration of the public interest 
and emphasized the rights of viewers, at least in the abstract. Under 
that view, "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right 
of the broadcasters, which is paramount." After Turner, however, 
that view can no longer be given any credence in the cable context. It 
is the operator's right that is preeminent.85 
In determining that Pruneyard was inapplicable to regulatory 
intrusions on the programming discretion of cable operators, 
Thomas noted that "we permitted California's compelled access 
rule only because it did not burden or conflict with the mall 
owner's own speech."86 Thus, for Thomas, Rehnquist, and 
Scalia, the cable operator's constitutionally protected editorial 
discretion to choose programming was to be determined by ref-
erence to the rights of newspaper editors as conceived in Torn-
illo. 
At the same time, the FCC has determined that the physi-
cal scarcity rationale may no longer be applicable to broadcast-
ing, or persuasive even if applicable, and that perhaps even 
television broadcasters should be understood as possessing con-
stitutionally protected editorial discretion akin to that enjoyed 
by newspaper publishers. 87 Members of the Court have at least 
intimated as much, recognizing how quickly telecommunica-
tions technologies are changing and the potential need for doc-
trinal adjustments in response to technological evolution. 88 
85. Id. at 815-16 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390). 
86. Id. at 820 n.5. 
87. In determining that the fairness doctrine should be repealed, the FCC 
rejected the notion that scarcity of broadcast frequencies justifies intruding on 
a broadcaster's "editorial discretion." The FCC determined that the availabil-
ity of cable television, satellite television, newspapers, and other information 
sources together "provid[e] the public with suitable access to the marketplace 
of ideas so as to render the fairness doctrine unnecessary." In the Matter of 
Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Con-
cerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 
F.C.C.2d 142, 197 (1985). Even without viewing broadcast television in con-
text with other forms of television and print information sources, the develop-
ment of digital broadcast television could itself destroy the scarcity rationale 
for diluted protection for the "editorial discretion" of broadcasters. 
88. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter, de-
clined to identify a standard of review in a challenge to provisions of the Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. These provi-
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Given the attack on the rationales for treating broadcast televi-
sion differently from other technologies for communication, the 
day may soon come when the Court determines that not only 
cable television, but broadcast television as well, should be 
given the same protection under the First Amendment as news-
paper publishers. 89 
The analysis to be presented in this Article develops a per-
spective with doctrinal consequences for the protection of tele-
vision programmers that move in the opposite direction. The 
analysis will not depend on the technological characteristics of 
the medium at issue. Rather, it will depend on the nature of 
human choices as they relate to constitutional norms. 
The following sections will explore the following proposi-
tion: television networks-whether broadcast or cable-to the 
extent that they are acting as entrepreneurs responding to the 
economic market forces of consumer sovereignty should be 
viewed as not possessing the First Amendment rights of edito-
rial discretion akin to those of traditional newspaper editors. 
Rather, such television networks should be viewed as possess-
ing rights akin to those of Pruneyard's shopping center own-
ers-that is, property owners engaged not in speech, but in 
commerce, who wish to maintain control of their property for 
commercial rather than for communicative reasons. 
II. TELEVISION PROGRAMMING DECISIONS AND 
CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY 
We have used [the First Amendment] for the protection of private, 
possessive interests with which it has no concern. It is misinterpreta-
tions such as this which, in our use of the radio, the moving picture, 
sions permitted cable operators to refuse to carry "patently offensive" sexual 
programs on their public access channels. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Con-
stortium, 518 U.S. at 738. These four Justices determined that it would be 
"unwise" and "premature" to choose a "specific set of [doctrinal] words now," 
because '"[t]he broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change; 
solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those accept-
able today may be outmoded ten years hence.'" Id. at 738-42 (quoting CBS v. 
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)). Reluctance, based on tech-
nological change, to identify a doctrinal approach to adjudicating the constitu-
tionality of regulations of the cable industry applies as well to maintaining a 
decades-old doctrinal approach to adjudicating the constitutionality of regula-
tions of the broadcast industry. Indeed, Justice Breyer specifically referred to 
the dynamic nature of broadcasting, even though the case at hand involved 
regulation of cable operators. 
89. See, e.g., KRA'ITENMAKER & POWE, supra note 10, at 55; POSNER, su-
pra note 14, at 672-74; Spitzer, supra note 68, at 1007-28. 
480 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:451 
the newspaper and other forms of publication, are giving the name 
"freedoms" to the most flagrant enslavements of our minds and wills. 
-Alexander Meiklejohn90 
It [is] time to move away from thinking about broadcasters as trus-
tees. It [is] time to treat them the way almost everyone else in society 
does-that is, as businesses. [T]elevision is just another appliance. 
It's a toaster with pictures. 
-Then-FCC Chairman Mark Fowler91 
A. A TAXONOMY OF ACTORS IN THE DISSEMINATION OF 
TELEVISION PROGRAMMING 
Many people are involved in the ultimate dissemination of 
television programming: writers, directors, camera operators, 
actors, producers, editors, and the corporate executives who de-
cide which programs to order and to put on the air.92 The 
writer might conceive her role as artist. She might seek to ex-
press her view of truth, or beauty, or an ugly reality. So might 
the directors, the camera, lighting, and sound technicians, the 
actors, and the producers. There may be countless creative 
production teams, all endeavoring to create some version of 
truth through television programming as an art form. 
Many, however, do not. Muriel Cantor has studied the 
ways in which television producers choose story lines and has 
considered the extent to which these actors seek to please their 
own sense of creativity, their sense of what the viewing audi-
ence wants, or their sense of what the television networks and 
advertisers want. She concludes that "[w]hen selecting content, 
producers have to consider the organizations who finance and 
control the series, the craft groups who work alongside them, as 
well as the viewing audience."93 Cantor notes that while "it 
is ... possible that [some] television producers make decisions 
with only their own aesthetic standards as reference points, "94 
other "creators make decisions based both on what the network 
90. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 104-05. 
91. Then-FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, justifying the repeal of the fair-
ness doctrine regulations, quoted in SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 49 (footnote 
omitted). 
92. MURIEL G. CANTOR, THE HOLLYWOOD TV PRODUCER: HIS WORK AND 
HIS AUDIENCE 92 (1983). 
93. Id. at 38. 
94. Id. at 31-32. 
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officials want and on their own intuitive judgment of what the 
audience wants."95 
Indeed, in the end, the goals and purposes of producers, 
writers, and other "creative" participants are of practical ir-
relevance for determining the content of the television pro-
gramming that is actually presented to the viewing public. 
These are relatively powerless players-at the mercy of those 
who select which programs to carry-much as is the ordinary 
citizen who herself might wish to say something to the nation 
but who cannot gain access to the broadcast signal or cable. 
The discretion of the television programmer impinges upon the 
"creative" participants' interests, or serves their interests, de-
pending on what "editorial" choices the programmer makes in 
service of the media corporation's :ri.eeds.96 Indeed, the fairness 
95. Id. at 29; see also Jaime Wolf, The Blockbuster Script Factory, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1998 (Magazine), at 32, 35. Wolf describes "the blockbuster 
way of thinking" in movie production. From this perspective, 
a script is far less a literary or an imaginative undertaking than it is 
a business plan for a start-up company that requires some ... $100 
million in initial capitalizaj;ion. In essence, studios are investment 
banks that specialize in financing this kind of venture; their execu-
tives are experts in evaluating such plans in terms of particular ele-
ments that are thought to guarantee a good return. 
Id. As for other expensive and complex manufacturing enterpnses, there is a 
specialization and division of function in writing these blockbusters. "Screen-
writers who labor to get a movie green-lighted merely stand at the head of a 
conveyor belt designed by producers and studios to precision-tool hits, sending 
their scripts along for subsequent handling by a small army of additional writ-
ers," each one with a different specific skill and function. Id. at 32. 
96. Gitlin describes the structure and players involved in the television 
programming process: 
Each network contains an entertainment division, within which there 
are development departments for drama, comedy, and movies for 
television. They plant ideas for shows with producers, or with the 
major suppliers-studios and production companies-who hire the 
right producers and writers for the project; · and they take ideas-
"pitches" -directly from writers and producers. 
TODD GITLIN, INSIDE PRIME TIME 20 (1983). And he describes the principle by 
which they determine what shows to produce: "If they think the characters, 
the relationships, and the premises will resonate with a mass audience, they 
underwrite a script." Id. 
The television programmer chooses among countless programming options 
in a highly selective way. The television programmer, and the higher execu-
tives to which the programmer is accountable, evaluate some three thousand 
program ideas per year. From those three thousand ideas, she will order one 
hundred scripts. Among those scripts, twenty-five pilots might be produced. 
Among those pilots, five or ten might be selected for produced and broadcast-
ing. And among those new productions, one or two might be renewed for an-
other season. Id. at 20-21; see also CANTOR, supra note 92, at 32 ("If a pro-
ducer is successful it may be that his choices are in agreement with a number 
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doctrine, the cable must-carry rules, the Prime Time Access 
Rules, or possible mandates of free air time for political candi-
dates impinge upon the discretion of the programmer, not upon 
the writer, the director, the actor, or others who might claim to 
be engaging in speaker-driven self-expression.97 It is, in short, 
the programmer who is the operative decision maker and the 
object of past and potential governmental regulations. It is the 
programmer, as agent of the media corporation's interests, who 
asserts constitutionally privileged "editorial discretion" when 
such regulations are challenged under the First Amendment. 
of subgroups and publics who make up the audience. If the producer is unable 
to communicate to a large enough segment of the audience, his series is 
dropped.") 
97. Even writers and producers, to a surprising extent, are purposefully 
engaged in an entrepreneurial pursuit of a mass audience by creating products 
shaped by the forces of consumer sovereignty, as they understand the agenda 
of the networks and advertisers to whom they are accountable. According to 
Gitlin, "[e]pisode writers are usually modest and often embarrassed by their 
labors." GITLIN, supra note 96, at 71. He quotes one comedy writer: "You 
don't have to have talent to write for television .... I thought it was writing, 
but it's not. It's a craft. It's like a tailor. You want cuffs? You've got cuffs." 
Id. 
Soon after the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, Rod 
Serling wrote a story for television inspired by the murder of a black youth in 
Mississippi by two whites who were angered because their victim had appar-
ently whistled at a white woman. 
By the time Serling took the idea to the Theater Guild for production 
on the U.S. Steel Hour, he was already trimming .... [T]he victim was 
now an old pawnbroker, the killer a neurotic .... To avert the slight-
est hint that Serling's unspecified location might be the South, the ex-
ecutives insisted that the show open with a shot of a white church 
spire, New England style. 
GITLIN, supra note 96, at 182. Significantly, Serling, himself, anticipated the 
need to cater to the perceived desires of the audience, stripping the story of its 
essence, of the elements that inspired him-racism in the American South of 
the 1950s. 
Even Norman Lear, creator and producer of All in the Family, a show that 
seemed to have so much ideological content in the early 1970s, was more en-
gaged in creating a market-driven message than in self-expression. "When 
Lear Americanized All in the Family from its English prototype, he says, 'I 
was one hundred percent interested in creaming an audience.'" Id. at 212. 
Yet there remain protestations of personal creativity and agenda among 
some writers and producers: 
The medium's leading writers and producers insist that they can ca-
ter to the audience's tastes without pandering to them. In the words 
of [producer] Leonard Goldberg, ... "I think it is the responsibility of 
television not only to entertain, but present contemporary problems 
facing our society and to offer some guidance, some hope, and just to 
make people think about them." 
S. ROBERT LICHTER ET AL., WATCHING AMERICA 10 (1991). 
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B. TELEVISION PROGRAMMERS AS RATIONAL PROFIT 
MAxlMIZERS IN THE REGIME OF CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY 
Leading free-market theorists suppose that profit-seeking 
media corporations respond to market forces as does any other 
sort of profit-seeking corporation. Krattenmaker and Powe, for 
example, criticize FCC efforts to improve the "quality" of broad-
cast programming. "Quality is a function of viewers' desires 
and broadcasters' resources, elements the FCC cannot con-
trol."98 Thus, "to succeed, a broadcaster, like any entrepreneur, 
[must] know what customers want. "99 
Richard Posner also supposes that television networks de-
velop and select programming in an entrepreneurial fashion to 
maximize profit. In considering whether monopoly or competi-
tion could produce more "diversity'' in television programming, 
Judge Posner reasoned from the premise that programming de-
cisions are made by reference to anticipated viewer preferences: 
[M]onopoly in broadcasting could actually promote rather than retard 
programming diversity. If all the television channels in a particular 
market were owned by a single firm, its optimal programming strat-
egy would be to put on a sufficiently varied menu of programs in each 
time slot to appeal to every substantial group of potential television 
viewers in the market, not just the largest group. For that would be 
the strategy that maximized the size of the station's audience. Sup-
pose, as a simple example, that there were only two television broad-
cast frequencies (and no cable television), and that 90 percent of the 
viewers in the market wanted to watch comedy from 7 to 8 p.m. and 
10 percent wanted to watch ballet. The monopolist would broadcast 
comedy over one frequency and ballet over the other, and thus gain 
100 percent of the potential audience. If the frequencies were li-
censed to two competing firms, each firm would broadcast comedy in 
the 7 to 8 p.m. time slot, because its expected audience share would 
be 45 percent (one half of 90 percent), which is greater than 10 per-
cent. Each prime-time slot would be filled with "popular" program-
ming targeted on the median viewer, and minority tastes would go 
unserved. Some critics of television believe that this is a fair descrip-
tion of prime-time network television. Each network vies to put on 
the most popular programs and as a result minority tastes are ill 
served.100 
From the opposite end of the political spectrum, and basing 
his opinion on observation as much as on theory, Todd Gitlin is 
also among those who interpret programming decisions as 
driven by an entrepreneurial desire to identify and to satisfy 
98. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 10, at 73. 
99. Id. at 79. 
100. Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1054-55 (7th Cir. 
1992); see also POSNER, supra note 14, at 672-74. 
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consumer demand. He acknowledges the undeniable fact that 
television programming executives are people like all others 
and have their own tastes and their own politics. Yet when act-
ing as a television executive, rather than as citizen or parent, 
the programmer ordinarily subordinates her tastes and values 
to the demands of the job. Gitlin suggests that "executives 
learn to heed the institutional voice. If they possess any dis-
tinct taste, aside from a relish for show-business glitter, they 
have to dispel it, or subdue it. To keep taste and market judg-
ment separate is 'professional."'101 And for the television execu-
tive, professionalism on the job demands programming deci-
sions that will maximize revenue-revenue generated by the 
decisions of advertisers to buy time during the programs in 
question. 102 
Network executives often say that their problem is simple. Their tra-
dition, in a sense, is a search for steady profits. They want, above all, 
to put on the air shows best calculated to accumulate maximum reli-
able audiences. Maximum audiences attract maximum dollars for 
advertisers, and advertiser dollars are, after all, the network's objec-
tive.103 
Thus, the programming executive sees ''himself as the instru-
ment of the popular will."104 "The trick is not only to read the 
restless public mood, but somehow to anticipate it and figure 
out how to encapsulate it in a show."105 
In this regard, Gitlin reports the views of a vice-president 
for research projects at NBC, who likened the production of 
television shows to the production of automobiles. "Most people 
do not put on television what they personally like any more 
101. GITLIN, supra note 96, at 23-24. 
102. "Television executives certainly do not see themselves as opinion lead-
ers. They live in terror of ratings and perceive their basic task as predicting 
the public's response." Edward Rubin, Television and the Experience of Citi-
zenship, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1158 (1990). 
103. GITLIN, supra note 96, at 24-25. Muriel Cantor agrees: 
The decisionmaking process in the television industry has to be un-
derstood in the general construct of commercial television. The main 
function of entertainment programs generally is to attract large audi-
ences to sell products; therefore, if a show does not attract a large 
enough audience, it often will be dropped. The advertiser wants a 
certain number of viewers for his money; in fact, the "cost per thou-
sand" viewers often determines whether the advertiser will stay with 
a show. 
CANTOR, supra note 92, at 64. 
104. GITLIN, supra note 96, at 24. 
105. Id. at 203. 
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than executives in Detroit make ,cars they personally like."106 
The head of the Entertainment Division for CBS, B. Donald 
Grant, also compared the production of television shows to the 
manufacture of automobiles, and expressed a similar profes-
sional ethic: "I have my own values. Everybody has their own 
values. The guy who is making Chevrolet cars, let's say, may 
have Cadillac tastes, but he's making Chevrolet cars because 
he knows that that's what's marketable. And that's basic. 
Business is a business."107 AB Krattenmaker and Powe argue 
that no distinction exists in fact between the market dynamic 
shaping the production decisions of automobile or sneaker 
manufacturers and those of television programmers, 108 so 
Grant confirms the proposition.109 
106. Id. at 24. 
107. Id. at 230. 
108. See KRATIENMAKER & POWE, supra note 10, at 280-282. 
109. Gitlin is emphatic about the extent to which the quest for ratings, for 
the "maximum reliable audiences," provides the governing principle and dy-
namic by which decisions are made about what shows to create, to air, and to 
retain. GITLIN, supra note 96, at 25. "Short-sighted guesses of future ratings 
are the alpha and omega shaping the shows that take up the prime time of 
Americans, the twenty-two hours a week ... when, at any given moment, one-
third of all Americans are staring into the blue light." Id. at 11. Network ex-
ecutives admit as much. In response to criticisms about the poor quality of 
television programming, networks "insist[] that they simply gave people the 
entertainment they wanted." Id. at 12. A vice president for television re-
search at CBS has similarly stated that "I'm not interested in culture. I'm not 
interested in pro-social values. I have only one interest. That's whether peo-
ple watch the program. That's my definition of good, that's my definition of 
bad." Id. at 31; see also Roger D. Wimmer & Martha L. Popowski, Program 
and Audience Research, in BROADCAST/CABLE PROGRAMMING: STRATEGIES 
AND PRACTICES 44, 45 (Susan Tyler Eastman et al. eds., 3d ed. 1989) ("Broad-
cast and cable programmers are interested in one goal: reaching the maximum 
possible audience."). 
Television networks have constructed elaborate procedures and mecha-
nisms for predicting market demand for potential programs and for measuring 
market "consumption" of existing programs. CANTOR, supra note 92, at 64-65; 
see also Wimmer & Popowski, supra, at 45-54. Confirming their abiding objec-
tive to create the market-driven message, the networks conduct research on 
"every marketable attribute of a show: plots, continuations, concepts, stars, 
titles." GITLIN, supra note 96, at 39. According to the executive in charge of 
testing for ABC in the early 1980s, a television show "is a machine whose 
parts wear out. Its use lies entirely in its marketability; why not let testing 
diagnose the faulty elements?" Id. Yet, for all the energy expended in predict-
ing audience demand for different television productions, television executives 
view the task of predicting popularity as part science and part art. Id. at 25, 
31. 
The quest for the surest possible maximum audience explains why 
the networks are cautious yet, in their limited way, pluralist at the 
same time. Executives want to play it safe, but there are two impor-
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C. ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF THE TELEVISION PROGRAMMING 
DECISION 
Some argue that programming executives have not entirely 
excluded their personal values from their professional deci-
sionmaking. They suggest, first, that even when they are try-
ing to serve the corporate bottom line, the television elite can-
not help but allow their personal values to insinuate them-
selves into productions. These commentators point to the 
content of television programming, especially its evolution over 
the past half century, as evidence of a particular political bias. 
Second, some suggest that the television elite use their power 
intentionally to shape public opinion. 
These hypotheses complicate the question of whether tele-
vision programming decisions respond to the forces of consumer 
sovereignty in the way that other entrepreneurial production 
decisions do. But consider the significance of the first hypothe-
sis mentioned above. Even if it is true that some television 
programming executives unavoidably allow their personal val-
ues to shape their business decisions while endeavoring to 
maximize corporate profits, they are still trying to construct a 
message that responds to the demands of the market. Their at-
titude, intent, and strategy are not concerned with promoting 
their own values and pursuing their own priorities. By this 
hypothesis, they do not devote their most important persuasive 
resources to the issues of greatest concern to them. I 10 In the 
programs they choose and the topics they pursue, their goal 
remains to maximize profits by satisfying outside forces rather 
than their personal values and priorities. Such television pro-
grammers may be imperfect business decision makers, but they 
remain, at their essence, business decision makers.III 
tant qualifications. They are not expert at knowing just how to play 
it safe. And if they succeed in playing it too safe, they may bore their 
audience to the point of indifference. From these qualifications flow 
whatever diversity the networks maintain. The quest for the oflbeat 
or for high demographics and prestige, sends them after new mate-
rial, satisfying some of the creative drives of some writers and pro-
ducers; then the quest for the mass market clicks back in, flattening 
that new material, striving to reduce it to standard proportions. 
Id. at 186-87. 
110. This is quite unlike decisions to be expected by a participant in plural-
ist and republican decisionmaking. See infra Part III.B.1. 
111. Consider an analogous situation so familiar in debates about the na-
ture of law. If a federal judge, while endeavoring to engage in "neutral" inter-
pretation, cannot help but allow her personal values to shape her decisions, 
she is hardly rendered indistinguishable from a legislator or a voter. She may 
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Consider, now, the second hypothesis. According to Ben 
Stein, who studied television during the 1970s, programming 
has manifested a particular (liberal) political orientation. Stein 
has suggested that television reflects a consistent perspective 
on businessmen (that they are evil), 112 crime (that it is por-
trayed-inaccurately, in Stein's view-as typically perpetrated 
by whites on whites),113 police (romanticized),114 the military 
(bureaucratic, mindless, and lacking human decency),115 small 
towns (peaceful and lovely on the surface, while hiding evil un-
derneath),116 big cities (that New York is exciting, intense, but 
dangerous, while Los Angeles is less exciting, more ''laid-back," 
and less dangerous),117 the rich (superficially lovely, while 
be an imperfect judge, and even a poor one, but she thinks about legal issues 
that arise during her cases differently from the way she thinks about political 
issues when standing in a voting booth. As a judge, her values impede her 
goal of neutral interpretation. As a voter, vindicating her personal values is 
her goal. 
112. BEN STEIN, THE VIEW FROM SUNSET BOULEVARD: AMERICA AS 
BROUGHT TO You BY THE PEOPLE WHO MAKE TELEVISION 15-28 (1979). 
113. See id. at 29-39. In Stein's view, real-life murderers and rapists "are 
usually poor, minority-group people, apparently acting on sudden impulses of 
rage and anger," while "robberies and muggings are also usually perpetrated 
by young minority-group males" and the victim usually is "another ghetto 
dweller." Id. at 30. He continues, "On television, things could hardly be more 
different. The typical TV murder involves a well-to-do white person killing 
another well-to-do white person .... The criminal is a comfortable middle-class 
or upper-middle-class person, even if not a businessman." Id. at 30. 
One can quarrel with the accuracy of Stein's views about whites, racial 
minorities, and crime. Indeed, he claims that "[i]n the thousands of hours I 
have spent watching adventure shows, I have never seen a major crime 
committed by a poor, teenage, black, Mexican, or Puerto Rican youth, even 
though they account for a high percentage of all violent crime." Id. at 31. But 
even if television does not accurately convey the demography of crime, the 
question remains whether the television producer and programmer are 
portraying personal views of reality, or whether they are reacting to the 
public's tastes and preferences. Stein's observations about the content of 
television programming with respect to crime is consistent with Gitlin's anal-
ysis of how programmers determine which shows to order and to broadcast. 
114. See id. at 40-46. 
115. See id. at 47-56. 
116. See id. at 63-73. 
117. See id. at 74-80. Stein himself seems to have no love lost for New 
York City, characterizing it as tainted by "the filth, the street killings, the 
junkies, the high prices, the cheating, the dirty air, and the other realities of 
New York life." Id. at 79. He sees television executives as largely trans-
planted to Los Angeles from New York, as retaining a wistful bias in favor of 
New York, and as expressing that bias in their programming decisions: 
The affection that TV writers and producers feel for New York comes 
across clearly in shows set in Los Angeles. A person who has lived in 
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scheming and unhappy underneath),118 the poor (without flaw 
or fault, society's heroes or victims), 119 and the clergy (absent 
from primetime television).120 
One might quarrel with the accuracy of Stein's observa-
tions about the content of television programming. One might 
question, if the observations ever were accurate, 121 whether 
they remain so. More significant for purposes of this Article's 
analysis, however, is the possibility that the political slant that 
Ben Stein has detected may reflect not the persuasive agenda 
of television programmers, producers, and writers, but the es-
capist and entertainment agenda of the public. 122 Even a tele-
vision program constructed purely to satisfy consumer desires 
has content reflecting values. Its content, however, like the 
content of an automobile, or a pair of trendy sneakers, is a 
function of the consumers' values. 
It is possible that media corporate managers would choose 
to sacrifice profits by endeavoring to affect public values and 
perceptions through the expression of their personal opinions 
or the opinions of the corporate entity. After all, Mobil pur-
chases op-ed space in the New York Times; CBS could well de-
vote some of its broadcasting time for similar endeavors. But to 
posit that such self-expression is the dominant concern of me-
dia corporation, or even a substantial concern, strains credu-
lity. Indeed, corporate officers owe a fiduciary duty to share-
holders to make business decisions that will maximize 
corporate profits. 123 As Posner, Krattenmaker, and Powe sug-
gest, not only is it a reasonable hypothesis that media corpora-
tions behave like other profit-seeking corporations in creating 
products they anticipate will fare well in the economic market-
place, 124 the hypothesis is supported by the way in which count-
both places can easily see that even if a Chicano is shown lounging 
next to a palm tree, New York is in the writer's mind. 
Id. at 80. Whatever bias this might reveal in the television writer, this pas-
sage may help to reveal biases under which Mr. Stein's analysis labors. 
118. See id. at 81-91. 
119. See id. at 92-99. 
120. See id. at 100-04. 
121. Stein purported to study programming content from the late 1970s. 
See id. at xiv. 
122. Even if a market-driven message represented the political agenda of 
the public, its dissemination would not qualify as valuable "speech" from a 
pluralist or republican perspective. See infra notes 163-73 and accompanying 
text. 
123. See United States v. Byrun, 408 U.S. 125, 137-38 (1972). 
124. See RONALD V. BE'ITIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE POLITICAL 
2000] SELLING THE MAR,KET-DRNEN MESSAGE 489 
less network presidents, programmers, producers, and media 
observers speak about the television industry. 
III. THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE AND 
THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
We can surely agree that no one can raise a cry of deprivation of free 
speech if he is compelled to prove that there is something more than 
naked commercial selfishness in his purpose. 
-Then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover 125 
A. RUPERT MURDOCH, BILL CLINTON, AND MARTIN LUTHER 
KING: THE VARIETIES OF COMMUNICATIVE INTENT 
What common thread runs through Martin Luther King's 
decision to deliver his "I Have a Dream" speech, Bill Clinton's 
decision to advocate a middle class tax cut during the early por-
tion of the 1992 presidential campaign, and Rupert Murdoch's 
Fox television network decision to present Living Single and 
other television shows targeted to the interests of an African-
American audience? Surely there are differences in how each 
man related to the message he chose to convey. Martin Luther 
King strongly believed in the content of his message. He in-
tended to persuade as many people as possible of its truth. 
Candidate Bill Clinton may have believed in the virtues of a 
middle class tax cut. Given his choices as President, however, 
it is perhaps more reasonable to suppose that he did not view 
such a tax cut as good public policy. If the latter is true, he 
chose to advocate the policy to pander to the predicted prefer-
ences of voters in the Democratic primaries. Rupert Murdoch 
may well be unconcerned-and, indeed, might disagree with 
much-about the lives and perspectives of young black profes-
sionals in urban America. Yet he seemed to construct a broad-
cast schedule during the early existence of his Fox television 
network for entrepreneurially strategic reasons. He sought to 
reach an audience whose entertainment interests were not di-
rectly addressed by the other television networks. 
Under conventional notions about the freedom of speech, 
however, the communicative decisions of each of these men 
would be viewed as having indistinguishable constitutional 
significance. A governmental regulation that, for example, re-
ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 226 (1996). 
125. Speech by then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover at the Na-
tional Radio Conference (Nov. 9, 1925), quoted in Kalven, supra note 3, at 16. 
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quired Murdoch to broadcast Bill Clinton's advocacy rather 
than an episode of Living Single, or one that required Bill Clin-
ton to reprint passages from King's speech in his campaign lit-
erature, or to reprint portions of a Living Single script, would 
be viewed as intruding on the same constitutionally protected 
speaker interests-the right to choose the content of the mes-
sages one disseminates. 
One can, however, identify real bases for distinguishing the 
constitutional value of King's speech, Clinton's speech, and 
Murdoch's broadcast. The bases for distinction have nothing to 
do with the content of the message conveyed or judgments 
about the worthiness of the content conveyed. The distinctions 
have nothing to do with the technology employed for dissemi-
nating the messages. Rather, the distinctions are rooted in the 
nature of the communicative intent of the actor in question. 
Indeed, the distinctions depend on two components of the com-
municator's intent. The first component concerns the intent 
involved in a communicator's creation of the content of his mes-
sage. The second concerns the intent involved in a communica-
tor's reasons for disseminating his message. 
Consider, now, two kinds of intent underlying a communi-
cator's creation of the content of his message. For one kind of 
expressive content, the communicator constructs his message 
by reference to a judgment about what other people want to 
hear. This communicator seeks to determine how many people 
would want to consume a message or pay money for it. This 
communicator is concerned about predicting, responding to, 
and profiting from market demand. He interprets the values 
and preferences of others and generates the content of his mes-
sage as a function of this interpretation. This communicator 
produces a market-driven message. 
For the other kind of expressive content, the communicator 
constructs his message by reference to his own conscience, be-
liefs, and values. This communicator looks within, identifies 
what he believes, and articulates those beliefs to others. This 
speaker intends to create a speaker-driven message-that is, to 
engage in self-expression.126 
126. The speaker-driven message is similar to Habermas's notion of "com-
municative action." The market-driven message falls within Habermas's cate-
gory of "strategic action." For Habermas, "[i]n communicative action partici-
pants are not primarily oriented to their own individual successes; they 
pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonize 
their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions." 1 JURGEN 
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In addition to these two kinds of intent underlying a com-
municator's decisions in forming the content of his message, 
one might distinguish three kinds of motive for disseminating a 
message. Two motives for dissemination seem to have particu-
lar significance for the market-driven message. First, one 
might wish to sell a market-driven message with the motive to 
earn a profit. Disseminators of a market-driven message evalu-
ate what messages consumers crave, construct their "speech" in 
the way that an automobile manufacturer might plan a car 
design or a cereal manufacturer might plan a product concept, 
and seek to sell that message-as-product. Their objective is to 
earn a profit from the success of their product in the consumer 
market. They are, in this sense, indistinguishable from what 
one ordinarily would regard as producers of consumer goods.127 
They are entrepreneurs responding to economic forces in the 
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE 
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 286 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 
1984) (1981). A person engages in "communicative action" when he has "an 
attitude oriented to reaching understanding" in a "process of reaching under-
standing." Id. In contrast, when engaged in "strategic interaction," "a speaker 
acts with an orientation to success and thereby instrumentalizes speech acts 
for purposes that are only contingently related to the meaning of what is said." 
Id. at 289. Habermas suggested that "strategic action" would include lying, 
manipulating, and any intentionally persuasive use of words that does not 
honestly articulate the beliefs of the speaker. See id. at 306-07, 333-37. Al-
though he does not address the phenomenon of selling the market-driven mes-
sage, as opposed to pandering, the former would seem to fall a fortiori into the 
category of strategic action. Although selling the market-driven message does 
not involve the intent to persuade at all, it does instrumentalize speech "for 
purposes that are only contingently related to the meaning of what is said." 
Id. at289. 
The analysis presented in this Article's analysis does not depend on 
Habermas's theory of communicative action and is not derived from it. 
Rather, it is tied to traditional strands of American political and constitutional 
theory. It so happens, however, that these strands of political theory are con-
cerned with communication as a vehicle for reaching agreement, in the context 
of individuals recognized as having certain participatory rights, and that 
Habermas's theory of communicative action parses the meaning and implica-
tions of communication from a similar perspective. He says that 
[i]f we assume that the human species maintains itself through the 
socially coordinated activities of its members and that this coordina-
tion has to be established through communication-and in certain 
central spheres through communication aimed at reaching agree-
ment-then the reproduction of the species ... requires satisfying the 
conditions of a rationality that is inherent in communicative action. 
Id. at 397 (emphasis added). 
127. Ronald Bettig has noted a "commodification of human intellectual and 
artistic creativity" on an international scale. BE'ITIG, supra note 124, at 226. 
This Article draws a connection between product development and sales by 
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economic forces in the regime of consumer sovereignty. Posner, 
Krattenmaker, Powe, Gitlin, and Cantor describe the behavior 
of commercial television programmers in a way that would fall 
within this model of selling the market-driven message. 
Second, an actor might wish to pander with a market-
driven message-that is, to curry favor with listeners who al-
ready embrace the message and to induce others to embrace it 
as well. One might suspect that certain politicians' decisions 
about what positions to take, and how to express them, are ex-
amples of pandering with a market-driven message. Indeed, 
Senator Paul Tsongas accused Governor Bill Clinton of pander-
ing to voters in 1992 with his proposal of a middle-class tax cut. 
The third motive for disseminating a message seems to 
have particular significance for speaker-driven self-expression. 
An actor might be concerned with disseminating his honestly 
held views toward the enlightenment of others or of self. In 
this pursuit of truth, the actor tries to test his views against 
those of others or to persuade others that his views are correct. r2s 
One might suspect that certain political activists decide 
what to say by reference to their own beliefs and that they 
choose to express accurately and sincerely what those beliefs 
are. Martin Luther King would seem to fit this model of com-
municative intent. Similarly, one might suspect that certain 
reporters, artists, law professors, and screen writers form their 
manufacturers and the development and sale of the market-driven message by 
(for example) broadcasters, and it distinguishes these activities from product 
advertising by manufacturers. 
128. This kind of speaker is even willing to expend his resources in order to 
persuade others. Political contributions and campaign expenditures are famil-
iar examples, and the inequalities in speaking power flowing from inequalities 
in wealth have been a focus among those concerned with electoral reform. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that "virtually every means of communicating 
ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money .... The elec-
torate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for 
news and information has made these expensive modes of communication in-
dispensable instruments of effective political speech." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam). It further stated that "the dependence of a 
communication on the expenditure of money" does not vitiate its protection 
under the First Amendment. Id. at 16. Indeed, the willingness of an actor to 
spend money to disseminate an idea, rather than to make money on the sale of 
an idea, provides evidence that the actor intends to disseminate a speaker-
driven message rather than a market-driven message. Although a speaker 
might promote a speaker-driven message concerned with his own material 
well-being, such as a message that taxes should be reduced or student loans 
should be increased, the content of the message reflects his own views and 
preferences, and the material benefit he seeks is not from the sale of the mes-
sage but the policy consequences of the message. 
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message by referring within themselves ·toward persuading 
others to embrace their perspective. Such a speaker expresses 
a message intended to shape the marketplace of ideas, to 
change or reinforce people's views or values, by expressing his 
own notion of what is right.129 
*** 
As earlier acknowledged, one might be concerned about the 
practical significance of legal categories which focus on an ac-
tor's motives and intent. How could the legal system determine 
an actor's intent in fact, in order to give real world significance 
to categories that distinguish between an actor's decision to 
formulate and sell the market-driven message and an actor's 
decision to enlighten through self-expression? 
Consider four responses. First, the fear that one could 
never hope to ascertain reliably an actor's complex purposes 
should not abort an essential inquiry into constitutional norms. 
Almost any method one might employ in interpreting constitu-
tional text requires identifying values deemed to underlie that 
text and exploring their implications. If an actor's purpose is 
really what should matter given the constitutionally significant 
normative framework, recognizing that normative proposition 
is foundational-the basis on which formal and technical doc-
trine must be constructed. Law, after all, is about the vindica-
tion of public values. This is no less true-perhaps it is espe-
cially true-for constitutional law. 
Second, as suggested in the introduction, exploring the 
normative significance of categories of purpose that are pure, 
yet rare-such as a purpose to enlighten through speaker-
driven self-expression or a purpose to profit entrepreneurially 
by selling a market-driven message-enables one to explore the 
normative significance of more complex varieties of purpose 
that may be far more common. 
Third, by identifying an actor's purposes as a linchpin on 
which constitutional protection should depend, one can en-
deavor to construct proof rules by which the legal system could 
make determinations about an actor's purposes, specifically de-
signed to account for imperfections in adjudicative fact finding. 
Finally, in confirmation of the two foregoing propositions, 
one should note that the legal system already contains count-
129. Of course, even a market-driven message can have an effect in shap-
ing people's ideas. Such unintended effects should be deemed constitutionally 
irrelevant. See infra text accompanying notes 155-62, 184-88. 
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less contexts in which an actor's purposes have been defined as 
legally relevant and in which the difficulties in fact finding 
have been accommodated.130 Both within the law and more in-
formally, human beings are forever being judged by their pur-
poses, and properly so. Our capacity for moral choice is so 
much of the human self-image. 
Thus, despite the apparent problems involved in determin-
ing whether a particular actor was engaged in selling a market-
driven message, pandering with a market-driven message, or 
enlightening with speaker-driven self-expression, some pa-
tience may be warranted. Once one determines that the cate-
gories have normative constitutional significance, one can con-
front the problems of developing legal doctrines to put those 
categories into practical operation.131 
A normative constitutional distinction can and should be 
drawn between decisions to sell the market-driven message, to 
pander with the market-driven message, and to enlighten with 
speaker-driven self-expression. Such is the task of the follow-
ing sections. These sections consider whether an actor's choice 
to sell the market-driven message warrants special constitu-
tional solicitude as part of "the freedom of speech." They will 
explore this question from the perspective of a First Amend-
ment informed by three normative perspectives: the value of 
speech in enabling citizens to engage in democratic self-
government; the role of speech in enabling individuals to attain 
personal fulfillment and autonomy; and the relationship be-
130. Indeed, federal campaign law restricting contributions to political 
campaigns itself requires a determination as to whether a donation was "made 
for the purpose of influencing" an election. If so, restrictions apply. If not, re-
strictions do not apply. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 9032 (1976). The criminal law, of 
course, is filled with provisions that make an actor's purposes legally relevant, 
and require proof of those purposes beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Court's constitutional law of defamation requires a determination of 
whether a defendant speaker acted with "actual malice"-i.e., whether the de-
fendant knew his statements about the plaintiff were false or was reckless as 
to their falsity. See infra notes 256-61 and accompanying text. 
131. Beyond questions of workable legal doctrine, there is a fourth reason 
for paying attention to an actor's purposes and motives when endeavoring to 
define communication that should be deemed a valuable part of "the freedom 
of speech" worthy of constitutional protection. Principles affect the way in 
which people think and talk about issues. If discourse about the freedom of 
speech were informed by principles that elevate efforts to enlighten with the 
speaker-driven message and that denigrate efforts to sell or pander with the 
market-driven message, behavior in the marketplace of ideas might be im-
proved. See infra notes 263-64; 303-05 and accompanying text. 
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tween Congress's copyright power and the First Amendment's 
prohibition oflaws abridging the freedom of speech. 
B. Do CHOICES TO SELL THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE 
DESERVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AS SPEECH? 
1. Democratic Self-Governance Perspectives 
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of 
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps 
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who 
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the 
power which knowledge gives. 
-James Madison132 
It is broadly accepted that speech is protected because it is 
necessary for democratic self-government.133 "Democratic self-
government," however, is not self-defining. Thus, the following 
analysis will consider the normative significance of decisions to 
sell the market-driven message from the perspective of two sig-
nificant strands in American constitutional law that posit the 
manner in which our democracy ought to operate: republican-
ism and pluralism. 
In versions of democracy with a republican emphasis, citi-
zens ideally would act in pursuit of the public welfare through 
political discourse. Versions of republicanism posit that each 
citizen has a right and a responsibility to seek the public wel-
fare through debate and deliberation and to vote according to 
his (or her) view of the public welfare.134 Law should be the 
132. 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
133. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever dif-
ferences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is 
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was 
to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs."); MEIKLEJOHN, supra 
note 26, at 26-27 ("The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the ne-
cessities of the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of 
Reason in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement 
that public issues should be decided by universal suffrage."); SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 13, at xvii ("My goal in this book is to evaluate the current system in light 
of the relationship between political sovereignty and the free speech princi-
ple."); Bork, supra note 26, at 26 (arguing that only "explicitly and predomi-
nantly political speech" is entitled to constitutional protection). 
134. Versions of republicanism frequently posit that each citizen has an 
equal right and equal responsibility to participate in the formation of public 
policy. See, e.g., GoRDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 233 (1992) ("Republican citizenship implied equality."). Com-
mentators have built upon this premise of equality in critiquing the Supreme 
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community's best collective judgment about rules that will best 
serve its long-term public interests.135 
By contrast, in versions of democracy with a pluralist em-
phasis, there is a less ambitious model of citizen behavior. Plu-
ralism forgoes aspirations for a public-spirited deliberation 
about public policy. Rather, from a pluralist perspective, de-
mocratic self-government provides the mechanisms by which 
citizens can pursue self-interest in a process of interaction with 
each other-whether cooperative or competitive.136 Although 
Court's invalidation of governmental efforts to limit the impact of powerful 
speakers on public discourse. See Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A 
New Beginning for Campaign Finance, 13 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (1993), 
http://www.prospect.org/archives/13/13acke.html; SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 
98 (arguing that "[e]fforts to ... ensure that [economic inequalities] are not 
turned into political inequalitiesD should not be seen as impermissible redis-
tribution"). This Article pursues a critique of current judicial doctrine that 
does not depend on this equality perspective. At the same time, it is not in-
consistent with, and could be supplemented by, greater emphasis on equality 
in defining the extent to which actors are engaged in "the freedom of speech" 
protected by the First Amendment. 
135. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 18 (positing a "central constitu-
tional goal of creating a deliberative democracy"); id. at 20 (suggesting the 
need for "broad and deep attention to public issues"); id. (positing a precondi-
tion of"political equality" as reflected in "one person-one vote"). 
136. First Amendment scholars have characterized Justice Holmes's juris-
prudence as having been predicated on pluralist premises and Justice 
Brandeis's opinions as having reflected republican premises. See, e.g., 
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 71-82 (examining Holmes's emphasis on indi-
vidual self-interest and his resulting belief in competing pluralist interest 
groups); SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 23-28 (comparing Holmes's conception of 
interest groups competing in a marketplace of ideas to advance their self-
interest with Brandeis's more romantic view of communication as civic par-
ticipation). In Sunstein's view, pluralism and republicanism would have dif-
ferent responses to governmental efforts to promote public deliberation or to 
curb inequalities in speaking power derived from inequalities in wealth. See 
id. at 28. I suggest that this is not necessarily so. At least with respect to en-
trepreneurial decisions to sell the market-driven message, pluralism and re-
publicanism can have converging implications. 
Furthermore, Sunstein distinguishes between pluralism's marketplace 
view of democracy and republicanism's view of "civic competition." See id. at 
28. He suggests that from Holmes pluralist perspective, "truth" is defined as 
that which "emerges through 'free trade in ideas,'" such that no idea is intrin-
sically more worthy than another. Id. at 25. "For Holmes, [truth] seems to 
have no deeper status." Id. Sunstein also suggests that for Holmes, not only 
is politics a "market," but it is a market ''like any other." Id. The former 
proposition seems incontrovertible. The second, I suggest, is manifestly wrong 
for several reasons. First, to posit that trade in ideas is indistinguishable from 
trade in sneakers and cigars ignores that the First Amendment gives the free-
dom of speech (whether conceived in market or civic terms) a special status. 
Second, positing this equivalency between markets in ideas and markets for 
products ignores the foundational and, therefore, prior position that rulemak-
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this notion of pluralism is normatively less demanding than is 
republicanism, it has its own normative frames of reference. It 
posits not only that majorities have the power to rule but that a 
majority among "the People" have the right to rule. It encom-
passes, as well, a norm of political equality that is nearly uni-
versally articulated, even if somewhat vaguely: each citizen, as 
a member of the sovereign People, has equal status and an 
equal right, through the franchise, to contribute to the forma-
tion of public policy.137 
The republican and pluralist notions of democracy have 
been balanced in our constitutional heritage, with each empha-
sized in different institutional contexts. In The Federalist No. 
10, for example, James Madison's fear of "majority faction" 
seems to view a pluralist version of democracy as too often de-
scriptive of the electorate's behavior. "A zeal for different opin-
ions," Madison said, has "divided mankind into parties, in-
flamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much 
more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate 
for their common good."138 Voters might in fact pursue public 
policy based on short-term and selfish concerns.139 In doing so, 
they might act contrary to "the permanent and aggregate inter-
ests of the community."140 Madison sought to prevent such ef-
fects of majority faction through the structure of the nation's 
ing processes must occupy. Markets in products require rules. In the Ameri-
can scheme, the Constitution provides rules for making rules-including the 
rules by which markets in products are conducted. Third, pluralist democracy 
can have deeply normative roots. From such a perspective, it is not necessary 
to embrace republican ideals in order to accord society's rulemaking proce-
dures a privileged status-even over its procedures for economic market ex-
change. For more on Sunstein's treatment of Holmes and pluralism, see infra 
notes 175-81 and accompanying text. 
137. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964) (holding that the 
Equal Protection clause "guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by 
all voters in the election of state legislators" and prohibits diluting the weight 
of votes "because of place ofresidence"). 
138. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
139. See WOOD, supra note 134, at 253 ("Madison's Federalist No. 10 
was . . . [a] frank acknowledgment of the degree to which private interests .. . 
had come to dominate American politics .... Madison and the Federalists .. . 
were not modern-day pluralists. They still clung to the republican ideal of an 
autonomous public authority that was different from the many private inter-
ests of the society."); see also ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL 
HlSTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 13-14 (1995) (stating that American revo-
lutionaries claimed a republican virtue in contrast with British corruption). 
140. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
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legislative process. This suggests Madison's embrace of repub-
lican objectives, at least as an ideal toward which governmental 
structures and processes should be oriented. Ideally, democ-
ratic self-government should pursue "the permanent and ag-
gregate interests of the community."141 If voters cannot be re-
lied upon to act as republican citizens, then at least the govern-
ment's structure should discourage pluralist efforts to 
undermine the republican vision of public policy.142 
Furthermore, as suggested in Hamilton's The Federalist 
No. 78, a significant part of the Constitution's function was to 
provide a method for ensuring that at least the nation's funda-
mental public policy would respect the republican objectives of 
providing for the community and the future, as well as for the 
self and the present. Hamilton suggested that the people them-
selves, in making "the supreme law of the land" in the 
Constitution's text, endeavor to make public policy with ex-
traordinary care; and that this carefully crafted policy, enforced 
by politically unaccountable judges, is designed to supersede 
the decisions of majority factions-that is, decisions by "the 
people themselves" reflecting "ill humors" stirred up by "the 
arts of designing men."143 Thus, for Hamilton as for Madison, 
pluralist democracy might describe the electorate's ordinary 
behavior. Republican democracy was an ideal to be approxi-
mated through a range of constitutional structures, devices, 
and substantive provisions.144 
141. Id. 
142. Senators theoretically approach issues of public policy differently than 
do members of the House, in large part because their six-year term of office 
provides a longer separation from the momentary impulses of the electorate 
than does a Representative's two-year term. Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 
63, at 384 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that the Sen-
ate six-year term provides "sufficient permanency ... as a defense to the peo-
ple against their own temporary errors and delusions"), with THE FEDERALIST 
No. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that be-
cause of their two-year terms, House members have "immediate dependence 
on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people"). More importantly for pre-
sent purposes, people as voters approach life's questions differently than do 
people as consumers, in large part because as consumers people make deci-
sions for the self and the moment. As voters, people can make decisions ori-
ented not only toward the future, but focused more on the welfare of the com-
munity as well. 
143. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961). 
144. Both the pluralist and republican strands have run through American 
thought and discourse about democracy through the years. Robert Wiebe, for 
example, describes the rhetoric of labor and farmer leaders from the late nine-
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Constitutional scholars have long noted that the two jus-
tices most responsible for modern First Amendment doctrine 
had different understandings of the freedom of speech because 
each viewed democracy from a different perspective. Justice 
Holmes embraced a pluralist perspective of "excessive indi-
vidualism."145 According to Meiklejohn, 
Mr. Holmes sees a human society as a multitude of individuals, each 
struggling for his own existence, each living his own life, each saving 
his own soul, if he has a soul to save, in the social forms of a competi-
tive independence. Always, therefore, he tends to interpret the con-
stitutional cooperation of one hundred and more millions of Ameri-
cans, together with past and future generations who belong to the 
same community, as if they had no fundamental community of pur-
pose at all. The theory of strife he can understand-but not the the-
ory of cooperation. A nation tends to be, for his mind, a huge colloca-
tion of externally related atoms.146 
Justice Brandeis, on the other hand, embraced a per-
spective that emphasized a more ambitious and optimistic re-
publican notion of the political process. Cass Sunstein, build-
teenth century, at a time when society was understood as becoming increas-
ingly fractured. The rhetoric suggests an optimistic reliance on republican 
strands in the American democratic tradition: 
The Knights did not speak just for wage earners or the Populists just 
for farmers. Each invited all respectable citizens to join in the na-
tional revival. Both envisaged sweeping social changes from simple, 
peaceful mechanisms: cooperatives, land reform, the subtreasury, bi-
metalism. Correcting the crucial errors would bring all Americans 
together again .... 
Behind these expectations of wholeness lay the vision of the Peo-
ple, the American citizenry deciding in the common interest. 
WIEBE, supra note 139, at 124. He also describes the reliance on the rhetoric 
of pluralist difference and equality underlying the expansion of those eligible 
to vote during the first half of the nineteenth century. See infra note 171. Re-
publican strands shaped the Progressive movement of the late nineteenth cen-
tury: "[P]rogressives favored quality, not quantity: better informed, more alert, 
less gullible citizens. Their model voter was an individual who approached 
political problems as scientific issues to be resolved objectively in the public 
interest, then cast his secret ballot accordingly." WIEBE, supra note 139, at 
164; see also David Chang, Conflict, Coherence, and Constitutional Intent, 72 
IOWA L. REV. 753, 767-75 (1987) (discussing the motive of political self-
constraint as a basis for constitutional mandates). 
145. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 71. 
146. Id. at 71-72. Indeed, Holmes's pluralism has been viewed as merely a 
description of the way America operated, rather than resting on or promoting 
any prescriptive notion. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 
168 (1973) (describing criticism of Holmes's "functional approach" to law, 
which "led directly to the doctrine that 'might makes right'"). 
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ing on Meiklejohn's earlier analysis of the distinctive strands in 
the thought of both Holmes and Brandeis, observes that 
Brandeis thinks that a democracy requires a certain sort of person, 
one who takes citizenship seriously .... Hence-in words foreign to 
Holmes-Brandeis writes that "the greatest menace to freedom is an 
inert people"; hence "public discussion is a political duty"; hence the 
free speech principle is connected with faith in "the deliberative 
forces" in government. 147 
The following sections suggest that from both republican 
and pluralist perspectives, decisions to sell the market-driven 
message as a commodity may not warrant special protection as 
part of "the freedom of speech." Because the Supreme Court 
has defined First Amendment interests with respect to both 
speakers and listeners, 14s the following discussion considers 
whether both dissemination and receipt of the market-driven 
message, when sold for economic profit, should be deemed wor-
thy of special protection as an essential part of "the freedom of 
speech" under a republican-oriented First Amendment and a 
pluralist-oriented First Amendment.149 
147. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 27. 
148. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("[T]he peo-
ple as a whole retain their ... collective right to have [radio] function consis-
tently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of 
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount."); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976). 
149. Cf. PuRCELL, supra note 146, at 5. Purcell suggests that "[d]uring the 
nineteenth century . . . [t]he democratic ideal ... was widely accepted as an 
axiom of life. Though Americans were unconcerned with elaborate theoretical 
justifications, they were nevertheless convinced that democracy was both ra-
tionally and morally the best possible form of government." Id. Purcell exam-
ines the impact of "scientific naturalism as a philosophical world view" -i.e., of 
empiricism, skepticism, and the scientific method of inquiry-on the views 
held by American intellectuals about democracy during the first two-thirds of 
this century and finds a fundamental erosion of that nineteenth century faith. 
Id. at 10-11. 
The scientific naturalists would not credit ethical or moral beliefs as any-
thing more than emotion (and, as such, not provably true or false). Id. at 48-
49. Purcell quotes Eric Temple Bell, once president of the Mathematical Asso-
ciation of America, as having said that "[t]he philosophic theory of values is to 
the propagation of bunk what a damp, poorly lighted cellar is to that of mush-
rooms." Id. at 59-60. "By the early thirties the most fundamental epistemo-
logical assumptions of American intellectuals rejected the idea that any pre-
scriptive ethical theory could possess rationally compelling authority." Id. at 
73. Said George H. Sabine in 1937, "in politics and ethics one can postulate 
what values one chooses[;] consistency will then determine what follows, but it 
cannot either rule out or substantiate the postulate." Id. at 199-200. 
It was scientific naturalism, and its jurisprudential expression of legal re-
alism, more than conventional justifications of democracy, that endured crisis 
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in the late 1930s and the aftermath of World War II. The proposition that 
values could be neither demonstrably true nor false was sorely tested by Hit-
ler, and by Stalin, and the emotional revulsion was felt not only by ordinary 
folk, but by intellectuals as well. The moral relativism of scientific naturalism 
became a target for those, such as Catholics, who were entirely comfortable 
with values, as well as for intellectuals who sought somehow to reclaim values 
within the perspectives of scientific naturalism. See id. at 159-78. 
The naturalistic intellectuals responded to these attacks by arguing that 
it was moral certainty that led to totalitarianism; moral relativism actually 
supported open and contingent democracy. See id. at 200. Democracy was 
justified instrumentally as providing privilege to fewer values than do authori-
tarian systems, and promoting a freedom of speech which, in a context of 
moral relativism, allows political processes at least to resemble the experimen-
tal methods of science. Id. at 205. "[D]emocracy alone was based on a rational 
and scientific attitude toward human understanding and political morality. 
Scientific naturalism necessarily implied an open, diverse, democratic social 
order." Id. The "relativist theory of democracy," as Purcell calls these views, 
was based on the notion that all ideals (propositions of value) are essentially 
equal. This is quite different from the pluralism of the more traditional sort-
that all men are essentially equal. Furthermore, Purcell notes that the natu-
ralists' justification of democracy was both prescriptive in this sense and de-
scriptive, as "an empirical description of the social consequences of philosophi-
cal relativism and absolutism." Id. at 239. 
It is unclear whether the prescriptive or descriptive versions of "the rela-
tivist theory -of democracy" would have anything to say about whether the 
speaker-driven or market-driven should be viewed as privileged under the 
First Amendment. Yet, one might speculate that from the prescriptive per-
spective, relativist theory might deem it irrelevant whether a person is articu-
lating his own beliefs or packaging those of others, so long as he does not seek 
to suppress the beliefs of others. Indeed, the relativist view might welcome 
the market-driven message as part of the bread and circuses of our time that 
could forestall impulses toward mass ideological movements. 
Although there may have been a fundamental difference between the 
views about democracy held by "Americans" in the nineteenth century and the 
views held by certain American "intellectuals" in the twentieth century, one 
must consider the relevance, if any, of such differences for questions about 
how the First Amendment should be interpreted. Intellectuals of this ilk nei-
ther have been given, nor have they seized, governmental authority. Govern-
ment, politics, and public policy remain deeply grounded in a priori, un-
provable belief. To scientific naturalists, the enterprise of constitutional 
interpretation, to the extent that it must be prescriptive, must be nonsense. 
Yet whatever claim certain intellectuals might have had to superior insight, 
changes in their views concerning the moral basis of democracy would not be 
relevant for those who believe, for example, in originalism as the proper 
method of constitutional interpretation. For others, who acknowledge that 
original intent must somehow be relevant in interpreting constitutional text, 
but who believe that modern social circumstances must somehow be incorpo-
rated as well, ideological changes could be relevant. What is unclear, however, 
is how a notion that the ideology of some intellectual elite has evolved should 
affect the task of interpreting the Constitution. Purcell notes that even in the 
twentieth century, "the great majority of Americans ... simply acceptO de-
mocracy as an ethical good on grounds of tradition, faith, habit, and necessity." 
Id. at 169. If participants in the prevailing political culture, :i:Ilcluding gov-
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a. Republican Perspectives 
i. On the Interests of the Speaker 
From the perspective of democracy with a republican em-
phasis, not even all self-expression intended to persuade would 
be worthy of the highest solicitude. The pursuit of short-term 
personal interests through speech intended to persuade others 
is at odds with the republican ideal of disinterested delib-
eration about the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community. Madison surely would not conclude that govern-
ment should be permitted to prohibit self-interested, speaker-
driven self-expression simply because such speech fails to abide 
by the ideals of republicanism. Despite this, he would be able 
to distinguish between the high value of discourse about the 
general good and the lower value of discourse about personal 
interest. 
One who seeks to sell a market-driven message, however, 
has no purpose of participating in public discourse at all. 
Rather, the seller of the market-driven message seeks simply to 
engage in commerce as a participant not in the marketplace of 
ideas, but the marketplace of products. He is neither con-
tributing to the community that with which republican deci-
sionmaking is concerned-each citizen's honestly held views 
about the community's interest; nor is he seeking to get from 
the community that to which republican decisionmaking views 
as his entitlement-the community's careful consideration of 
the merits of his views. He is thinking about selling a product. 
The product may be formed with words and symbols, but the 
ideas conveyed are not being put to uses relevant to republican 
democracy and its creation of public policy. He is not concerned 
about persuading or being persuaded. Thus, he should be 
viewed as no more entitled to the First Amendment's special 
solicitude than is the manufacturer of shoes, sailboats, or sau-
nas. ISO 
ernment officials, continue to believe (or speak as if they believe) in democracy 
in a morally vague, unskeptical, and nonempirical way, it is difficult to justify 
the proposition that these intellectuals' skepticism about any moral basis for 
democracy should provide the perspective from which the First Amendment's 
meaning is constructed. 
150. Meiklejohn did not address this question, but did address another that 
goes further than is necessary here. For Meiklejohn, even some who express 
their own ideas are not engaged in the protected "freedom of speech": 
The First Amendment was not written primarily for the protection of 
those intellectual aristocrats who pursue knowledge solely for the fun 
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Alexander Meiklejohn invoked the republican notion of de-
liberation as an ideal approach to making public policy and the 
town meeting as a model of republican deliberation. Reasoning 
from the premise that the town meeting "is a group of free and 
equal men, cooperating in a common enterprise, and using for 
that enterprise responsible and regulated discussion,"151 Meik-
lejohn distinguished between mere "speech," which is not pro-
tected, and "the freedom of speech," which is protected. For 
Meiklejohn, "debaters must confine their remarks to 'the ques-
tion before the house.' ... If a speaker wanders from the point 
at issue, ... he may and should be declared 'out of order.' He 
must then stop speaking, at least in that way."152 For Meik-
lejohn, even a speaker who expresses his heartfelt views about 
one issue is not participating in the "freedom of speech" if the 
community has agreed to discuss another issue. It follows a 
fortiori from this republican perspective that if an actor is not 
expressing his personal views at all-let alone his personal 
views on "the permanent and aggregate interests of the com-
munity"-he is not "cooperating in [the] common enterprise," 
and he is not participating in "freedom of speech.''153 
Indeed, Meiklejohn himself suggested that 
[t]he radio as it now operates among us is not free. Nor is it entitled 
to the protection of the First Amendment. It is not engaged in the 
task of enlarging and enriching human communication. It is engaged 
in making money. And the First Amendment does not intend to 
guarantee men freedom to say what some private interest pays them 
to say for its own advantage. It intends only to make men free to say 
what, as citizens, they think, what they believe, about the general 
welfare.154 
of the game, whose search for truth expresses nothing more than a 
private intellectual curiosity or an equally private delight and pride 
in mental achievement. It was written to clear the way for thinking 
which serves the general welfare. 
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 45-46. 
151. Id. at 23. 
152. Id. 
153. In discussing deliberation, Meiklejohn emphasized the importance of 
articulating all viewpoints rather than enabling all individuals to articulate 
their beliefs. Thus, nine people whose views are the same as one already ex-
pressed might be denied the opportunity to speak, in favor of one person who 
wishes to express views that have not yet been heard. This is a perspective 
rooted in republicanism rather than pluralism. See id. at 94-98. 
154. Id. at 104; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 17-18 (observing that 
"[n]ewspapers and broadcasting stations in turn operate largely ... on the 
profit principle"). 
504 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:451 
11. On the Interests of the Listener 
One might object to this suggestion on the ground that al-
though the seller of the market-driven message may not be 
concerned with the ideas being disseminated, the consumers-
or the "audience"-are so concerned. Indeed, the audience 
might crave the market-driven message. Furthermore, con-
suming the market-driven message that has been sold for profit 
might affect the way people think, just as can listening to the 
speaker-driven message that has been disseminated to 
enlighten. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that 
[i]t cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium 
for the communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and 
behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a politi-
cal or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which charac-
terizes all artistic expression. The importance of motion pictures as 
an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are de-
signed to entertain as well as to inform.155 
From the perspective of a First Amendment rooted in a democ-
racy with a republican emphasis, however, these objections are 
misplaced. 
The market-driven message when sold for profit might well 
be desirable to people but surely not all that is valuable in the 
marketplace of commerce-as is the latest fashion in sneakers 
or automobiles-warrants protection as "speech" in the republi-
can marketplace of ideas. Although people might crave the 
market-driven message as entertainment and escapism, their 
consumption of the message hardly draws upon the responsible 
characteristics of the American citizen that forces herself to fo-
cus, with discipline, on the difficult task of thinking carefully 
about public policy. Indeed, for the audience as republican citi-
zens, what is of distinctive constitutional value is information 
about each other's honestly-felt and well-considered views. 
Only this information enables people to make collective judg-
ments about the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community. One who seeks to sell the market-driven message 
155. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (footnote 
omitted). Justice Clark continued, "'The line between the informing and the 
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of [a free press]. Everyone is fa-
miliar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's 
amusement, teaches another's doctrine.'" Id. (quoting Winters v. New York, 
333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)). This Article's analysis is concerned with defining 
this "elusive" line in terms of the intent with which speakers speak and listen-
ers listen. 
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fails to reveal his views at all, let alone his views about the 
general interest.156 
To be sure, the audience might be thinking thoughts, and 
want to think particular thoughts, when pursuing television 
shows or movies for entertainment. But people think when 
they commit crimes, play tennis, use drugs, and have sex, and 
they engage in those activities with a goal of having certain 
thoughts and experiencing particular feelings. But a republi-
can rooted First Amendment implies a privileged status for 
speech in which speaker and listener think specifically about 
identifying the permanent and aggregate interests of the com-
munity; not for activities simply because they might trigger 
thoughts. 157 
Furthermore, to the extent that the consumers of the 
market-driven message spend their time engaged in such en-
tertainment, they have less time and attention to devote to 
speakers who are engaged in self-expression through the 
speaker-driven message. Engaging in entertainment is not 
equivalent to engaging with one's fellow citizens about commu-
nity values and public policy.158 People seek entertainment to 
satisfy certain immediate desires. Entertainment displaces an 
156. Although the market-driven message does, indeed, contain messages 
and convey ideas received by the audience, the content of the market-driven 
message is determined by what appeals to large numbers of people for enter-
tainment or escapism. See, e.g., Broadcast Services; Financial Interest and 
Syndication Rules, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,242 (1991) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.662) 
(removed from C.F.R. in 1996). Thus, the messages are likely to reflect the 
short-term and personal desires of the community. These desires may well not 
even concern public or governmental matters. Even if disseminators of the 
market-driven message intended these ideas in a speaker-driven way (which 
by definition they do not), they would be second-class ideas from the republi-
can perspective. The ideas conveyed would not concern the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community. 
157. From this perspective, the freedom of speech is not exercised unless 
both speaker and listener seek a meeting of the minds, a common understand-
ing, about the general welfare. Meiklejohn expressed such a view, in suggest-
ing that the First Amendment's 
purpose is to give every voting member of the body politic the fullest 
possible participation in the understanding of those problems with 
which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal. When a free 
man is voting, it is not enough that the truth is known by someone 
else .... The voters must have it, all of them. The primary purpose of 
the First Amendment is, then, that all the citizens shall, so far as pos-
sible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life. 
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 88-89. 
158. See Collins & Skover, supra note 37, at 1105 ("The human drive for 
pleasure, fueled by so many aspects of a highly capitalistic and technological 
society, is greatly accelerated by the amusement medium."). 
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individual's consideration of his own long-term interest, let 
alone his consideration of the permanent and aggregate inter-
ests of the community.159 
Alexander Meiklejohn and his town meeting are again in-
structive. For the town meeting as a model of republican deci-
sionmaking processes, 
the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers, but the 
minds of the hearers. The final aim of the meeting is the voting of 
wise decisions .... And this, in turn, requires that so far as time al-
lows, all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and 
fairly presented to the meeting .... 
. . . What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that 
everything worth saying shall be said .... Just so far as, at any point, 
the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with 
information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is rele-
vant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-
balanced planning for the general good. It is that mutilation of the 
thinking process of the community against which the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution is directed. 160 
For Meiklejohn, therefore, it would be "out of order" for 
"twenty like-minded citizens" each to read the same position 
statement at the meeting-even if members of the audience 
might wish to hear the same tune sung over and over again. To 
do so would add nothing relevant to the community's delibera-
tion and, because time is necessarily limited, could prevent the 
consideration of different views that other members of the 
community espouse.161 
Thus, consumption of the market-driven message-core ac-
tivity in the entrepreneurial realm of consumer sovereignty-
seems an activity antithetical to the aspirations of citizen be-
havior in a republican democracy.162 Given our premises (for 
159. Id. ("[A] society that dedicates more than a quarter of every day to 
television is less likely to embrace the Madisonian ideals of critical discourse 
and civic participation."). 
160. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 25-26 (emphasis in original). 
161. Id. 
162. Indeed, Meiklejohn belittled discourse intended to shape ideas, and 
received by an audience in that spirit, when the mutual concern of speaker 
and listener was self-interest rather than the public good. He recoiled against 
Holmes's prescription that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Id. at 86; see supra notes 
133, 142-43 and accompanying text. Pursuant to this Holmesian perspective, 
a pluralist perspective, 
[w]e Americans ... have taken the "competition of the market" prin-
ciple to mean that as separate thinkers, we have no obligation to test 
our thinking, to make sure that it is worthy of a citizen who is one of 
"the rulers of the nation." Each one of us, therefore, feels free to think 
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this section) that speech is protected because of its role in ena-
bling the processes of republican decisionmaking, there is no 
good reason to accord decisions to sell or to consume the mar-
ket-driven message a privileged status-especially in the face 
of potential government efforts to displace the disseminators of 
market-driven messages with those who wish to engage in 
speaker-driven self-expression. The point, again, is not that 
the government must regulate decisions to sell the market-
driven message under a republican-oriented First Amendment, 
but that it may. 
b. Pluralist Perspectives 
Because republicanism is so far removed from American 
political practice, it is a weak and unlikely perspective from 
which to define the parameters of the First Amendment's "free-
dom of speech." People pursue short-term and personal inter-
ests pervasively, both in politics and in private interaction. 
Thus, a pluralist model of politics provides a far better fit. 
The Federalist's notion of pluralism seemed to contain both 
descriptive and prescriptive elements. It was descriptive (and, 
indeed, disappointed) in noting ways in which voters, through 
selfishness or shortsightedness, might fail to pursue the perma-
nent and aggregate int~rests of the community. But The Fed-
eralist's view of pluralist democracy is prescriptive when com-
paring it with circumstances that deviate even more from a 
republican ideal. Thus, Madison implies that majority faction 
is to be preferred to minority faction, because at least the for-
mer vindicates the majoritarian element of "the republican 
principle": 
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the 
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister 
views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may con-
vulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its vio-
lence under the forms of the Constitution.163 
Many versions of pluralism are rooted in an additional 
moral notion about the equal political status of each voter.164 
as he pleases, to believe whatever will serve his own private interests. 
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 86. 
163. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
164. See, for example, Wesberry v. Sanders, where Justice Black, for the 
Court, determined that "in its historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2, 
that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means 
that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to 
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be worth as much as another's." 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (citations omitted). 
Justice Black relied on the proposition that "[o]ne principle was uppermost in 
the minds of many delegates: that, no matter where he lived, each voter 
should have a voice equal to that of every other in electing members of Con-
gress." Id. at 10. Whatever question there might be as to whether most 
(rather than simply many) delegates favored such a principle of political 
equality, it seems clear that voter equality has been a long and substantial 
strand in American political discourse. Although disagreeing with Justice 
Black that the framers intended to mandate "one person, one vote" for con-
gressional elections, Justice Harlan acknowledged that "many, perhaps most, 
of them also believed generally . . . that within the States representation 
should be based on population." Id. at 27. Justice Harlan also noted that 
Congress has periodically enacted legislation under Art. I, § 4 requiring that 
congressional districts contain "as nearly as practicable an equal number of 
inhabitants." Id. at 42-43; see also WOOD, supra note 134, at 259-61. The 
point here is not to establish that Wesberry was correctly decided or that it 
was not. Rather, it is that the value of political equality has been a consistent 
theme in American thought about democracy, even from a pluralist perspec-
tive in which republican ideals were ignored or deemphasized. Cf. Gray v. 
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("The conception of political equality from 
the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fif-
teenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-
one person, one vote."). 
In 1816, Thomas Jefferson asserted that "a government is republican in 
proportion as every member composing it has an equal voice in the direction of 
its concerns ... by representatives chosen by himself." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533, 573 n.53 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Ker-
cheval, in 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1816-1826, at 38 (Paul Leices-
ter Ford ed., 1899)). 
Robert Wiebe describes the development of fractured political parties and 
homogeneous local political "lodges" in the 1840s. He notes, 
A grudging acceptance of differences sufficed to give 19th century 
lodge politics its distinctive form of equality. It was an equality that 
had nothing to do with a beliefin everybody's worth or in everybody's 
right to his own habits, customs, and faith. It implied no willingness 
whatsoever to rub elbows with strange people .... Hate ... played an 
important role in defining the culture of lodge politics. 
This equality was strictly procedural: preparing for elections, vot-
ing, participating in the results, and on round again .... Participation 
trained citizens-in effect, it made people citizens. 
Decentralization was crucial to this process. So was the general 
leveling of authority that generated a sense of all groups holding 
some for themselves and no group holding a great deal for any pur-
pose. It was a curious validation of James Madison's faith that in an 
extensive republic, suspicious, fragmented factions would police one 
another's power .... 
But what held all this together? The political parties themselves 
fell short .... What gave heterogeneity its wholeness in the 19th cen-
tury, what created unity, pure and simple, out of this diversity, was 
the single moment of a general election. Here democratic culture 
came full circle. At the beginning, it was the franchise that defined 
each white man as the equal of every other, validated his right to self-
determination, and invested him with public authority. At the end it 
was using those same badges of sovereignty that transformed other-
2000] SELLING THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE 509 
Unless a voter's neighbors inform him of their desires, he can 
decide neither how to persuade them nor how to compromise 
with them. To respect the equal political status of each mem-
ber of the community, therefore, pluralist decisionmaking de-
pends upon exchanges of earnestly held beliefs and ideas. 
Such a prescriptive notion of pluralism posits the right of 
citizens to pursue their personal and short-term interests 
through persuasion and voting.165 Democracy with a pluralist 
wise scattered, suspicious men of every type and persuasion into one 
governing People .... For that instant, they were the American Peo-
ple. Then the moment passed; they left as they had come, with all 
their divisive attachments intact. 
WIEBE, supra note 139, at 81-83; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 20 (ob-
serving that Madisonian democracy is founded on "political equality" and that 
"[a]t least in the public sphere, every person counts as no more or no less than 
one"). 
165. It is hardly deniable that democracy in American constitutional law 
has rested on a normative foundation. From the Constitution's Preamble, in 
which "the People of the United States" claimed the right to create their pre-
ferred government, to Justice Marshall's acknowledgment in Marbury v. 
Madison that "the people have an original right" to the government they want, 
political actors were speaking and acting not as descriptive chroniclers and 
combatants wielding raw power but as participants in a normatively rooted 
enterprise. 
Prescriptive versions of pluralism also frequently posit that each individ-
ual has an equal right to participate. See ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 8 (1967). Dahl's 
interpretation of the pluralist impulse in America posits the Virtue of "multi-
ple centers of power ... to tame power, to secure the consent of all, and to set-
tle conflicts peacefully ... because constant negotiations among different cen-
ters of power are necessary in order to make decisions." Id. at 24; see id. at 40. 
Robert Wiebe sees a similar commitment to equality in America's "logic" of 
democracy, in both its variant emphases on individual (pluralism) and commu-
nity (republicanism) even at a time when only white men enjoyed an equal 
moral status: 
Since all white men governed themselves equally as individuals, all 
white men combined as equals to govern themselves collectively. In-
dividually, each white man made his contribution to the whole, an 
additive idea about citizenship that could be traced back to Aristotle. 
Collectively, all white men formed the governing people, a holistic 
idea about civic life that only congealed early in the 19th century .... 
WIEBE, supra note 139, at 15. 
This notion of political equality is reflected in the way in which the Su-
preme Court has interpreted the Constitution to allocate voting rights. "One 
person, one vote" is a foundational characteristic of pluralist democracy. No 
one is entitled to have his personal preferences count for more than those of 
his neighbors in the law's accommodation of private interests. In Wesberry v. 
Sanders, Justice Black characterized a prevailing view at the Constitutional 
Convention: "[N]o matter where he lived, each voter should have a voice equal 
to that of every other in electing members of Congress." 376 U.S. 1, 10 (1964). 
In Reynolds v. Sims, Chief Justice Warren articulated similar sentiments: 
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emphasis responds to the problems created because each in-
dividual's consciousness is separated from each of his fellows'. 
We are separated beings, with personal values and interests, 
and we all wish to maximize the benefits we gain from this life. 
Because our desires may conflict, each of us might potentially 
limit the extent to which others might benefit from their lives. 
Because our desires may coincide, each of us might potentially 
help others to increase satisfaction and happiness. 
Thus, democracy with a pluralist emphasis is concerned 
with providing a system that can, as justly as possible, create 
the rules by which the conflicting interests of intrinsically 
valuable human beings are resolved. It is also concerned with 
providing space within which individuals can communicate 
about their concerns and interests, toward maximizing the ex-
tent to which those interests are cooperatively vindicated 
within the confines of existing law. 
i. On the Interests of the Speaker 
For pluralist democracy, "speech" is the means through 
which each citizen may endeavor to garner support for his pref-
erences.166 Thus, to qualify as "speech," communication must 
[E]ach and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective 
participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies. 
Most citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters 
through the election of legislators to represent them. Full and effec-
tive participation by all citizens in state government requires, there-
fore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of 
members of his state legislature. 
377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). 
Prescriptive rules of the political process-and the separation of the eco-
nomic sphere from the more fundamental sphere of politics (the sphere within 
which the rules for economic transactions are made)--can be derived from a 
premise of political equality and are reflected in the near universal view that 
it is permissible and desirable to prohibit vote buying. During the pluralist 
trends of the early nineteenth century, when political equality was a driving 
theme among "white men," to use Robert Wiebe's phrase, the Governor of New 
York proposed in 1852 that a person who tries to bribe a voter should lose his 
own franchise. WIEBE, supra note 139, at 71. To corrupt another's expression 
of political will, in other words, was such a violation of the rules of the game 
that one deserved to be disqualified from playing. Each individual has a right 
to pursue his own preferences in public policy, but only to the extent of 
exercising one vote. 
166. Gordon Wood reports the views held by organizations of New York ar-
tisans in 1765: "Self-interest is the grand Principle of all Human Actions .... 
And in the great essential Interests of a Nation, ... as every individual is in-
terested, all have an equal Right to declare their Interests, and to have them 
regarded." WOOD, supra note 134, at 246 (second emphasis added). Wood 
2000] SELLING THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE 511 
be undertaken with an intent to persuade others to embrace 
the views articulated by the speaker. Activity that is not un-
dertaken with this intent to persuade is not "speech" because it 
is not relevant to the goals of pluralist decisionmaking-
providing the means by which people can maximize their prefer-
ences, as affected by the problems and potential from interaction 
with others, through persuasion.161 
Robert Bork has reasoned about the meaning of the First 
Amendment based on the notion that "the freedom of speech" is 
protected because it is necessary for democratic self-
government. He has argued that only when speech is "explic-
itly political" should it be deemed constitutionally protected.168 
notes that this was an early statement of notions of "popular pluralistic repre-
sentation" and "interest-group politics" that "would be more fully developed 
over the following decades." Id. at 245-46. 
167. Justice White, dissenting in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765 (1978), made a similar point. In First National Bank, Justice 
White determined that a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporations from 
expending money to influence the vote on referenda proposals did not violate 
the First Amendment. He was concerned that political positions taken by cor-
porations do not necessarily reflect the values of shareholders. Although "in-
vestors are united by a desire to make money, ... [t]bis unanimity of purpose 
breaks down ... when corporations make expenditures ... designed to influ-
ence the opinion or votes of the general public on political and social issues 
that have no material connection with or effect upon their business." Id. at 
805-06. White suggested, therefore, that "when a profitmaking corporation 
contributes to a political candidate this does not further the self-expression ... 
of its shareholders in the way that expenditures from them as individuals 
would." Id. at 806. Because, in bis view, "[i]deas which are not a product of 
individual choice are entitled to less First Amendment protection," id. at 807, 
any intrusion on the freedom of speech by the challenged statute was not so 
significant as to warrant its invalidation. 
168. Bork, supra note 26, at 20. On similar grounds, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has criticized the proposition that the protection of commercial 
speech is consistent with the notion that the First Amendment is "primarily 
an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy": 
I had understood this view to relate to public decisionmaking as to po-
litical, social, and other public issues, rather than the decision of a 
particular individual as to whether to purchase one or another kind of 
shampoo. It is undoubtedly arguable that many people in the country 
regard the choice of shampoo as just as important as who may be 
elected to ... political office, but that does not automatically bring in-
formation about competing shampoos within the protection of the 
First Amendment. 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
787 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. Collins & Skover, supra note 37, at 
1105 (expressing concern that television is problematic under the First 
Amendment because it makes citizens "less likely to embrace the Madisonian 
ideals of critical discourse and civic participation"). 
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A better view of what should qualify as protected speech 
from the perspective of a First Amendment rooted in pluralist 
democracy is substantially broader. From a pluralist perspec-
tive, "speech" surely does include discussion intended to per-
suade others about matters of public. policy, for through this 
discussion, individuals act to maximize the extent to which 
their concerns are vindicated. But, beyond this, a pluralist ra-
tionale for protecting speech would extend as well to discussion 
intended to persuade others to engage in private transactions 
within the confines of existing law and public policy. Of course, 
such speech has been treated as protected under conventional 
First Amendment doctrine. 
The concern of pluralist democracy is with the right of each 
individual to maximize the extent to which her preferences are 
vindicated in the context of relationships with others-whether 
in cooperation or in conflict.169 The reasons for a pluralist con-
cern for public policy-creating rules which, given a context of 
conflict and potential compromise among individuals, can pro-
vide the greatest satisfaction for the greatest number-apply 
with similar force to private interaction within existing public 
rules. Indeed, it would be odd if speech intended to induce {le-
gally permissible) private cooperation were deemed unpro-
tected, while speech intended to induce public action were 
169. Concern for the ability of each individual to pursue his particular con-
cerns was at the foundation of notions about voting rights and representation 
during the American revolutionary era. The notion of"virtual representation," 
in which one empowered element of society-for example, England-was 
viewed as naturally and properly taking account of and promoting the inter-
ests of another (and powerless) element of society-for example, the colonies-
was rejected in favor of demands for actual representation. "Apparently the 
interests of the individuals with the community were so peculiar, so personal, 
that the only ground and reason why any man should be bound by the actions 
of another who meddles in his concerns is, that he himself choose that other to 
office." GoRDON s. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787, at 182 (1969) (quotations omitted). Because the justification for actual 
representation is the existence of each individual's particular interests and the 
right of each individual to pursue those interests through voting, a freedom of 
speech derived from that right to vote should encompass the right honestly to 
articulate the individual's views and preferences, so that his fellows can mean-
ingfully take account of his desires. It would not extend, however, to "speech" 
that expressed other than the actor's own views and preferences. To hold 
otherwise would be to permit individuals to endeavor to manipulate the 
judgment and votes of others, who have an equal right to the consideration of 
their own unique concerns and preferences. One has a right to pursue one's 
preferences by voting, and by speaking. This analysis reflects a prescriptive 
notion of pluralism, rather than a more descriptive version that could 
countenance strategic behavior. 
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deemed protected.110 When private cooperation is induced, 
public action can be rendered unnecessary. Private cooperation 
within existing public rules enhances the satisfaction of the co-
operating individuals without harming the interests of the 
broader community as reflected in its public rules and poli-
cies.171 
170. One could, however, sketch such a scenario, based on a notion that 
private, voluntary interaction is inferior to public interaction. While such a 
notion might be consistent with certain strands of republicanism, a pluralist 
focus on individuals and their right to pursue personal desires provides no ba-
sis for drawing such a line. 
One also might draw such a line by reference to certain class or status-
based propositions. During the individualist and competitive 1840s, a person's 
status in the community could vary significantly depending on whether the 
person was viewed from an economic or political perspective. Wage earners, 
according to Robert Wiebe, were held in low social esteem, and suffered a vul-
nerable legal status. But as citizens, as political actors, they were the equals 
of other citizens: 
What did alter the wage earner's democratic standing was to change 
identities, then reenter public life through lodges that affirmed their 
members' independence: now no longer wage earners but Irish De-
mocrats or Iowa Grangers or Civil War veterans. By making them-
selves invisible as wage earners, their citizenship lost its ambigu-
ity .... [W]age earners recast themselves in work-neutral terms ... 
and acquir[ed] public equality as they did. A democratic problem that 
could not be resolved in the working world, in other words, found its 
most effective answer in the political world. 
WIEBE, supra note 139, at 95-96. In its time, a notion that workers are the 
political equals of their fellow citizens, but socially inferior, suffered a deep 
internal tension. Even if at one time such a notion could have justified the 
proposition that speech directed toward public action is more valuable and 
worthy of protection than is speech directed toward voluntary and legal pri-
vate action, there no longer exists such a prevailing view about the social infe-
riority or incapacity of persons, at least as defined by reference to categories of 
economic activity or other private endeavor. 
171. Robert Wiebe suggests that in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
Americans emphasized the individual as a participant in democracy and that 
in this pluralist sense, "19th century democracy acknowledged no significant 
contradictions between individual self-interest and collective action. The Peo-
ple sacrificed no individuality." Id. at 83. 
Vincent Blasi argues that political rationales for the protection of speech 
provide no basis for viewing nonpolitical expression-such as literature or sci-
entific inquiry-as protected. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Char-
acter, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1567, 1569-70 (1999). This seems wrong, however, at 
least if the political rationale for protecting speech is made in a pluralist, 
rather than a republican, context. From the pluralist perspective, any speech 
seeking a meeting of the minds between two or mo:i;e people, within the law, 
enhances social welfare. Literature, to the extent reflecting a desire by an au-
thor to communicate her ideas to the reader, qualifies as valuable. Scientific 
inquiry so qualifies as well, as the researcher or theorist seeks truth and to 
disseminate her view of truth to persuade, or to be tested by, colleagues. 
Indeed, Blasi's own argument as to why speech should be viewed as con-
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Thus, the notion that speech is protected because it is nec-
essary for the operation of democracy with a pluralist emphasis 
readily extends to protecting "commercial speech"-that is, 
speech which "does 'no more than propose a commercial trans-
action."'172 From the liberal-pluralist perspective, the commu-
nication necessary to enable individuals to make mutually 
beneficial bargains within the parameters of existing law is just 
as important as is the communication necessary to enable indi-
viduals to make decisions about the merits of existing law.173 
That communication intended to persuade others about 
personal interests and private transactions should be deemed 
protected speech for a First Amendment rooted in notions of 
pluralist democracy does not at all imply that a choice to sell 
the market-driven message should be deemed protected as well. 
Decisions to sell the market-driven message do not express the 
views or desires of its disseminator. Rather, like the manufac-
turer of cars and sneakers, the entrepreneur has created a 
product by predicting market demand. His purpose is to satisfy 
and capitalize upon that market demand. 
Although such decisions to respond to anticipated market 
demand might be valuable from the policy perspective oflaissez 
faire and consumer sovereignty, they are irrelevant from the 
perspective of the freedom of speech with a pluralist emphasis. 
No one argues that choosing to produce and to sell a car with-
stitutionally valuable is instrumental in a way similar to the instrumental na-
ture of a pluralist rationale for protecting speech. According to Blasi, "a cul-
ture that prizes and protects expressive liberty nurtures in its members cer-
tain character traits .... Such character traits are valuable ... not for their 
intrinsic virtue but for their instrumental contribution to collective well-being, 
social as well as political." Id. at 1569. A pluralist rationale for protecting 
speech would not distinguish between self-expression that is expressly politi-
cal from that which is not. So long as the impetus for self-expression is to per-
suade others, one committed to pluralist democracy would value the speech as 
a potential vehicle for augmenting social welfare. 
172. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh 
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 
(1973)). 
173. See DAHL, supra note 165, at 17-18 ("If! hold that no one can, as a 
general matter, know my goals and values better than I myself, then no doubt 
I will insist that the process of making decisions must provide me with a full 
opportunity to make my views known; and even if I am willing to leave details 
to experts, I do not want anyone else to have more power over the decision, in 
the last say, than I do. A solution along these lines might well appeal to me as 
the best attainable, given the inescapable conditions ... that my need for hu-
man fellowship impels me to live in a society, that I cannot live with others 
without sometimes disagreeing with them, and that I must therefore find 
some way to adjust our conflicts that will appeal to all of us as fair."). 
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out seat belts is speech protected by the First Amendment. No 
one argues that choosing to purchase a car without seat belts is 
speech. No one argues that choosing to drive a car without seat 
belts is speech. These activities are not speech because they do 
not involve the expression of one's personal ideas for the pur-
pose of engaging the agreement of others or challenging the 
views of others. From this perspective, speech is the debate 
about the merits of existing law. Speech is the bargaining for 
voluntary transactions within existing law. The transactions, 
themselves, however, are not speech.114 
Of course, Coase, Posner, and Epstein argue that such vol-
untary transactions are no less socially valuable than is the 
speech that enables people to reach the agreement to engage in 
the transaction, and, indeed, that the transactions are no less 
socially valuable than is speech about public policy. Yet, even 
they attach this value, as a matter of constitutional law, not to 
the First Amendment's freedom of speech, but to the Fifth 
Amendment's protection of property. Contrary to their views, 
the conventional notion holds not only that production and con-
sumption decisions are not part of the First Amendment's free-
dom of speech, but also that norms of laissez faire are matters 
of policy discretion rather than constitutional mandate under 
the Fifth Amendment. 
The proponents of the "parity" of speech and property mar-
kets and those who assert the primacy of speech over property 
markets agree that transactions in property are not speech. 
Cass Sunstein, however, a proponent of the conventional wis-
dom, has presented an analysis that blurs the boundaries be-
tween speech and property markets. Indeed, he has apparently 
endorsed the Krattenmaker and Powe notion that laissez-faire 
market policies rooted in norms of consumer sovereignty are 
consistent with, and implicit in, the notion that the First 
Amendment protects a free "marketplace of ideas." 
17 4. In contrast, urging people to buy a car-an example of so-called 
"commercial speech" -is relevant to decisionmaking in a democracy with a 
pluralist orientation. Similarly, urging people to buy or watch the market-
driven message is relevant. When such advertising consists of speaker-driven 
messages, the actor is seeking to persuade others to act in a way that serves 
his interests. Cf. discussion infra Part III.C. Thus, a programming decision to 
carry and air Murphy Brown, to the extent animated by a concern to profit 
from predicted market demand, would not deserve special constitutional pro-
tection from the perspective of a First Amendment rooted in concerns for plu-
ralist democracy. A commercial urging people to watch Murphy Brown, how-
ever, could. 
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Sunstein says that this view "can be traced to Justice 
Holmes's great Abrams dissent, where the notion of a 'market 
in ideas' received its preeminent e:xposition."175 He elaborated 
on his understanding of this view: "Under the marketplace 
metaphor, the First Amendment requires-at least as a pre-
sumption-a system of unrestricted economic markets in 
speech. Government must respect the forces of supply and de-
mand."176 Sunstein rejects this Holmesian conception of the 
marketplace of ideas-as he interprets Holmes-because "it 
confuses modern notions of consumer sovereignty in the mar-
ketplace with democratic understandings of political sover-
eignty."177 He argues that "for purposes of assessing the sys-
tem of free expression, Madison's conception of sovereignty is 
the governing one."178 
Significantly, Sunstein's version of Madisonian majoritari-
anism is essentially republican, where citizens debate matters 
of public policy with "respect for the facts, a commitment to 
reasoned argument, and an effort to reach collectively benefi-
cial outcomes rather than to behave . . . in a narrowly self-
interested manner."179 Based on this republican understanding 
of the First Amendment, Sunstein argues that government 
should be freer than it has been to regulate television pro-
gramming: 
Democratic liberty should not be [confused] with "consumer sover-
eignty." ... People might well choose to view a silly situation comedy 
at night, while also enthusiastically supporting a [government] re-
quirement of media attention to public affairs. Their support of that 
requirement, operating through democratic channels, could reflect a 
reasoned judgment .... [D]emocratic judgments should prevail, so 
long as they do not intrude on anything that is properly characterized 
as a right. 180 
Sunstein thus addresses the relationship between con-
sumer sovereignty and the First Amendment. He suggests that 
government should be deemed relatively free to regulate televi-
sion programming decisions. His analysis is problematic, how-
ever, for two reasons. 
175. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 169 (1997) 
(emphasis added). 
176. Id. (emphasis added). 
177. See id. at 170-71. 
178. SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 72. 
179 . . see id. 
180. Id. at 73. 
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First, his argument that the First Amendment does not en-
compass consumer sovereignty is rooted exclusively in the nar-
row and unrealistic normative framework of republicanism. 
Consumer sovereignty may be at odds with a republican pur-
suit of the long-term general welfare, but so is interest group 
politics. Yet, Sunstein does not argue that self-interested po-
litical persuasion is beyond the freedom of speech protected by 
the First Amendment. Indeed, he neglects the relationship be-
tween self-interested persuasion and the First Amendment. 
Second, by equating Holmes's notion of the "marketplace of 
ideas" with consumer sovereignty, Sunstein cedes Holmes to 
Director, Coase, and Epstein. Ironically, Sunstein thus as-
cribes some plausibility to their assertion that consumer sover-
eignty is a constitutional norm begging for vigorous protection, 
by linking it, at least rhetorically, to this conventional constitu-
tional metaphor of the speech "marketplace." If Sunstein is 
correct about the relationship between Holmes's speech mar-
ketplace and economic markets in speech, one would need to re-
ject Holmes and pluralism to justify rejecting Coase's views 
about the constitutional parity of speech and property markets. 
Recall Sunstein's proposition: "Under the marketplace meta-
phor, the First Amendment requires-at least as a presump-
tion-a system of unrestricted economic markets in speech. 
Government must respect the forces of supply and demand."181 
But Sunstein's analysis misinterprets the meaning of 
Holmes's commitment to the free competition of ideas in "the 
market." The facts about which Holmes wrote in his Abrams 
dissent involved the prosecution of advocates for the Russian 
Communist revolution. Abrams had distributed leaflets urging 
American factory workers to stop producing weapons that were 
to be used not only in the war against Germany, but also, he 
claimed, against the Russian revolutionaries. He was convicted 
of "incit[ing], provok[ing], and encourag[ing] resistance to the 
United States." 
This was unpopular speech, not sold for any anticipated 
economic profit, but expressed at great risk to the speakers. It 
had nothing to do with entrepreneurial motives to exploit the 
economic forces of supply and demand. Abrams had not deter-
mined that American factory workers wanted to hear calls for a 
political strike and that they would purchase his leaflets in or-
der to enjoy his message. Abrams was not engaged, in other 
181. SUNSTEIN, supra note 175, at 169 (emphasis"added). 
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words, with the production and sale of market-driven messages 
in a regime of consumer sovereignty. Abrams was expressing a 
personal viewpoint-and doing so at great risk to himself-and 
his purpose was to engage others in communication about right 
and wrong. 
In finding Abrams's speech constitutionally protected, 
Holmes suggested that the First Amendment requires free 
space for competition among proponents of different versions of 
the truth: 
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logi-
cal. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a 
certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes 
in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow [such] opposition ... 
seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, ... or that you 
do not care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either 
your power or your premises. But when men [realize] that time has 
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than 
they believe [in] the very foundations of their own conduct[,] that the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that 
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted 
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground 
upon which their wishes can be safely carried out. 182 
Holmes, of course, is talking about a "marketplace" of ideas 
in a highly metaphorical sense, having significant distinctions 
from an economic market. An economic market involves pro-
ducers whose calculations constitute supply curves and con-
sumers whose values constitute demand curves. Holmes views 
the free trade in ideas as "the best test of truth." When people 
test truth, they necessarily are engaged in an exploration of 
their own beliefs. Speakers can test truth only when engaged 
in self-expression.183 Listeners can test the truth of ideas only 
when exploring what they believe, not when simply experienc-
ing what they enjoy. Indeed, the truth that results when a 
thought gets accepted in the "market" does not involve eco-
nomic transactions at all. 
Voters did not pay Newt Gingrich for the privilege of em-
bracing his "Contract with America." The scientific community 
did not pay Albert Einstein for the opportunity to embrace his 
theory of general relativity. The American people did not pay 
Martin Luther King for his prescriptions on racial justice. 
These were not relationships between seller and buyer in the 
182. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added). 
183. For a consideration of "Socratic" exploration and the "devil's argu-
ment," see infra note 228. 
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regime of consumer sovereignty. These were relationships 
among people seeking some notion of "truth" in a context of 
mutual exploration. It was this sort of relationship, not that 
between producer and consumer, that Holmes had in mind. 
In short, Holmes does not equate the "truth" resulting from 
self-conscious argument about the virtues of communism ver-
sus the virtues of capitalism with the point of intersection.be-
tween a product's supply curve and its demand curve in eco-
nomic markets. Holmes's pluralist marketplace of ideas would 
not--as my foregoing analysis endeavors to suggest--equate 
the value of a television programming decision with the value 
of a political speech. Indeed, the notion of "truth" Holmes dis-
cusses involves determinations of right and wrong among peo-
ple self-consciously discussing and considering questions of 
right and wrong-like Abrams and the factory workers he was 
addressing. Neither the commercial television programmer, 
nor the manufacturer of trendy sneakers, is engaged in testing 
truth through speech when putting together a product to satisfy 
anticipated purchaser preferences in the regime of consumer 
sovereignty. 
Thus, while a notion of free trade in a regime of "consumer 
sovereignty'' would view efforts to sell the market-driven mes-
sage as fully worthy of protection as a property right, such was 
not Holmes's view of speech in Abrams. Indeed, Holmes's mar-
ketplace concept is tied to the significant second strand of 
Madisonian constitutionalism that Sunstein overlooked-the 
factional pursuit of self-interest. Madison viewed faction as in-
herent in politics. Because inherent, the speech engaged in by 
factions-self-interested political persuasion-must be viewed 
as a component of any "freedom of speech" that is constitution-
ally protected as necessary for democratic self-government. 
Thus, while Sunstein did conclude that consumer sovereignty is 
distinguishable from republicanism and its concomitant free-
dom of speech, he failed to consider whether consumer sover-
eignty is distinguishable from pluralism and its concomitant 
freedom of speech. 
*** 
The foregoing has suggested that from the perspective of 
democracy with a pluralist emphasis, speech is the means 
through which people can purposefully overcome their sep-
arated consciousness. Speech is the means though which both 
disagreement and agreement are revealed. Speech is the 
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means through which disagreement might be transformed into 
agreement through compromise. 
Speech enables transactions to occur in the regime of citi-
zen sovereignty-as the discussion that precedes voting and the 
enactment of laws. Secondarily, speech enables transactions to 
occur in the regime of consumer sovereignty-as the bargaining 
that precedes contract's meeting of the minds-so long as those 
transactions sought to be induced are within the boundaries of 
existing law. Thus, from the perspective of democracy with a 
pluralist emphasis, activity does not involve speech unless both 
the communicator and the recipient are self-consciously en-
gaged in a dynamic of informing, and learning about, each 
other's views. 
From the perspective of a First Amendment rooted in de-
mocracy with a pluralist emphasis, the freedom of speech is 
comprised of efforts, self-interested· or not, to persuade others 
through self-expression. It is concerned, in other words, with 
communication-communication that can enable individuals to 
understand.one another, to identify differences, to reveal com-
monalities, to find circumstances where law must mediate pub-
lic conflict and where contract and exchange can exploit private 
agreement. Because decisions to sell the market-driven mes-
sage do not involve this communicative intent, they should be 
deemed unprotected by a First Amendment rooted in democ-
racy with a pluralist emphasis. 
ii. On the Interests of the Listener 
From the perspective of those who receive speech in a de-
mocracy with a pluralist emphasis, the constitutionally pro-
tected interest is in having access to solicitations, to efforts by 
their fellows to inform, to induce agreement, to find common 
ground, and to bridge difference. The value of speech is in in-
forming the listener what the speaker believes, or possesses, 
that could be of benefit to each. The value of speech is as the 
informational vehicle by which utility-enhancing exchanges can 
occur. This value is realized only when both the speaker and 
the listener participate, anticipating that there could be a meet-
ing of the minds between them. There can be no such meeting 
of minds when the disseminator produces or sells, and the au-
dience receives, the market-driven message, because the com-
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municator of the market-driven message has not expressed 
what is on his mind at all.184 
Joseph Burstyn's passages about the constitutionally pro-
tected status of motion picture entertainment suggests poten-
tial objections to this analysis: 
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium 
for the communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and 
behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from [a] direct espousal of a po-
litical or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which char-
acterizes all artistic expression. The importance of motion pictures as 
an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are de-
signed to entertain as well as to inform.185 
Burstyn thus implies two objections to the proposition that 
decisions to sell-and to consume-the market-driven message 
should be deemed unprotected (or low value) speech, from the 
perspective of the interests of listeners in a system of pluralist 
democracy. First, listeners may feel that they benefit from the 
market-driven message. Indeed, by definition, the market-
driven message-when produced as a product to be sold for 
profit in the regime of consumer sovereignty-is something 
that a good number of people want to hear. Second, the mar-
ket-driven message contains ideas, and the recipient of that 
message thinks thoughts because of it.186 Thus, one might ar-
gue that the audience's concern for market-driven speech is dis-
tinguishable from a consumer's concern for cars and sneakers. 
Market-driven speech affects the thinking of those who hear it. 
The sale and purchase of market-driven speech may be com-
merce, but it is commerce in words. From the perspective of a 
First Amendment concerned with enabling the processes of 
pluralist decisionmaking, these objections do not bear scrutiny. 
On the first objection: That people might feel they benefit 
from having access to the market-driven message (when sold 
for profit) is not a sufficient reason for concluding that from the 
perspective of the audience, a First Amendment rooted in the 
needs of pluralist decisionmaking should be deemed to accord 
to it a specially protected status. People feel that they benefit 
from having access to cars, sneakers, prostitution, cigarettes, 
184. Cf J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 32 (R.B. McCallum ed., 1946) (writing that 
people must hear arguments from those "who actually believe them; who de-
fend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them," rather than from 
others who may merely report the arguments). 
185. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (emphasis 
added). 
186. See id. 
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and any number of products and services that are routinely 
subject to extensive regulation. This, however, does not trans-
form these goods and services into protected speech. To qualify 
as valuable and protected "speech" for a First Amendment with 
a pluralist emphasis, the communicator must benefit the audi-
ence in a particular way-informing them of the communica-
tor's views. Only such honest communication enables the meet-
ing of minds, public or private, that pluralism celebrates. 
On the second objection: It is true that the market-driven 
message-even when sold for profit-contains ideas and that 
the recipient thinks thoughts in reaction to it. But from the 
perspective of a First Amendment rooted in pluralist democ-
racy, this also should not be sufficient to qualify the market-
driven message as protected speech within "the freedom of 
speech." Anything that humans create contains whatever ideas 
underlie the creation. Furthermore, as discussed above, people 
think thoughts in response to driving a car (with or without 
seatbelts), playing football (with or without a helmet), smoking 
cigarettes (with or without spiked nicotine), and every other ac-
tivity.187 When the audience interacts with a television show, a 
movie, or even a book as entertainment or escapism, its rela-
tionship to the communication is not relevant to the processes 
of pluralist democracy. The audience's use of the ideas cannot 
be to find common ground between disseminator (i.e., the tele-
vision programmer) and listener, because the disseminator has 
not expressed his views at all. With no prospect for a meeting 
of minds, there is no basis for finding that the audience has a 
privileged interest in receiving the market-driven message 
from the perspective of a First Amendment rooted in concerns 
for pluralist democratic decisionmaking. 
Thus, from a pluralist perspective, the relevant dynamic 
for analyzing the First Amendment value of an audience's con-
sumption of the market-driven message is one of economic 
transaction, by which I mean an exchange of goods for services, 
services for money, or other things of value to the participants. 
We never have considered such economic transactions to qual-
ify as constitutionally protected speech. Even Director, Coase, 
and Epstein do not make such an argument. Whether eco-
187. To be sure, there can be market transactions involving words and 
ideas as commodities. But from a pluralist perspective, speech is not a com-
modity but a medium. It is not the end, but a means to the end of creating 
agreement. A solicitation to purchase market-driven speech is protected. The 
market-driven speech itself is not. It is just another commodity. 
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nomic transactions should be deemed entitled to vigorous con-
stitutional protection under the Fifth Amendment as a property 
interest is an entirely different question. For the First Amend-
ment, however, when deemed concerned with according special 
protection to speech because of its essential place in democratic 
decisionmaking processes with a pluralist emphasis, this 
exclusion of the market transaction from the ambit of protected 
"speech" is entirely appropriate.188 
2. Personal Fulfillment Perspectives 
Republican and pluralist versions of democratic rationales 
for protecting the freedom of speech imply that an actor is not 
engaged in "speech" unless engaged in self-expression. Self-
expression, in this sense, connotes the communication of an in-
dividual's own values, beliefs, and views, for the purpose of 
testing those views against others' or persuading others to 
adopt those views. The individual looks within, decides what is 
most important to her at the time, and candidly expresses her 
views to test them against those of others or to persuade others 
to adopt them. -
Some have argued that whatever the value of self-
expression may be to democratic self-government, self-
188. While an economic transaction is not "speech," the negotiations and 
representations that precede the transaction are "speech." The sale of a pair 
of sneakers is not "speech." The negotiations and representations that precede 
that sale are "speech." A contract for the sale represents a meeting of the 
minds about the issue at hand, the fruit of the negotiations and represen-
tations. 
Likewise, the "sale" of the market-driven message-through dis-
semination and consumption-is a transaction in a commodity. Representa-
tions urging the sale of the market-driven message involve communication 
seeking a meeting of the minds and, therefore, are "speech." Thus, to the ex-
tent that a decision to broadcast Murphy Brown represents the sale of a mar-
ket-driven message, neither the broadcast nor its reception by the consumer 
should be deemed part of "the freedom of speech," so far as a First Amendment 
rooted in notions of pluralist democracy would be concerned. But the broad-
caster's advertisement for Murphy Brown, urging viewers to watch it, could be 
protected as "speech." Such expression could indeed communicate the true 
views of the actor-the Columbia Broadcasting System. It would be a 
speaker-driven message, seeking to induce a meeting of the minds between 
speaker and listener, leaving to the listener the decision that determines 
whether a meeting of the minds in fact occurs. Thus, the speech is a transac-
tion cost, rather than the commodity which is the subject of the transaction. 
This analysis assumes a personification of a corporation that might not be 
supportable. Whether corporations should be understood as "persons" for 
Fourteenth Amendment purposes, and for First Amendment purposes, is be-
yond the scope of this Article. 
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expression also is valuable because it promotes self-
fulfillment-i.e., that it is a particularly valuable method by 
which individuals achieve self-realization. Thus, a concern for 
self-fulfillment could provide a rationale for placing special 
value--and, perhaps, constitutional value--on self-expression. 
Indeed, the personal fulfillment value was promoted by Thomas 
Emerson as a rationale for the protection of speech.189 It well 
fits contemporary impulses toward self-indulgence. Yet, it is a 
problematic basis for understanding why the framers of the 
First Amendment were concerned about "the freedom of 
speech." 
Frederick Schauer has noted two difficulties. First, to de-
termine whether a particular choice or activity would qualify 
for constitutional protection under the First Amendment as in-
formed by the personal fulfillment value, "the freedom of 
speech" must be defined by reference to this particular norma-
tive perspective. Second, to justify the proposition that speech 
warrants constitutional protection based on the personal ful-
fillment value, one must identify how "the freedom of speech" 
promotes personal fulfillment in a way significantly distin-
guishable from the way in which other activities contribute to 
personal fulfillment. 
People gain fulfillment, after all, from a wide range of ac-
tivities. Some are fulfilled by smoking marijuana. Others are 
fulfilled by manufacturing cigarettes, or driving recklessly, or 
building tall structures, or paying low wages. Indeed, the rela-
tionship between seller and buyer in the context of consumer 
sovereignty is one in which each seeks fulfillment, of one sort or 
another, from an exchange. Fulfillment in the sense of enjoy-
ment, or satisfaction, from putting one's desires into action fails 
to distinguish any notion of speech from other sources of en-
joyment or satisfaction. 
To justify the view that individual fulfillment underlies the 
Constitution's protection of speech, one must posit that there is 
something special about speech as a source of individual ful-
fillment that justifies (and justified to the framers) giving to 
that particular source of fulfillment a privileged constitutional 
status.190 Not even Director, Coase, and other proponents of 
189. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 
(1970). 
190. See Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 
1284, 1290-92 (1983) (discussing the significance of self-fulfillment as a ra-
tionale for protecting speech). 
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the notion that speech markets and property markets are of 
equal value, argue that "speech," ''liberty," and "property'' have 
indistinguishable constitutional meaning. Ross Perot might 
well have been deeply fulfilled by building his businesses, and 
Donald Trump may be deeply fulfilled by building his struc-
tures, but neither speech absolutists who embrace the person~! 
fulfillment value nor proponents of speech and property market 
parity would likely claim that Perot's and Trump's business ac-
tivities should be privileged as speech under the First Amend-
ment. If the legal category of "speech" in the First Amendment 
is to have meaning distinct from the legal category of ''liberty'' 
or "property'' in the Fifth Amendment, one must identify the 
particular sort of personal fulfillment an actor gains by partici-
pating in the freedom of speech and why. this. sort of fulfillment 
is distinguishable from that gained from other activities. 
Schauer suggests that the best case version of self-
fulfillment as a justification for protecting the. freedom of 
speech is an Aristotelian notion of how people should seek ful-
fillment rather than an Epicurean notion of how people do seek 
fulfillment: 
This conception of the rich life is derived from ideas of personal 
growth, self-fulfillment, and development of the rational faculties. 
Under this conception, one who is enjoying the good life may be nei-
ther content nor euphoric in the ordinary sense. . . . He should feel 
satisfied in the knowledge that he is realizing his full potential. If it 
is the power of reason that distinguishes man from other forms of 
animal life, then only by fully exploiting this power. can one be said to 
enjoy a full life.191 
A purely subjective, Epicurean notion of self-fulfillment would 
fail to provide a rationale for according special constitutional 
protection to any particular source of self-fulfillment-whether 
speech, religion, or the pursuit of property. Indeed, the purely 
subjective definition of the good is a char~cteristic of consumer 
sovereignty. From this perspective, there may well be a par-
ity-though not an identity-between the markets of speech 
and property. What determines whether something is valuable 
is whether someone determines that it is valuable to hilnself. 
But, as Schauer correctly notes, the Cons.titution's specifi-
cation of speech for protection-and its additional specification 
of religion and property for protection-implies that each has a 
politically defined value-not a purely subjective value-that is 
191. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 49 
(1982). 
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distinct from the others. Invoking an Aristotelian notion of 
self-fulfillment-rational self-development-as a justification 
for valuing the freedom of speech can provide a political, rather 
than purely subjective, basis for identifying that which would 
warrant special protection as "speech." Indeed, Schauer finds 
an implicit definition of speech in the Aristotelian ideal: 
[M]inds do not grow in a vacuum. Intellectual isolationism is almost 
wholly inconsistent with intellectual development. . . . mntellectual 
self-development comes from communication of our ideas to others. 
Our thoughts are refined when we communicate them. Often we have 
an idea in some amorphous and incipient stage, but see it develop or 
see its weaknesses for the first time when the idea must be specifi-
cally articulated in a form intelligible to some other person. 
Seen in this light, communication is an integral part of the self-
development of the speaker, because it enables him to clarify and bet-
ter understand his own thoughts. Communication may also be in-
separable from the self-realization of the hearers, the recipients of 
communication.192 
This definition of the freedom of speech implicitly distin-
guishes speech from other sources of self-fulfillment. In so do-
ing, it is consistent with the conventional notion of constitu-
tional law that rejects a parity of markets in speech and 
property. It also is remarkably similar to the notion of speaker-
driven self-expression, disseminated for the purpose of enlight-
ening self and others, that this Article suggests is the implicitly 
proper definition of "speech" for a First Amendment dedicated 
to the promotion of democracy with either a republican or plu-
ralist emphasis. 
It is, furthermore, a definition of speech that excludes deci-
sions to create a market-driven message, and to sell that mes-
sage for economic profit. One who manufactures a market-
driven message does not identify his own ideas. He cannot re-
fine his ideas when communicating the market-driven message 
to others, because he has not presented his own ideas. The 
hearers cannot benefit from discourse about the "speaker's" 
ideas, again because the "speaker" has disseminated content 
derived externally, rather than from his own beliefs and values. 
Thus, whatever rational self-development comes from the self-
conscious and interactive search for understanding among 
uniquely intelligent human beings cannot come from the sale, 
or consumption, of the market-driven message. 
*** 
192. Id. at 54-55. 
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Those who believe that "the freedom of speech" is protected 
by the First Amendment because of the role that this freedom 
plays for individual fulfillment come perilously close to propo-
nents of consumer sovereignty who see a constitutional parity 
between markets of speech and property. Part of the value of 
consumer sovereignty, after all, is its promise of a mechanism 
for satisfying each individual bargainer, according to her own 
values. While proponents of consumer sovereignty profess to be 
agnostic about whether one source of fulfillment is better than 
another-leaving that decision to the individual-proponents of 
the freedom of speech based on norms of personal autonomy 
must see speech as a special source of fulfillment. Their diffi-
cult task, as Frederick Schauer has so effectively pointed out, is 
to explain why speech is special and to define what human ac-
tivities qualify as speech. 
Although proponents of property rights based on norms of 
consumer sovereignty and proponents of speech rights based on 
norms of personal autonomy are all concerned with the value of 
individual fulfillment, the boundaries between speech and 
property need not be breached. Each is a distinctive constitu-
tional category, implicitly with a distinctive meaning. Speech 
absolutists who deny a parity of markets must explain why the 
speech they see as absolutely protected is distinguishable from 
the property rights they see as minimally protected. Even pro-
ponents of consumer sovereignty who urge the parity of mar-
kets must respect the legally distinct categories of "speech" and 
"property" implicit in constitutional language. Parity of consti-
tutional value does not imply identity in constitutional mean-
ing. Thus, for both the speech absolutists and the proponents 
of consumer sovereignty, the fulfillment one gains from engag-
ing in speaker-driven self-expression must be distinguishable 
from the fulfillment one gains from selling the market-driven 
message. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that for both views of con-
stitutional law, one who sells the market-driven message is en-
gaging in activities to which the rights of property-not the 
rights of speech-are relevant. The difference between the 
speech absolutists and the proponents of consumer sovereignty 
is in the constitutional status of property rights. There should 
be no difference in their judgment as to whether selling the 
market-driven message is an exercise of speech rights or of 
property rights. 
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3. Copyright Perspectives 
The Constitution accords Congress power to "Promote the 
Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing, for limited 
Times, to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries." Commentators have con-
sidered whether there is a tension between Congress's copy-
right power and the First Amendment's prohibition of laws 
"abridging the freedom of speech."193 Through the copyright, an 
author has the right to forbid the dissemination of his work en-
tirely or to withhold it except upon terms satisfactory to him.194 
Enforcement of this right prevents persons who have not ob-
tained the author's consent from disseminating the copyrighted 
"speech." Some have argued that by preventing those who wish 
to use or to disseminate another's material from doing so with-
out her consent, copyright abridges of the freedom of speech for 
the would-be user,195 even as it protects the freedom of 
speech-more precisely, the concomitant "editorial discretion" 
not to speak-for the creator and those to whom she sells her 
rights.196 What, if anything, can copyright reveal about the re-
lationship between entrepreneurial decisions to sell the mar-
ket-driven message and the freedom of speech? 
The copyright power often is understood as having been 
granted to Congress toward securing "the general benefits de-
rived by the public from the labors of authors."197 This eco-
nomic rationale for copyright is concerned with the benefits de-
rived by the public from the economically motivated creativity 
of authors and can thus be understood as expressing the values 
of consumer sovereignty. It is based on the behavioral premise 
that "the provision of a special reward"-i.e., the limited mo-
193. See, e.g., 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT§ 1.lO[A], at 1-62.1 to -63 (1988). 
194. "Publication of an author's expression before he has authorized its dis-
semination seriously infringes the author's right to decide when and whether 
it will be made public." Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 551 (1985). 
195. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 193, at 1-63; cf. Miami Herald 
Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) ("[The] compulsion to publish 
that which reason tells [newspapers] should not be published is un-
constitutional." (quotations omitted)); Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression 
Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321, 395-407 (1989) (discuss-
ing authorities that state that copyright arguably protects the holder's First 
Amendment rights by safeguarding the interest in not speaking). 
196. See Samuels, supra note 195, at 401. 
197. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984) (quotations omitted). 
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nopoly rights in their writings and discoveries-would "moti-
vate the creative activity of authors and inventors,'~ to the bene-
fit of the consuming public: 198 
The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the 
owner a secondary consideration .... "The sole interest of the United 
States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the 
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors." It 
is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to 
the public of the products of his creative genius.199 
Thus, the author envisioned by this economic rationale for 
copyright is one who would not have produced a work but for 
the incentive of economic reward. William Landes and Richard 
Posner have conceived the author envisioned by copyright in 
these economically calculating terms: "For a new work to be 
created, the expected return-typically, and we shall assume 
exclusively, from the sale of copies-must exceed the expected 
cost."200 
Authors may, and frequently do, sell their copyright to 
publishers, broadcasters, and other mass disseminators of the 
authors' works.201 Those to whom the copyright is sold have all 
198. Id. 
199. Id. (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 
158 (1948)); see UJ.. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Copyright is based on 
the belief that by granting authors the exclusive rights to reproduce their 
works, they are given an [econoniic] incentive to create, and that 'encourage-
ment of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors' .... The monopoly cre-
ated by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the 
public." (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954))). 
200. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 327 (1989) (emphasis added). 
Copyright also has been justified by a competing notion that authors have 
"natural rights" "to reap the fruits of their creations ... and to protect the in-
tegrity of their creations as extensions of their personalities." CRAIG JOYCE ET 
AL., COPYRIGHT LAW § l.05[BJ (3d ed. 1994); see PAUL GoLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 165-70 (1994). Congress and the Supreme Court have 
seemed to reject this notion, which would justify Congress's copyright power 
"not because [authors] need protection as an inducement for their efforts, but 
rather because they deserve protection as an inherent natural right attaching 
to the act of creation." PAUL GoLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT§ 1.13.2 (2d ed. 2000); see 
also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 660-61 (1834); R.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909), quoted in Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 n.10 ("The en-
actment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitu-
tion is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writ-
ings, ... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and 
progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for 
limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings."). 
201. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
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rights to control the work that had been accorded to the crea-
tor. Indeed, in most circumstances, the owner of a copyright 
seeking its enforcement is a publisher, broadcaster, or other 
sort of entrepreneurial disseminator. For these actors, copy-
right does not serve to induce creativity; rather, the copyright 
induces entrepreneurial investment and sales toward maximiz-
ing return on the investment. Yet, the economic rationale for 
copyright is still applicable, for through the actions of these en-
trepreneurs, whose investment is protected by the copyright, 
the public gains access to products that otherwise would not be 
so readily available. 
Is there a conflict between copyright (as informed by an 
economic rationale) and the freedom of speech? Does copyright 
protect the First Amendment interests of authors (and publish-
ers) at the expense of the speech rights of would-be users? How 
should one understand the relationship between copyright and 
the freedom of speech? 
a. On the Interests of the Creator and Licensed Disseminator of 
Works 
This Article's analysis has thus far suggested that from the 
three normative perspectives underlying "the freedom of 
speech"-republican democracy, pluralist democracy, and per-
sonal fulfillment-there may well be no reason to view the au-
thor and entrepreneur who seek to sell a market-driven mes-
sage as engaging in activity warranting First Amendment 
protection. The author who creates a market-driven message 
for the purpose of selling it, and the entrepreneur who buys the 
market-driven message for the purpose of selling it, are the 
paradigmatic actors envisioned by the economic rationale for 
copyright-the author who needs the incentive of reward in the 
economic marketplace in order to create, and the publisher who 
needs protection for his property in order to invest.202 Thus, 
this Article's analysis implies that there may well be no reason 
to view their work as part of "the freedom of speech" entitled to 
special constitutional protection. From this perspective, then, 
the paradigmatic creators and entrepreneurs contemplated by 
539, 54 7 (1985) (explaining the common practice of authors to sell their rights 
to publishers). 
202. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 200, at 327 ("For a new work to 
be created, the expected return-typically . . . from the sale of copies-must 
exceed the expected cost."). 
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the economic rationale for copyright are not people engaged in 
the freedom of speech. 
In contrast, one who seeks to enlighten through dissemi-
nating a speaker-driven message--one who engages in self-
expression-has a motive to speak apart from the promise of 
economic reward. This is an individual who, like Martin Lu-
ther King, is concerned with the search for truth through self-
expression and who is willing to sacrifice time and other per-
sonal resources in order to persuade.203 This is not the actor 
envisioned by Landes and Posner, who creates a new work only 
when the anticipated economic reward exceeds the expected 
cost. This actor who, under the foregoing analysis, has the 
purest claim to protection as a participant in the First Amend-
ment's freedom of speech does not need the protection of copy-
right to induce his communication. This speaker would not 
seek the protection of copyright-at least for purposes of pro-
tecting the scarcity (hence commercial value) of his message--
and, indeed, presumably would be pleased if his message were 
disseminated as far and as wide as possible. 204 For the para-
digmatic speaker warranting First Amendment protection-the 
actor who pedagogically engages in speaker-driven self-
203. See King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); 
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 
1999); supra note 183 and accompanying text. This is not to suggest that per-
sons who are granted copyrights should be viewed as categorically excluded 
from the First Amendment's protection of "editorial discretion." In fact, copy-
right has not been constructed exclusively from an economic rationale. Be-
yond this, some actors who do engage in speaker-driven self-expression, and 
who might seek a First Amendment freedom not to speak, would have an in-
terest in seeking the protection of copyright, so long as the law provided it. 
The point is simply that if one relies on an economic rationale for copyright, 
the paradigmatic actor warranting copyright protection would be precisely the 
entrepreneur seeking to sell a market-driven message who, under the analysis 
presented in this Article, is least entitled to the First Amendment's protection. 
204. When Universal City Studios sued Sony for copyright infringement 
based on the sale of video tape recorders, Fred Rogers, producer and star of 
public television's Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood, did not object to home video re-
cording of his program. He was happy that this then-new technology would 
enable more people to see, and be influenced by, his program than otherwise 
would be the case. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 445 n.27. Rogers seems to be 
one who believes in the message his program conveys and who conveys that 
message for the purpose of enabling others to see his truths. He seems to en-
gage in the creation of a speaker-driven message and disseminates that mes-
sage to enlighten. In contrast, Universal City Studios was a profit-seeking 
corporation. It was concerned with maintaining control over access to its 
commercial programming to maintain its scarcity, hence its economic value 
and return. See id. at 420. 
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expression to enlighten self and others-the economic rationale 
for the protection of copyright is irrelevant.2os 
205. Again, this is not to argue that no rationale for copyright could war-
rant protecting one who speaks purely motivated by a desire to enlighten 
through self-expression. Rather, it is to suggest that the economic rationale 
for copyright does not extend to persons who are motivated to speak by a pur-
suit of truth rather than by a pursuit of profit. Indeed, some natural right no-
tion that authors should be entitled to control the use of their works by others 
could well justify according certain protections of copyright to those engaged in 
speaker-driven self-expression. The notion that an author has a right to con-
trol the use of his words, to maintain the meaning of his words as he intended, 
can even be understood as consistent with republican, pluralist, or self-
fulfillment rationales for the freedom of speech. But this justification for such 
protection is entirely separate from the economic rationale for copyright. 
The insistent objection concerned with the complexities of an actor's 
mixed motives in the real world must be confronted as well. Even if it is theo-
retically correct that one who speaks the truth purely as she sees it is the 
paradigmatic actor entitled to the First Amendment's protection, and one who 
purely seeks. profit by selling the speaker-driven message is the paradigmatic 
actor warranting the protection of copyright-and that there is no reason to 
extend the protections of one area of law to the other area's paradigm-the 
real world is not organized into such neatly defined categories. 
As previously suggested, rarely might it be said that an author is moti-
vated purely by a speaker-driven desire to enlighten, with no concern for mak-
ing money. Few have unlimited resources such that they can devote as much 
of their resources as they wish to self-expression. Most people must spend 
most of their time earning a living. In doing so, they sacrifice energies that 
otherwise might be devoted to self-expression. Authors-even those motivated 
primarily by a sense of art-who seek to earn a living through their writing 
may sacrifice the purity of self-expression so that their product might be more 
attractive to potential buyers. Perhaps no one can engage in pure self-
expression, undiluted or unaffected by the pressures of earning a living. Con-
versely, entrepreneurs concerned with maximizing the return on their invest-
ments might well choose to forgo a project that they view as excessively offen-
sive to their own values, no matter how profitable that project might prove to 
be. Perhaps no one engages in pure commercialism, unaffected by some sense 
of personal conscience. 
That reality is complex, and that motives cannot easily be ascertained, 
might justify a decision to create doctrines tending to accord First Amendment 
protection to entrepreneurs who sell speech and copyright protection to speak-
ers who seek to enlighten the world. If we cannot reliably apply a category's 
theoretical boundaries to real world complexities, then perhaps we should not 
try. This is a prophylactic or "breathing space" justification, however, and is 
very different from a proposition that entrepreneurs who sell words deserve 
First Amendment protection and that speakers who seek to persuade with 
self-expression deserve the protection of copyright. See supra notes 184-88, 
193-201 and accompanying text. 
Yet, concessions to the messiness of reality would be inapplicable to 
circumstances in which reality turns out not to be so ambiguous. 
Furthermore, such concessions might be achieved through legal doctrines 
specifically tailored to minimize the costs of erroneous determinations of fact. 
In short, the messy reality justification for a prophylactic decision extending 
copyright protection to the speaker not motivated by profit, and First 
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This Article has suggested that proponents of free eco-
nomic markets should disentangle their notions that commer-
cial television programmers are properly treated both as eco-
nomic actors in the regime of consumer sovereignty and as 
speakers exercising "editorial discretion" protected by the First 
Amendment. Rather, whatever constitutional interest against 
regulation such programmers have is properly conceived as a 
property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. The 
analysis now also suggests that copyright-to the extent that it 
covers actors because of, and relevant to, an underlying eco-
nomic rationale-does not protect First Amendment speech 
interests of either authors or publishers. Rather, it protects 
their property interests in maximizing the return on their 
investment. 
Does this proposition intensify a concern that copyright 
compromises the First Amendment? Does copyright infringe 
the constitutionally protected freedom of speech of would-be 
users simply for the sake of protecting the property interests 
(rather than the speech interests) of authors and publishers? 
b. On the Interests of Users 
The analysis developed thus far would suggest that any 
putative copyright violator's First Amendment rights should be 
understood as depending on his motive for dissemination. If 
the nonauthorized disse.minator does not personally believe in 
the message contained in the copyrighted work and is not con-
cerned with its dissemination to enlighten others, he is not con-
cerned with engaging in discourse about which a First Amend-
ment with either a pluralist or a republican emphasis would 
have special concern. He is, furthermore, not engaged in Aris-
totelian self-expression, such that the personal fulfillment ra-
tionale for the freedom of speech would be applicable. Indeed, 
if the nonauthorized disseminator views the copyrighted work 
simply as a product to be offered in the economic marketplace 
and sold for a profit, a pluralist, republican, or Aristotelian 
tection to the speaker not motivated by profit, and First Amendment protec-
tion to the entrepreneur who uses words, leaves room for other ways of dealing 
with the messy reality problem. In contrast, justifying First Amendment pro-
tection for the entrepreneur, and copyright protection for the actor seeking 
enlightenment, on the proposition that each actor deserves the protection of 
both areas oflaw would render the parsing of mixed motives and factual com-
plexities irrelevant. The point here is to challenge this notion of just desserts 
and to suggest the importance of endeavoring to parse motives, however com-
plex that task might be. 
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rooted First Amendment should be no more concerned with 
state enforcement of the copyright holder's property right than 
it would be with state enforcement of any law prohibiting the 
theft of private property.206 
The proposition that "the freedom of speech" and copyright 
can be understood as envisioning paradigmatic actors with very 
different motives and intent is reinforced by the doctrine of 
"fair use." "Fair use" defines circumstances in which it is not a 
violation of copyright for unauthorized persons to disseminate 
or otherwise to use copyrighted material. Congress has identi-
fied four factors that are 
especially relevant in determining whether the use was fair ... : (1) 
the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; (3) the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; (4) the effect on the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.207 
The first factor is concerned with the putative violator's 
reasons for using the copyrighted material. In the preamble to 
§ 107, Congress has identified six purposes for which an unau-
thorized user may have acted that would establish eligibility 
for a finding of "fair use": "purposes such as criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for class-
room use), scholarship, or research [are] not an infringement of 
copyright."208 The Supreme Court has noted that in evaluating 
206. The analysis applies as well for state imposition on the liberties of an 
authorized disseminator of an author's copyrighted work. Indeed, this is the 
scenario which has been the primary concern of this Article-state imposition 
on the discretion of broadcasters who have purchased authors' copyrights or 
who are authorized disseminators of authors' copyrighted works. If the gov-
ernment were, for example, to mandate free prime-time television broadcast 
time for political candidates, it arguably would have displaced market-driven 
decisions to sell a product with speech higher on the hierarchy of values en-
compassed by "the freedom of speech"-speaker-driven messages disseminated 
to enlighten. 
Of course, one might suspect that many political commercials are not ex-
amples of the speaker-driven message intended to enlighten. Political candi-
dates notoriously pander to the electorate, creating market-driven messages 
with polls and focus groups, with the intent to benefit on election day from an 
existing distribution of values. For consideration of whether an effort to pan-
der with the market-driven message should be deemed worthy of special con-
stitutional protection, whether it should be deemed more worthy than efforts 
to sell a market-driven message, and whether a candidate's pandering in a po-
litical advertisement is constitutionally distinguishable from a corporation's 
pandering in a product commercial, see infra Part III.C. 
207. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560-61 
(1985). 
208. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1992). 
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"the purpose and character of the use" under factor one, "[t]he 
[inquiry] here may be guided by the examples given in the pre-
amble to § 107, looking to whether the use is for criticism, or 
comment, or news reporting, and the like."209 
Furthermore, § 107 indicates that "the commercial or non-
profit character of an activity, while not conclusive with respect 
to fair use, can and should be weighed along with other factors 
in fair use decisions."210 Indeed, an actor's commercial intent to 
sell copyrighted material for profit weighs against a finding of 
"fair use." "The fact that a publication was commercial as op-
posed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh 
against a finding of fair use. '[E]very commercial use of copy-
righted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the 
monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copy-
right."'211 
Thus, when purposes such as criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching, scholarship, or research are pursued for 
profit, the Court has seemed concerned about the degree to 
which a potential infringer was motivated by the statutorily fa-
vored purposes, and how much it was motivated by a bare con-
cern for profit. In Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. The Nation, 
for example, the Court found that one magazine's use of pas-
sages from Gerald Ford's memoirs (which were licensed to an-
other magazine), did not constitute "fair use." In considering 
the purpose of the use, the Court determined that a purpose of 
news reporting, per se, did not necessarily weigh in favor of de-
fendant's use. Indeed, this defendant, The Nation, had admit-
ted a "purpose of scooping the forthcoming hardcover and Time 
extracts."212 Thus, "The Nation's use had not merely the inci-
dental effect but the intended purpose of supplanting the copy-
right holder's commercially valuable right of first publica-
tion.''213 Because "[fJair use distinguishes between a true 
scholar and a chisler who infringes a work for personal profit," 
The Nation's commercial motive, underlying its news reporting 
purpose, for using the copyrighted material weighed against a 
209. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994) (quot-
ing 17 u.s.c. § 107). 
210. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). 
211. Harper & Row Publishers Inc., 471 U.S. at 562 (quoting Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)) (alteration in origi-
nal). 
212. Id. 
213. Id. 
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finding of "fair use."214 The Court has, therefore, at least inti-
mated that while purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research may qualify a use 
as fair, a motive to enlighten, rather than one simply to profit, 
must underlie these purposes. 
One can understand these congressional choices and judi-
cial interpretations as consistent with the hierarchy of First 
Amendment norms developed in this Article. When under-
taken in a noncommercial context; the six purposes Congress 
has listed can all be understood as reflecting a purpose to 
enlighten with speaker-driven self-expression. Research and 
scholarship are paradigmatic examples of an actor's search for 
truth. Publication of research and scholarship are paradig-
matic examples of an actor's purpose to induce others to em-
brace-or to challenge-his understanding of the truth. And so 
it is with the purposes of criticism, comment, reporting news, 
and teaching-particularly when undertaken in a noncommer-
cial context. 21s When pursued in a noncommercial context, 
these purposes provide the strongest version of factor one-"the 
purpose and character of the use"-to support a finding of "fair 
use." These purposes to enlighten by disseminating one's true 
beliefs-these pedagogical objectives-have been identified by 
Congress as having a social value higher than either a copy-
right holder's commercial objectives (which must be tempered 
by "fair use") or another nonauthorized user's commercial ob-
jectives (which are far less likely to qualify as "fair use"). 
Thus, when viewed from a perspective resting on an eco-
nomic rationale, copyright is concerned with assigning priori-
214. Id. (quotations omitted); see also Ass'n of Am. Med. Coils. v. Mi-
kaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding an admission exam prepara-
tion course's use of copyrighted questions had a commercial rather than an 
educational purpose), aff d mem., 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984). 
215. These activities frequently may be pursued for profit. It does not nec-
essarily follow, however, that the critic, the reporter, the commentator, or the 
scholar chooses to disseminate a market-driven message rather than to engage 
in self-expression. One reporter, who works for a paper with a strong sense of 
journalistic ethics, may believe that what she reports is true, yet seek to profit 
from disseminating her information. Another reporter, who works for a paper 
that presents sensationalism to lure readers, may well not believe her report-
ing, but write what she (or her editor) believes the public wants to read. The 
latter engages purely in market-driven expression for sale; the former engages 
in mixed purposes of disseminating truth, but does so in an institutional con-
text that seeks to profit from the fact that there is an economic market for the 
truth. For a discussion of the First Amendment hierarchy of values given the 
reality of mixed motives, see infra Part III.B. 
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ties to the competing property interests of entrepreneurial crea-
tors, publishers, and users. It accommodates First Amendment 
concerns in part through notions of "fair use," which tend to 
view those seeking to enlighten self and others through 
speaker-driven self-expression as entitled to a right of fair 
use.216 Prohibiting entrepreneurial users from using copy-
righted material does not impinge on First Amendment con-
cerns, because the entrepreneurial user-under this Article's 
analysis-is not engaged in the freedom of speech. Permitting 
pedagogical users engaged in self-expression to use copyrighted 
material as a "fair use" does not impinge the freedom of speech, 
because there is no impingement.211 
In short, in defining the law of "fair use," congressional 
choices and judicial interpretations imply the hierarchy of 
norms that this Article's previous analysis has sought to reveal: 
a purpose to enlighten with a speaker-driven message is more 
socially valuable than is a purpose to sell a market-driven mes-
sage-notwithstanding the Director-Coase view about the "par-
ity" of markets. 21s This Article has suggested reasons to justify 
216. It is widely understood that copyright mitigates potential tension with 
the First Amendment through the notion that only particular forms of expres-
sion are protected, while ideas are not. See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 195, at 
322-23 n.1. 
217. In addition to "the purpose and character of the use," a finding of"fair 
use" depends on "(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1995). One can understand the re-
maining three factors relevant to finding "fair use" as consistent with-if not 
derived from-the proposition that self-expression for enlightenment is more 
socially valuable than is an entrepreneurial decision to sell a market-driven 
message. In particular, factors (3) and (4) can be understood as indicia of 
whether one who uses copyrighted material does so with the purpose of 
enlightenment through self-expression, or with the purpose of profiting from 
selling a market-driven message. The larger the portion of a work used, the 
less likely that the user is engaging in self-expression. The larger the effect on 
the potential market for the copyrighted work, the more likely that the user is, 
in fact, acting with the commercial purpose of affecting the copyright holder's 
market. 
218. A finding that a user acted with a noncommercial purpose does not, of 
course, mandate a finding of"fair use," nor does finding a commercial purpose 
preclude a finding of "fair use." See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 584 (1994). Congress might well have concluded that even noncommer-
cial uses of copyrighted material could excessively undermine the value of that 
material to the copyright holder. It also might well have concluded that cer-
tain commercial uses might only marginally undermine the copyright holder's 
economic value, thus serving the economic rationale for copyright both by hav-
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this proposition not just as a matter of policies that may under-
lie our copyright law, but as a matter of First Amendment pre-
scription, rooted in notions of the freedom of speech derived 
from pluralist, republican, and personal fulfillment perspec-
tives. 
C. DO CHOICES TO PANDER WITH THE MARKET-DRIVEN 
MESSAGE DESERVE SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION? 
POLITICIANS AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
[P]andering pays no regard to the welfare of its object, but catches 
fools with the bait of ephemeral pleasure and tricks them into holding 
it in the highest esteem. 
-Plato219 
One might object to this Article's analysis on the ground 
that its suggested constitutional devaluation of decisions by 
television programmers to sell the market-driven message 
might imply a similar devaluation of decisions by politicians to 
pander to voters with the market-driven message. Any sugges-
tion that a politician warrants the First Amendment's solici-
tude only when earnest and forthright in expressing her true 
beliefs, one might argue, is too far removed from conceivable 
reality to be seriously contemplated. Furthermore, if political 
pandering and entrepreneurial selling with the market-driven 
message are of equally low constitutional status, then mandat-
ing free television time for political candidates would seem to 
show favoritism for one type of low-status message over an-
other and, therefore, might violate the prohibition of content-
motivated regulations.220 These objections require considering 
whether there are reasons to attribute distinguishable consti-
tutional value to a politician's pandering with the market-
driven message and a television programmer's selling of the 
market-driven message. 
ing induced the original author to create, and by enabling a secondary author 
to use the original work-both to the benefit of the consuming public and 
norms of consumer sovereignty. Whatever particular balance Congress might 
have struck, the analysis suggests that pedagogical uses of material for 
speaker-driven self-expression are more likely to outweigh a copyright holder's 
commercial interests than is a competing entrepreneurial use. 
219. PLATO, GoRGIAS 46 (Walter Hamilton trans., Penguin Books ed. 
1980). 
220. For a consideration of whether content-motivated regulation of efforts 
to sell the market-driven message should be permissible under the First 
Amendment, see infra Part V.A. 
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This Article has identified two components of an actor's in-
tent in disseminating a message: first, the intent with which 
the actor develops the content of his message; and second, the 
purpose for which the actor disseminates that message. Both 
the politician's pandering and the entrepreneur's selling dis-
seminate the market-driven message-that is, a message the 
content of which is determined by predicting market demand.221 
The politician's pandering and entrepreneur's selling can 
be distinguishable, however, on the second element of commu-
nicative intent: the reason for dissemination. A politician who 
panders with the market-driven message may not believe what 
he is saying, but he does seek to persuade others about the vir-
tue of the message. A politician seeks to secure as many votes 
as possible. Thus, Bill Clinton advocated a middle class tax cut 
during his quest for the democratic nomination in 1992 and 
aired television commercials seeking votes on that basis. Four 
years earlier, George Bush advocated a constitutional amend-
ment "to protect the flag" against arsonists and aired television 
commercials seeking votes on that basis. 
An entrepreneur who sells the market-driven message does 
not care whether the purchaser embraces any particular ideas 
or values expressed. Rather, he is concerned with whether the 
consumer will be sufficiently attracted to the product-whether 
because of the stars, the characters, the setting, the stories-to 
"purchase" it in the first place and, perhaps, with whether the 
consumer is so satisfied with the product that she will want to 
"purchase" another version of it in the future. Thus, Rupert 
Murdoch presented Living Single and other programs geared 
toward an African-American audience. He may well not have 
been sympathetic to the messages conveyed (whatever they 
might have been) and was probably unconcerned with whether 
people embraced those ideas. As a rational profit maximizer in 
the regime of consumer sovereignty, Murdoch wanted ratings 
for his fledgling network. He wanted viewers to consume the 
programs as entertainment and advertisers to purchase the 
programs as products. He identified an underserved compo-
221. The market of values and preferences from which the pandering poli-
tician seeks to benefit is different from the market of values and preferences 
from which the entrepreneur seeks to benefit. Politicians speak to people in 
their capacity as voters; entrepreneurs speak to people in their capacity as 
consumers. For more on the proposition that the same individual thinks dif-
ferently about the same questions depending on the context in which she 
places herself, see infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
540 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:451 
nent of the viewer market and sought to create and to sell en-
tertainment products that would meet otherwise unfulfilled 
market demand. 
Indeed, the point about the absence of communicative in-
tent--the intent to persuade with an intended message-in 
selling a market-driven message is reinforced when one recog-
nizes that a politician's pandering has an analogous event in 
the context of commerce: the commercial advertisement. 
Through the advertisement, the seller wishes to persuade an 
audience of the merits of some product. This is the difference 
between commercials advertising Living Single and the pro-
gram itself. The seller wishes to persuade an audience of the 
value of some idea. A seller might, or might not, believe his 
message: that watching Living Single is the best way to spend 
half an hour after dinner, or that Coke is "The Real Thing," or 
that people will be better off for having joined "The Pepsi Gen-
eration." Advertising a product that was developed through 
market research is functionally equivalent to advertising a 
politician's positions that were developed through focus groups. 
Each seeks to capture and build upon predicted market de-
mand. 
Thus, whether there is some inconsistency in treating the 
politician's pandering as protected by the First Amendment, 
while denying such protection to a commercial television pro-
grammer's efforts to satisfy consumer demand, is not revealed 
simply by noting that both actors seek to use the market-driven 
message. Indeed, the Article has thus far considered only the 
appropriate status under the First Amendment of speaker-
driven self-expression and entrepreneurial decisions to sell the 
market-driven message. 
Because part of the earlier analysis stressed the impor-
tance of speaker-driven self-expression-Le., that a speaker ac-
tually believe the truth of the messages she conveys-as a con-
dition of value under the First Amendment, it would be helpful 
to consider the implications of this proposition for the proper 
constitutional status of the politician's pandering. The full 
question at this point would consider the constitutional status 
of the politician's pandering and the entrepreneur's pander-
ing-Le., an entrepreneur's advertising that does not express 
his actual beliefs about his product, but instead conveys a mes-
sage, designed to persuade, that he thinks his audience would 
want to hear. 
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1. Political Pandering versus Entrepreneurial Pandering from 
a Republican Perspective: "The Arts of Designing Men" 
Democracy with a republican emphasis values the expres-
sion of one's honestly held views about "the permanent and ag-
gregate interests of the community." Pandering, whether po-
litical or entrepreneurial, satisfies neither condition. First, 
pandering does not involve self-expression. It involves, in this 
sense, a lie. Second, both political and entrepreneurial pander-
ing also seem unlikely to be designed to appeal to notions about 
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. The 
pandering politician appeals to concerns and impulses at the 
forefront of voters' minds-the here and now rather than the 
permanent; the interests of the self rather than those of the 
community. Thus, a strict application of the republican ideal 
would find neither the politician's pandering nor the entrepre-
neur's pandering particularly worthy of protection as part of 
the freedom of speech. In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander 
Hamilton spoke of "the arts of designing men" as inducing the 
electorate to support "dangerous innovations" adverse to the 
long-term and general welfare.222 
The pandering commercial advertiser seeks to appeal to 
concerns even farther removed from the republican ideal. 
When politicians construct a market-driven· message with 
which to pander, they are attuned to polling data which taps 
into people's attitudes as voters about matters of public policy. 
When an entrepreneur constructs a market-driven message to 
advertise a product for sale, they are attuned to people's values 
as consumers seeking immediate gratification for the self. 
Thus, the pandering politician taps into audience values that 
are, at least arguably, more forward-looking and community 
oriented t1ian does the entrepreneur who advertises a product, 
or who sells the market-driven message. In short, the "market" 
relevant to the marketplace of ideas for the pandering politi-
cian is not the same as the "market" relevant to the market-
place of products for the entrepreneur's market-driven mes-
sage. 
Consider the responses to President Clinton's difficulties 
with the Monica Lewinsky affair. ·The public-at-large reacted 
very differently to the Lewinsky story depending on whether 
people were asked about its importance to the nation in a pub-
222. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961). 
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lie opinion poll or were given the opportunity to watch a seem-
ingly endless supply of television programs devoted to the sub-
ject. Pollsters found that when questioned about matters of 
public policy, people minimized the significance of the scandal 
and wished the matter to be dropped. They were responding as 
citizens. Television ratings, however, indicated that when seek-
ing entertainment, people were quite interested in hearing 
more about the matter. They were acting as consumers. 
That people have different responses to the same informa-
tion when presented in different contexts is entirely reasonable. 
Indeed, that people might approach issues in a more disciplined 
manner when raised in a context explicitly concerned with pub-
lic policy than when raised in a context touching simply on 
life's everyday private choices is implicit in so much of the the-
ory of representative government on which much of the Ameri-
can system rests.223 
Although neither actor engages in self-expression and nei-
ther seeks to communicate about the permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community, it does not necessarily follow that a 
politician's pandering with a market-driven message and an 
entrepreneur's pandering with a market-driven advertisement 
are equally valueless in the context of the freedom of speech in 
a democracy with a republican emphasis. From this republican 
perspective, a politician's pandering is far from ideal because 
she fails to express her own views about the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community. Indeed, she is not even 
necessarily parroting the majority's notions of the long-term 
general welfare, because people as ordinary voters are more 
likely to think about public policy from a short-term and per-
sonal perspective. Yet, one might argue that from a republican 
perspective, pandering to the public policy impulses of a major-
ity of the electorate is more valuable than is an advertisement 
for a television program or for a can of Coke. Although Rupert 
Murdoch's advertisement for Living Single involves communi-
cative intent, his communication is not about matters of public 
policy at all, let alone about policy as conceived with reference 
to the long term and general welfare. 
223. See supra note 142; cf. David Chang, A Critique of Judicial Suprem-
acy, 36 VILL. L. REV. 281, 295 (1991) (arguing that people might create consti-
tutional provisions "to enforce a greater commitment to certain values ... 
than they can trust themselves, and their legislative representatives, to re-
spect" (emphasis omitted)). 
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2. Political Pandering versus Entrepreneurial Pandering from 
a Pluralist Perspective 
As earlier suggested, republicanism is an unrealistically 
demanding normative framework from which to develop the 
meaning of the First Amendment's freedom of speech. Though 
Madison in The Federalist No. 10 and Hamilton in The Federal-
ist No. 78 articulated a republican vision of ideal political be-
havior, they recognized that a more shortsighted and self-
centered pursuit of interests is inevitable in real life. The con-
stitutional design had to account for and accommodate the plu-
ralist impulses of the people.224 
The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as 
"speech which does no more than propose a commercial trans-
action."225 As earlier suggested, the larger objective of plural-
ism is to enable individuals to maximize the extent to which 
their concerns are vindicated, given the problems of conflict 
among them or the possibilities created by cooperation among 
them. From this perspective, speech designed to induce volun-
tary private transactions within the confines of existing law as 
much serves the pluralist objectives as does speech designed to 
induce agreement about public policy-that is, policy defining 
those private transactions should be regulated. Thus, plural-
ism, unlike republicanism, readily attaches value to honestly 
expressed statements proposing a commercial transaction. The 
matter at issue now, however, is the status of entrepreneurial 
pandering-the proposal of a commercial transaction that does 
not reflect the seller's true views about the merits of the prod-
uct he is offering. 
Developing a sense of the relative value of a politician's 
pandering versus an entrepreneur's pandering from the per-
spective of democracy with a pluralist emphasis requires sensi-
tive and careful analysis. As earlier suggested, the larger ob-
jective of pluralism is to enable individuals to maximize the 
extent to which their concerns are vindicated, given the prob-
lems of conflict among them or the possibilities created by co-
operation among them.226 Only the truthful articulation of 
one's personal values and priorities enables others to determine 
whether to agree, to contest, or to compromise. Only the truth-
224. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text. 
225. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973). 
226. See supra note 164. 
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ful articulation of one's beliefs enables others to determine how 
to respond and how to persuade. Dishonesty in articulating 
one's personal perspective fails to respect the equal right of 
each member of the political community to contribute to the 
formation of public policy. One who does not express his true 
views and values, according to his own priorities, precludes a 
true meeting of the minds between himself and his audience. 
This point suggests that any form of pandering, whether by 
politician or by entrepreneur, may not warrant protection as 
part of the freedom of speech relevant to democracy with a plu-
ralist emphasis. 
The point holds with respect to entrepreneurial pandering. 
Consider statements that entrepreneurs might make in adver-
tising their product. Assume that corporate executives decide 
to disseminate the message that "cigarettes are not harmful to 
your health." Assume that they make these statements, not be-
lieving them to be true, but believing that making the state-
ments will strike a chord with consumers, inducing them to 
make a purchase. Should this statement be deemed protected 
as part of "the freedom of speech" from a pluralist perspective? 
It should not. The pluralist perspective posits the equal 
right of individuals to pursue their interests through speech 
and to make decisions that maximize personal welfare, given 
the problems created by conflict and the possibilities created by 
agreement. Understanding the nature of disagreement, or how 
to attempt forging a meeting of the minds, requires that the 
advertiser express his honest beliefs about the product being 
advertised. 
Established doctrine concerning the constitutional status 
of false statements can be understood as roughly consistent 
with this analysis. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., considering 
the extent to which the First Amendment limits legislative dis-
cretion to impose liability for defamation, the Supreme Court 
said the following: 
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. 
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correc-
tion not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition 
of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false state-
ments of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error mate-
rially advances society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open debate on public issues.227 
227. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (quotations 
omitted). 
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The distinction between a statement of fact and the statement 
of an idea is elusive and, in my view, unproductive. Individuals 
and society have as much.at.stake in the articulation of propo-
sitions of fact, true or not, as in the articulation of ideas, so long 
as the speaker believes what she is saying. There was value in 
the Ptolemaic notion that the earth is at the center of the uni-
verse, because it reflected what Ptolemy-and those, like the 
Pope, who were persuaded-actually believed. There was value 
in Galileo's notion that the sun is at the center of the solar sys-
tem, because it reflected what Galileo-and those persuaded-
actually believed. The Ptolemaic view was not more valuable, 
and the Galilean view less, simply because the Pope viewed the 
former as true and the latter as false. Indeed, one cannot de-
termine whether a viewpoint of fact is false or true unless it is 
articulated and scrutinized. Galileo's speech, therefore, had 
value despite having been initially viewed as false; Ptolemy's 
speech had value despite having ultimately been viewed as 
false. The value lies in each speaker's honest expression of his 
views, endeavoring to enlighten self and others, in a self-
conscious exploration of the truth. 
Although the Gertz Court may have been misdirected in its 
effort to distinguish the constitutional status of "facts''. and 
"ideas," its suggestion that "the intentional lie" and "the care-
less error" do not warrant protection as part of "the freedom of 
speech" was suggestively promising. Persons who express 
ideas, believing them to be false, necessarily are not engaged in 
self-expression for purposes of enlightening self and others.22s 
Persons who express ideas, with reckless disregard for their 
truth or falsity, also are unconcerned about promoting under-
standing. Persons who express ideas carelessly are more con-
cerned about winning than about promoting understanding. 
Where an entrepreneur seeks to induce a sale, to persuade an-
other person of the virtue of a product or a choice, a pluralist 
respect for the equal right of that person to his preferences 
would mandate the truthful expression of one's beliefs. 
Is the same conclusion warranted with respect to the poli-
tician's pandering with the market-driven message? More 
careful attention to the politician's role in our democracy might 
suggest a different conclusion. A politician's role-arguably-is 
228. This is not to suggest that "Socratic" expression of statements one be-
lieves to be false should be deemed unprotected. The fundamental enterprise 
of Socratic dialogue, of course, is to deepen understanding and the search for 
truth. 
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one less involving speaking for herself in contests about public 
policy and more involving speaking for, or asking to speak for, a 
majority of the community. Indeed, a tradition of debate has 
questioned how a legislative representative should make deci-
sions in voting on matters of public policy. Should she exercise 
independent judgment and make the case for her decisions to 
her constituents? Should she vote according to her interpreta-
tion of her constituents' present or anticipated preferences? 
The former notion is more rooted in republican notions of rep-
resentation; the latter is in the spirit of pluralist notions of de-
mocracy. 229 
To the extent that the political candidate-and, even more 
so, the government official-is a representative or proxy for the 
larger part of the community, pandering to existing or pre-
dicted values can be understood as part of the process by which 
members of the community communicate, and seek a meeting 
of the minds, among themselves. Whether the politician pan-
ders to the impulsive and selfish side, or to the deliberate and 
magnanimous side, she enables a discourse about issues that 
might separate people, or link them together, as lawyers in liti-
gation enable their clients to engage in a discourse which they 
are otherwise unable to pursue. 
This analysis suggests that from the perspective of a First 
Amendment with a pluralist emphasis, a politician's pandering 
with the market-driven message has value. That value is a 
function of the politician's unique role as representative-as 
proxy for the people. Indeed, significantly, the politician's 
rights and responsibilities in voting-and speaking-for the 
community are not a function of the pluralist's empowerment of 
each individual citizen and the conditions and limitations of 
that empowerment. As a member of the legislature, the repre-
sentative's right to vote is different from that of the ordinary 
citizen-both in its basis and its extent. Thus, the politician-
as-representative-to-be derives a right to vote as a member of a 
legislature from her status as elected representative ''by, of, 
and for" the community. As a member of the legislature, the 
power attached to the right to vote is not simply to choose the 
personnel of government; indeed, she has become part of the 
229. The Federalist No. 52 (James Madison) suggests that the House was 
designed to promote representation intimately tied to voter preferences; The 
Federalist No. 63 (James Madison) suggests that the Senate was designed to 
promote the exercise of independent representative judgment. See supra note 
142. 
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personnel of government. Rather, her power to vote is to par-
ticipate directly in the creation of public policy. In contrast, 
from a pluralist perspective, the individual citizen has a right 
only equal to that of all others to have her preferences taken 
into account. For the individual citizen, honesty in self-
expression is essential if fellow citizens are to be able to ac-
count properly for their neighbors' concerns. It is a condition 
that implicitly attaches to each citizen's equal status and equal 
right to contribute to the formation of public policy. Thus, from 
this reading of democracy with a pluralist emphasis, pandering 
by a politician can play an essential role in government as it 
should work and is, therefore, worthy of protection as part of 
"the freedom of speech." 
3. Political Pandering versus Entrepreneurial Pandering from 
a Personal Fulfillment Perspective 
Earlier analysis suggested that however weak self-
fulfillment may be as a rationale for according constitutional 
protection to the freedom of speech, an Aristotelian notion of 
developing the power of reason provides the least implausible 
version.230 From this perspective, an individual must be en-
gaged in self-expression for purposes of enlightenment to qual-
ify as engaging in this particular freedom of speech. Neither 
the pandering politician nor the pandering entrepreneur is en-
gaged in such expression. Neither is engaged in activity rele-
vant to rational self-development. Neither explores his own be-
liefs with others by articulating them for others to hear and to 
respond. From this perspective, neither would warrant the 
First Amendment's protection. 
4. Political Pandering versus Entrepreneurial Pandering from 
the Perspective of Congress's Copyright Power 
The paradigmatic actor contemplated by the economic ra-
tionale for copyright needs an economic incentive to create-an 
incentive that would be diluted if law did not prohibit others 
from pirating the creator's work. The actor who constructs a 
market-driven message for sale is such an actor to which the 
copyright power is relevant. The actor who seeks to enlighten 
self and others through the expression of her beliefs does not 
need economic incentive to speak and is not one to whom the 
copyright power is relevant. Indeed, such persons are often 
230. See supra Part ill.B.2. 
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willing to expend personal resources of time, money, and repu-
tation in endeavoring to seek truth with others.231 
That Congress has been given the power to protect copy-
right, but is prohibited by the First Amendment from abridging 
the freedom of speech, does not appear particularly relevant for 
analyzing the constitutional status of political versus entrepre-
neurial pandering. Political panderers seek to persuade others 
about the truth of their positions. They seek political power, 
not economic reward, from pandering with the market-driven 
message. Indeed, they seek money contributions to spread 
their word. In contrast, entrepreneurial panderers-those who 
advertise their products or services in terms that they do not 
actually believe-seek economic reward from inducing consum-
ers to make purchase decisions. 
Both political and entrepreneurial panderers have some-
thing in common, however, that distinguishes their advertise-
ments from market-driven messages for which copyrights are 
sought. Both panderers would be happy if their advertisements 
were repeated, verbatim, as often and as widely as possible. 
This is quite unlike the copyright holder, who seeks to restrict 
others from disseminating his product to maintain its scarcity 
and, therefore, its economic value. Thus, the copyright per-
spective distinguishes decisions to create and to sell the mar-
ket-driven message from decisions to pander politically or en-
trepreneurially with the market-driven message. It does not, 
however, provide a basis for distinguishing the politician's pan-
dering from the entrepreneur's pandering. 
*** 
The foregoing has suggested that from the perspective of 
personal fulfillment, there is no basis for extending First 
Amendment protection to either form of pandering. Further-
more, Congress's copyright power does not provide a basis for 
distinguishing political from entrepreneurial pandering. At 
least from the perspective of democracy with a pluralist em-
phasis, however, and perhaps from the perspective of democ-
racy with a republican emphasis, there is reason to accord con-
stitutional value to the politician's pandering while denying 
such value to the entrepreneur's pandering. Thus, the political 
rationales for protecting the freedom of speech-in particular, 
the more plausible pluralist perspective-can draw a meaning-
ful distinction between political pandering and entrepreneurial 
231. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
2000] SELLING THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE 549 
pandering with the market-driven message. These conclusions 
supplement earlier analysis suggesting that entrepreneurial 
decisions to sell the market-driven message do not warrant pro-
tection under the First Amendment from the perspective of re-
publican democracy, pluralist democracy, individual fulfill-
ment, or Congress's copyright power.232 
IV. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNPROTECTED 
DECISION TO SELL THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE: 
MANDATING FREE TELEVISION TIME 
FOR POLITICAL CANDIDATES 
A. BROAD CONSIDERATIONS 
Free-market arguments that television programmers 
should be treated as are other entrepreneurs in a regime of 
consumer sovereignty are inconsistent with the proposition 
that they should also be treated as are speakers under the First 
Amendment. The entrepreneurial motives underlying deci-
sions to create a message-as-product, and relationships with 
others as seller to buyer, are otherwise understood as property 
interests to be protected under the Fifth Amendment, rather 
than speech interests to be protected under the First Amend-
ment. The First Amendment's freedom of speech is concerned 
with a different set of values than those encompassed by the 
notion of consumer sovereignty. Whether one considers the 
definition of "speech" from the perspective of democracy with a 
republican emphasis, democracy with a pluralist emphasis, 
autonomy in the development of the rational self, or the impli-
cations of economic rationales for Congress's copyright power, 
the freedom of speech extends to efforts to enlighten self and 
others through the honest expression of one's actual beliefs. It 
232. If this analysis about the low constitutional status of an entrepre-
neur's decisions to sell the market-driven message is persuasive, but the effort 
to distinguish the politician's pandering from the entrepreneur's pandering is 
not, one might explore the permissibility of regulations, for example, placing 
conditions on the kinds of advertisements that politicians could present--
especially if given free television time. For now, however, the analysis will 
proceed from the premise that, from a pluralist perspective, one can persua-
sively distinguish between entrepreneurial pandering with the market-driven 
message as unprotected by the First Amendment and political pandering with 
the market-driven message as protected by the First Amendment. This leaves 
intact the earlier analysis suggesting that entrepreneurial decisions to sell the 
market-driven message should not be viewed as part of the First Amendment's 
freedom of speech. 
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does not extend to efforts to anticipate the consumption desires 
of others, to construct products that satisfy those desires, and 
to sell such products for profit-no matter how much the prod-
ucts created might look like speech or, indeed, might constitute 
speech, if undertaken with different purposes. 
The analysis suggests, therefore, what one might call the 
"market-driven message principle"-a principle denying protec-
tion under the First Amendment to entrepreneurially moti-
vated decisions to construct and to sell market-driven mes-
sages. It is now appropriate to consider how this principle 
might be implemented in practice. The following sections will 
consider issues arising in the enforcement of the market-driven 
message principle in the context of proposals to mandate free 
television time for political candidates. 
Proposals to require broadcasters and cable operators to 
provide free time for political advertising have been quite mod-
est. In early 1997, for example, Representative Slaughter in-
troduced the "Fairness in Political Advertising Act of 1997."233 
This bill would impose on television broadcasters a duty to pro-
vide at least two hours of free air time to candidates for state-
wide or national office during each even-numbered year.234 
Furthermore, the bill would require that the time be allocated 
in segments of ''varying lengths of not more than 5 minutes nor 
less than 10 seconds"235 and that "at least one-half is broadcast 
during the hours of 7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m."236 The FCC would 
be obliged not to renew the license of a broadcaster that fails to 
comply with these requirements. 237 The legislation also directs 
the FCC to promulgate regulations imposing the same obliga-
tions on cable operators.238 
The National Association of Broadcasters, among others, 
opposes this legislation on policy and constitutional grounds. 
In particular, the NAB argues that mandating free air time vio-
lates the constitutionally protected "editorial discretion" of 
broadcasters. 239 
233. H.R. 84, 105th Cong. (1997). 
234. Id. § 2(c)(2)(A). 
235. Id. § 2(c)(2)(B). 
236. Id. § 2(c)(2)(C)(i). 
237. Id. § 2{c)(l). 
238. Id.§ 3. 
239. See Dan Morgan, A Made-For-TV Windfall; Candidates' Air Time 
Scramble Fills Stations' Tills, WASH. POST, May 2, 2000, available at 2000 WL 
19606800. 
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The requirement that broadcasters set aside two hours per 
national or statewide candidate, in five second to ten-minute 
intervals, during primetime hours could affect the broadcasters 
in two ways. First, the broadcaster might simply replace a paid 
commercial with a legally-mandated unpaid political commer-
cial. Second, the broadcaster might replace time otherwise de-
voted to programming with an unpaid political commercial 
while endeavoring to sell and fill regularly slotted paid com-
mercial time. 
Under the first scenario, the broadcasters' programming 
choices would be unaffected. They would not be able to claim 
plausibly, therefore, that their editorial discretion to select pro-
gramming has been abridged at all. Broadcasters might argue 
that they possess privileged "editorial discretion" to choose the 
advertising they will broadcast. A recognition that even their 
programming decisions reflect entrepreneurial decisions to 
manufacture and to sell the market-driven message for profit-
and that such decisions do not warrant protection as speech 
under the First Amendment-mandates rejecting any notion 
that the decision about to whom to sell their air time qualifies 
as protected "editorial discretion." Whatever protection such 
sales decisions have are properly understood as arising under 
the Fifth Amendment's protection of property, rather than the 
First Amendment's protection of speech.240 
240. Broadcasters have argued, and the Supreme Court has agreed, that 
regulations intruding on their discretion to select advertisers does impinge 
"editorial discretion" protected by the First Amendment. In CBS, Inc. v. De-
mocratic National Committee, the Court considered whether the FCC was 
obliged under the First Amendment to prohibit broadcasters from refusing to 
carry paid political or public advocacy advertisements. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
Noting that "Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to develop with 
the widest possible journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations," 
id. at 110, Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion determined that "(t]he li-
censee's policy against accepting editorial advertising cannot be examined as 
an abstract proposition, but must be viewed in the context of its journalistic 
role," id. at 118. 
In CBS, Inc. v. FCC, CBS, ABC, and NBC challenged an FCC order to ac-
cept a thirty-minute paid political advertisement from President Carter's re-
election committee. 453 U.S. 367 (1981). They argued that accepting the ad-
vertisement would disrupt regular programming and offered to sell five 
minute time slots instead. Id. at 372. Although the Court rejected the argu-
ment that the Commission had "unduly circumscrib[ed] their editorial discre-
tion," its analysis proceeded from the premise that the choice of advertisers 
does involve editorial discretion protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 
395-96. The Court determined that the regulation at issue was not unconsti-
tutional because of specific physical characteristics of broadcast frequencies-
in particular, the need for regulation to prevent broadcast chaos, and the scar-
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Under the second scenario, the broadcasters' programming 
choices would be affected. Rather than the forty-six or so min-
utes per hour of programming presented during prime time, 
broadcasters might be left with forty minutes per hour of pro-
gramming. Thus, for several weeks every two years, NBC 
might have to produce and broadcast episodes of ER with six 
(or so) fewer minutes of story, as would CBS with its Diagnosis 
Murder. Perhaps Friends or Frasier or other half-hour series 
might have to skip a broadcast week. 
Given the current doctrinal premise that the programming 
decisions of television broadcasters are exercises of "editorial 
discretion" protected by the First Amendment, media corpora-
tions claim that such regulations violate the First Amendment 
on several grounds: first, the regulations arguably discriminate 
against some speech and in favor of other speech based on con-
tent; second, the regulations arguably violate what can be 
called "the Buckley admonition"; and third, the regulations ar-
guably compel broadcasters to speak against their will.241 
This Article's suggestion that the entrepreneurially moti-
vated decision to sell the market-driven message does not qual-
ify for protection as "speech" under the First Amendment would 
dispose of each of these arguments. To regulate such pro-
gramming decisions by mandating the broadcast of free politi-
cal advertising would no more necessarily violate the prohibi-
tion against content-motivated government action than does 
the regulation of other categories of "unprotected speech" -such 
as obscenity, defamation, or fighting words. 
city of broadcast frequencies; Id. at 395-97. These are the factors on which 
the Red Lion Court relied in upholding the "fairness doctrine." Red Lion 
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-401 (1969). 
Of course, as has been noted, the proposition that physical characteristics 
of the broadcast spectrum justifies treating broadcasters differently from other 
speakers under the First Amendment has been severely undercut not only by 
technological advances but by the incisive analysis of free-marketeers such as 
Director, Coase, and Epstein. See supra notes 17-21, 28-30, 36 and accompa-
nying text. If the Court were to accept their arguments discounting the sig-
nificance of the physics of broadcasting, then broadcasters could be deemed 
entitled to the full gamut of protections under the First Amendment--
including the "editorial discretion" to choose advertisers. If the Court were to 
accept my argument, however, that entrepreneurial choices to sell the market-
driven message should not be understood as "editorial discretion" protected by 
the First Amendment at all, then technological changes, or changes in our un-
derstanding of the significance of technology, would be irrelevant. 
241. E.g., Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 649-59 (1994); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247 (1974). 
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Indeed, mandating free time for political candidates during 
primetime hours does not regulate with reference to the con-
tent of the displaced television programs. It regulates only by 
reference to time periods when the programs air. The time se-
lected for mandating free time for political candidates is based 
on the fact that the television entrepreneurs have created the 
maximum possible audience during those hours by successfully 
responding to the forces of consumer sovereignty.242 
Second, a principle denying protection as speech to deci-
sions to sell the market-driven message also can dispose of "the 
Buckley admonition." As discussed above, this principle, articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, has long vexed 
efforts to reform political campaigns: 
['l']he concept that government may restrict the speech of some ele-
ments of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is 
wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed to secure 
the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and an-
tagonistic sources and to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas 
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.243 
The Buckley admonition proscribes efforts to redistribute 
speaking opportunities when such reforms involve displacing 
the "speech" of those who, in the absence of the regulation, 
would speak. The Buckley admonition, however, does not ad-
dress the permissibility of efforts to enhance speaking opportu-
nities for some that intrude on the non-speech interests of oth-
ers. 
Third, viewing the programming decisions of commercial 
television corporations as entrepreneurial action in the regime 
of consumer sovereignty also helps to dispose of arguments that 
mandating free time for political candidates would force the 
television businesses to speak against their will. Indeed, as 
discussed above, the Supreme Court has shown a vastly greater 
willingness to tolerate regulations that require non-speaking 
property owners engaged in commerce-such as, for example, 
the owner of a shopping center244-to grant access to speakers 
242. For consideration of whether it should be deemed permissible for the 
government to engage in content-motivated regulation of entrepreneurial deci-
sions to sell the market-driven message, see infra notes 270-88 and accompa-
nying text. 
243. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) (quotations 
omitted). 
244. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980); see supra 
text accompanying notes 81-83. 
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than to tolerate regulations that require speaking property 
owners not to speak245 or to convey the messages of others. 246 
Furthermore, one can connect this point to the concerns 
raised by the Buckley admonition. Compelling a shopping cen-
ter owner to grant access to speakers does not displace any 
speaking the shopping center has been doing and increases the 
quantity of public discourse.247 Compelling a television station 
to displace entrepreneurial decisions to sell the market-driven 
message to grant access to speakers also does not displace any 
speaking the television station has been doing and increases 
the quantity of public discourse. Compelling a traditional 
newspaper editor to carry a certain message, however, may im-
pinge on that speaker's chosen message by displacing his 
speech and replacing it with that of someone else.248 The Buck-
ley admonition, concerned with an actor's personal First 
Amendment rights,249 is not compromised in the former situa-
tion. It is compromised in the latter. 
245. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143. 
246. E.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of 
Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (holding that a state may not require 
parade organizers to include a group expressing a message with which the or-
ganizers disagree); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-17 (1977) (holding 
that a state may not require the display of the state motto on private property 
by persons who disagree with it). 
247. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 85-88. 
248. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974). This 
point assumes that, as a matter of fact, the content decisions made by news-
paper editors are not driven by entrepreneurial considerations. Whether the 
assumption holds true in general, or for particular newspapers, might be con-
tested. My point here is not to suggest a blanket proposition that all newspa-
per editors engage in speaker-driven self-expression and are, therefore, pro-
tected. Indeed, the market-driven message principle would hold that if a 
newspaper editor makes decisions about the content of the paper predomi-
nantly for entrepreneurial considerations responding to the forces of consumer 
sovereignty, she would be engaged in activity not protected as speech under 
the First Amendment, but as property under the Fifth. 
249. Cf. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 
727, 812-15 (1996). Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, and Scalia determined that 
cable television operators maintain personal rights of speech not held by 
broadcasters under existing-but unstable-doctrine: 
In Turner, by adopting much of the print paradigm, and by rejecting 
Red Lion, we adopted with it a considerable body of precedent that 
governs the respective First Amendment rights of competing speak-
ers. In Red Lion, we had legitimized consideration of the public in-
terest and emphasized the rights of viewers, at least in the abstract. 
Under that view, "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the 
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." After Turner, how-
ever, that view can no longer be given any credence in the cable con-
text. It is the operator's right that is preeminent. 
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*** 
Despite all this, a principle denying protection to entrepre-
neurially motivated decisions to sell the market-driven mes-
sage leaves room for putative "speakers" to claim that they are 
concerned with enlightening self or others through self-
expression and, therefore, are entitled to the First Amend-
ment's greatest protection. Such a claim would create an issue 
of fact. If a court determined, as a matter of fact, that the 
broadcaster was concerned with enlightening through dissemi-
nating a speaker-driven message, then the traditional notion of 
protected "editorial discretion," and its established strongly 
protective doctrines, would be applicable. If, however, a court 
determined that the broadcaster was concerned with selling a 
market-driven message, then the constitutional concerns about 
intruding on its protected interests would fade. Established 
doctrine, which depends on and emerges from those concerns, 
would have to be supplanted. 
Broadcasters also might concede that market-driven con-
cerns enter into their programming choices and into their 
choices of which commercial advertisements to carry. They 
might claim, however, that programming decisions involve a 
complex amalgam of a media corporation's market-driven and 
persuasive speaker-driven objectives. Rupert Murdoch, for ex-
ample, vetoed the production of a movie about Clarence Tho-
mas and Anita Hill. The movie would have been potentially 
profitable for his Fox television network, but offended his per-
sonal values. 250 
To the extent that programming decisions are made with a 
measure of speaker-driven concerns, a broadcaster might ar-
gue, they warrant a measure of protection as part of the First 
Amendment's freedom of speech, even under the market-driven 
message principle. To deny protection because broadcasters 
are entrepreneurs as well as speakers arguably would allow the 
market-driven message principle to devour speech that other-
wise warrants protection. 
Id. at 816 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Red Lion Broad Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)). This 
proposition presupposed that the activity in which cable operators are engaged 
qualifies as "speech" for purposes of the First Amendment. 
250. See Bernard Weinraub, Hill v. Thomas, Again in the Court of Senate 
Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1999, available at 1999 WL 30478819 (asserting 
that Murdoch opposed the film because he "was a friend of Justice Thomas 
and believed that Justice Thomas had been railroaded at the confirmation 
hearings"). 
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Such a claim would require consideration of both a norma-
tive question and a practical question. One must determine in 
a normative sense whether a broadcaster who makes pro-
gramming decisions with a hybrid motivation warrants protec-
tion as a participant in the freedom of speech. Furthermore, 
one must determine how to answer the factual question of 
whether a broadcaster was acting simply to sell a market-
driven message, purely to enlighten with a speaker-driven 
message, or for hybrid considerations. 
B. THE CLAIM OF HYBRID MOTIVATION: 
NORMATIVE ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE 
In response to an intrusion on their programming discre-
tion, justified in part on the ground that they are concerned 
with selling a market-driven message, broadcasters could ar-
gue: the government cannot know what was in the mind of 
Rupert Murdoch or Brandon Tartikoff. It does not know what 
is in the mind of the CBS Board of Directors. Network execu-
tives have political values and concerns. They do try to con-
tribute responsibly to public awareness and public discourse, 
even while paying attention to market share and the bottom 
line. When you intrude on our programming discretion, by dis-
placing minutes or episodes of ER, or Friends, or Frasier, you 
are taking away time in which we are indeed engaged, at least 
partially, with a concern for enlightening with a speaker-driven 
message. That is still an intrusion on our editorial discretion, 
and one which compromises constitutional values. 
This is an argument that concedes what could hardly be 
denied-that television programmers, at least in part, are con-
cerned with selling a market-driven message. Yet it seeks to 
claim a corner of the First Amendment's protective blanket, by 
asserting, in the fashion of Ben Stein, 251 that broadcasters en-
deavor to enlighten with speaker-driven self-expression to the 
extent that the market will bear.252 At this point, however, at 
least while operating within the principle that would deny pro-
tection to the market-driven message, the broadcasters admit 
to being imperfect First Amendment claimants. 
251. Stein argued that television programmers pursue an ideologically mo-
tivated persuasive agenda. See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text. 
252. Cf BE'ITIG, supra note 124, at 36. Bettig has an ambiguous view 
about the extent to which the capitalists who own the mass media endeavor to 
shape public ideology in a way that serves their interests or to shape their 
product in a way that fits the existing tastes and values of the consumers. 
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Assuming, for now, that broadcasters make primetime pro-
gramming decisions in part because of both entrepreneurial 
and pedagogical considerations, the Fairness in Political Adver-
tising Act of 1997253 would impinge partially on both constitu-
tionally unprotected and protected choices. Intruding on pro-
gramming decisions, therefore, would involve circumscribing a 
degree of protected "editorial discretion." Furthermore, it also, 
arguably, would partially violate Buckley's foundational admo-
nition that "restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our so-
ciety in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment."254 
One can respond to these points in several ways. First, one 
might argue that any influence of market-driven considerations 
undermines, if not obliterates, the value of putative speech-
from the perspective of republicanism, pluralism, or self-
fulfillment, all of which place value on self-expression. When 
one decides what to say by reference to external considerations, 
one does not express one's true values, perspectives, and priori-
ties. 
This extreme position begs a rather obvious response. Few 
people speak without considering how their message will play 
in public. A professor might decide not to make a particular 
point at a faculty meeting if he anticipates a negative response. 
A citizen similarly might decide to remain silent at a town 
meeting. If speech must be purely speaker-driven to warrant 
special constitutional protection, very little of what people ac-
tually say is worthy of protection indeed. 
This suggests that such a purist position is untenable and 
leads to a second response to a broadcaster's assertion of hybrid 
motivation. One might posit that the more purely a statement 
reflects a motive for enlightening with a speaker-driven mes-
sage, the more valuable and worthy of constitutional solicitude 
it is. The more purely a statement reflects a mo~ive to profit 
from the sale of a market-driven message, the less valuable as 
speech and less worthy of protection it is as speech. Along such 
lines, one might posit that there are different ways in which a 
person with hybrid motivation can take account of speaker-
driven and market-driven considerations. 
First, one's primary motive could be pedagogical-to 
enlighten oneself or others by engaging in speaker-driven self-
253. H.R. 84, 105th Cong. (1997). 
254. Buckleyv. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam). 
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expression. A speaker would like to press his highest priorities 
but might choose to censor his remarks, or forgo some of his 
preferences, based on an anticipated audience response. Sec-
ond, one's primary motive could be entrepreneurial-to profit 
economically by selling market-driven messages. An actor 
would like to disseminate a product that she anticipates will 
generate the most revenue, but might choose to censor her 
product, or forgo some profits, because the "speech" otherwise 
disseminated would excessively offend her personal values. 
Thus, so long as one's motive for speaking is to enlighten, 
whatever one says purposefully expresses one's personal val-
ues, preferences, and priorities. When one's motive for "speak-
ing" is entrepreneurial, it is only what remains unsaid that 
purposefully reflects one's values, preferences, and priorities. 
When the entrepreneur acts, what is "said" reflects the desires 
of consumers when those desires are within the limits of toler-
ability for the entrepreneur. Rupert Murdoch, for example, de-
cided to present Living Single because he believed it would find 
a market, not, one would suppose, because it expressed his 
views of truth. He decided not to present a movie about Cla-
rence Thomas and Anita Hill because the project offended his 
personal values, not because he thought it would fail to find a 
market. 
A democratic rationale for protecting the freedom of 
speech, whether with a republican or a pluralist emphasis, 
would find no special reason for protecting the dissemination of 
messages that are merely tolerable to the actor, rather than af-
firmatively reflecting the actor's preferences and priorities. So 
with the rationale of self-fulfillment. Thus, if television pro-
grammers decide what to air based on market-driven factors, 
and decide not to air some projects based on speaker-driven fac-
tors, their activity is predominantly market-driven and not 
"editorial discretion" worthy of special constitutional solicitude. 
In summary, one might posit that if one's impetus to speak 
is to enlighten self or others through the expression of personal 
views, and one's impetus for self-censorship is rooted in mar-
ket-driven considerations, one's speech remains worthy-or 
more worthy-of special constitutional solicitude. Conversely, 
if one's impetus to "speak" is to profit from the sale of market-
driven messages, and one's impetus for self-censorship is rooted 
in personal notions of truth and propriety, one's "speech" is 
unworthy-or less worthy-of special constitutional solicitude. 
In the higher value scenario, one's principle for selecting mes-
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sages is speaker-driven; one's principle for exclusion is market-
driven. For the lower value scenario, one's principle for select-
ing messages is market-driven; one's principle for exclusion is 
speaker-driven. This analysis suggests a hierarchical contin-
uum of value within a framework of a First Amendment in-
formed by republican democracy, pluralist democracy, or per-
sonal fulfillment. 
C. PROBLEMS OF PROOF; BURDENS OF PROOF 
In determining how to construct doctrine for the adjudica-
tion of an actor's intent, it is critically important not only to 
consider factors relevant for proving the actor's intent, but 
also-and more fundamentally-to consider who should bear 
the burden of proving the actor's intent. In our present context, 
one must consider whether the government should bear the 
burden of proving that the actor was engaged primarily in un-
protected activity (i.e., entrepreneurial decisions to sell the 
market-driven message) or whether the actor should bear the 
burden of proving that he was engaged primarily in protected 
activity (i.e., decisions to enlighten with speaker-driven self-
expression). 
This section will confront the burden of proof question in 
two ways. First, it will explore the implications of an estab-
lished context in which an individual's claim to First Amend-
ment protection depends on a factual determination of bona £i-
des: defamation actions.255 Second, it will address in a more 
255. One can successfully assert a claim that a government regulation bur-
dens the Free Exercise of religion only when the activity regulated is "conduct 
motivated by sincere religious belief." Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. 
of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 893 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment); see also Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 
U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("The narrow function of a reviewing court in this context 
' is to determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner ter-
minated his work because of an honest conviction that such work was forbid-
den by his religion."). Thus, established doctrine in this area requires explor-
ing a constitutional claimant's values and beliefs, toward determining whether 
she was expressing those beliefs in a particular context, just as would the 
market-driven message principle I have suggested in this Article. Most Free 
Exercise claims, however, have not been opposed by the government on the 
ground that the claimant's interest was based on concerns other than sincere 
religious belief. E.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485 
U.S. 439, 447 (1988) (noting that the Government did not dispute "that the 
Indian respondents' beliefs are sincere"). Thus, the Free Exercise context may 
not allay the concerns some might have about whether such a principle con-
cerned with an actor's bona :tides can be implemented effectively. See United 
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944). 
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general and systematic way factors to consider for allocating 
burdens of proof in constitutional adjudication. 
1. Learning from the Defamation Analogy 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court 
ruled that a public official could not recover "damages for a de-
famatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he 
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that 
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard 
of whether it was false or not."256 Speech is defamation and is 
unprotected by the First Amendment, depending on the 
speaker's intent. Where the speaker does not intend to express 
his beliefs-whether by speaking with a knowledge of falsity or 
a lack of concern with whether his statements are true-he 
may be liable in a defamation action by a public official. 
The New York Times Court determined that the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proving that the defendant acted with a be-
lief that his statements were false or without caring whether 
his statements were true. Furthermore, such proof had to 
amount to more than a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, 
the plaintiff must prove the defendant's "actual malice" with 
"convincing clarity."257 This section will explore both the sub-
stantive notion that a speaker who acts with "actual malice" 
has not engaged in protected speech and the procedural notion 
that the plaintiff in a defamation action bears the burden of 
proving "actual malice" by "clear and convincing" evidence. 
The substantive notion that an actor does not engage in 
protected "speech" when he speaks believing his statements are 
false, or not caring whether they are true, can be understood as 
closely related to the notion that selling, or pandering with, the 
market-driven message is of low First Amendment value. Like 
one who sells or panders with a market-driven message, one 
who speaks with "actual malice" has not engaged in self-
expression. He has not expressed his views about how the 
world is or should be. From the perspective of pluralist notions 
of democracy, such communication does not warrant protection 
because the actor fails to respect the right of his fellows to ac-
count accurately for his views. One who speaks with "actual 
malice," like one who purveys the market-driven message, has 
expressed ideas that cannot possibly be the basis for a meeting 
256. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). 
257. Id. at 285-86. 
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of minds between speaker and listener, simply because the 
speakers are not expressing what their minds believe.258 From 
the perspective of republican notions of democracy, one who 
speaks with actual malice, like one who purveys a market-
driven message, has no thought or interest in deliberating 
about the permanent and aggregate interests of the commu-
nity. From the perspective of personal fulfillment, one who 
speaks with actual malice, like one who purveys a market-
driven message, has not engaged in the self-expression that can 
promote an Aristotelian development of the rational self. 
More important for present purposes than a normative 
congruence between denying protection to "actual malice" and 
to decisions to sell the market-driven message is the enforce-
ability of both principles in practice. The notion of actual mal-
ice in defamation actions, and the requirement that it be 
proved by clear and convincing evidence, has been workable. 
To the extent that the legal system can cope with the task of 
adjudicating whether the plaintiff has proved (by clear and 
convincing evidence) that a defendant in a defamation action 
has acted with "actual malice," it would seem able to cope at 
least as well with the task of adjudicating whether the govern-
ment has proved (by clear and convincing evidence) that a tele-
vision broadcaster or cable operator has chosen programming 
during a certain time period because of unprotected entrepre-
neurial motives to sell market-driven messages for profit. 
The New York Times Court justified placing a heavy bur-
den of proof on the plaintiff in a civil defamation action in large 
part because of concern about excessively "chilling'' protected 
speech: 
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth 
of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments 
virtually unlimited in amount-leads to a ... "self-censorship." Al-
lowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the 
defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred .... 
Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred 
from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and 
even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be 
proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to 
make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." 
The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public de-
258. Indeed, one might suspect that in many circumstances, the dissemina-
tion of allegations with "actual malice" might be motivated by an entrepreneu-
rial concern to sell a market-driven message. If a headline will sell newspa-
pers, then use it (thus, entrepreneurially market-driven), regardless of 
whether it is true (thus, "actual malice"). 
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bate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.259 
One can assume that it is sensible to consider whether one 
or another rule of liability and burden of proof may discourage 
or encourage the "'unfettered interchange of ideas for the bring-
ing about of political and social changes desired by the peo-
ple.'"260 One also can assume that the New York Times burden 
of proof was necessary to avoid a constitutionally problematic 
chill of expression that a speaker believes to be true.261 It does 
not follow from such concerns, however, that a putative speaker 
must always be insulated from regulation by favorable burdens 
of proof to avoid "chilling" constitutionally valuable speech. 
Consider the behavioral pressures that would be created by 
a regime in which television broadcasters bear the burden of 
proving that their primetime programming choices are speaker-
driven, intended to express truth, rather than market-driven 
and disseminated as a product. It seems unlikely that the 
broadcasters would forgo broadcasting altogether. This is quite 
unlike the "chill" anticipated by the Court in New York Times, 
whereby potential critics of government action would steer 
clear of expressing criticism altogether, for fear of tort liability. 
The broadcaster is engaged in the business of broadcasting. 
The regulation in question imposes not tort liability, but a loss 
of control of discrete broadcasting time periods and a possible 
loss in profits. Unless this possibility of lost profits funda-
mentally undermines the broadcasting business, it is not plau-
sible that broadcasters would choose to forgo the very activity 
which produces their profits, simply because they have lost con-
trol of a portion of broadcasting time. 262 
259. Id. at 279 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
260. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
261. For a discussion of the problematic notion that there is no constitu-
tional value in a false statement of fact, see supra notes 227-28 and 
accompanying text. 
262. In an analogous context, the Supreme Court has determined that 
"commercial speech" -that is, commercial advertising-is hardier than politi-
cal speech. One who disseminates a commercial advertisement generally is 
pursuing a high priority-his livelihood. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy 
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) ("Since adver-
tising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its 
being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely."). This strong incen-
tive to disseminate the message contrasts with that of the person who might 
think about discussing a public issue. Similarly, commercial broadcasters 
have a high incentive to disseminate their programming, which, after all, is 
the basis of their livelihood. 1 
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Rather, if the prospect of governmentally-mandated free 
air time for political candidates were to have any behavioral in-
fluence on broadcasters, it seems more likely that it would in-
fluence them to exercise their "editorial discretion" in a way 
that, in appearance if not in actuality, selects programming for 
speaker-driven expressive purposes, rather than because of 
market-driven entrepreneurial considerations.263 If broadcast-
ers were influenced to disseminate more speaker-driven mes-
sages, instead of selling market-driven messages, then "the 
freedom of speech" is arguably enhanced, because more speech 
is better than less. 
On the other hand, if broadcasters were influenced to pre-
tend to disseminate more speaker-driven messages, and courts 
were unable to determine in constitutional adjudication that 
programming displaced by regulation is market-driven and, 
therefore, without special First Amendment protection, broad-
casters would reclaim the "editorial discretion" otherwise lost 
under the market-driven message principle. This analysis thus 
suggests that so far as "chill" is concerned, regulation permit-
ted under the market-driven message principle would have ei-
ther a positive or a neutral impact on the freedom of speech.264 
2. The Market-Driven Message and Burdens of Proof 
These benign expectations about the problem of "chill" or-
dinarily associated with regulations of speech allow one to focus 
on other considerations relevant to allocating burdens of proof 
for issues of material fact in constitutional adjudication. 
Courts and scholars have generally paid too little attention to 
burdens of proof in constitutional adjudication. 265 Some space 
will be devoted here to the subject. 
263. Broadcasting corporations might well create new executive positions, 
perhaps "Corporate Policy Directors" or "Corporate Message Officers," whose 
responsibility it would be to develop (or appear to develop) the company line 
on matters of public policy, which would be translated (or appear to be trans-
lated) into television programming. Whatever role, real or apparent, these 
"Corporate Policy Directors" might play in programming decisions, one could 
hardly doubt that traditional programming executives would continue to focus 
on market research and market share and continue to play a central role in 
making ultimate programming decisions. 
264. If, however, media corporations were encouraged to disseminate 
speaker-driven messages-i.e., their corporate view on the way things are and 
should be-questions concerning the propriety and desirability of their control 
of such massive speech resources could be intensified. For a discussion of is-
sues of private power and speech, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 234-40. 
265. See David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and In-
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A burden of proof is necessary-indeed, adjudication is 
necessary-because courts lack perfect knowledge about legally 
relevant facts in disputes between members of the community. 
The burden of proof determines which party prevails in the face 
of uncertainty about a legally relevant fact. With uncertainty 
comes the possibility of error. Thus, burdens of proof are vehi-
cles through which the legal process can endeavor to avoid er-
roneous decisions. In the context of constitutional adjudication, 
a court might find erroneously that a challenged policy is un-
constitutional or find erroneously that a challenged policy is 
not unconstitutional. 
In thinking about how to allocate the burden of proof as a 
mechanism for avoiding erroneous legal decisions, judgments 
about the relative evil or harm from each kind of erroneous de-
cision can be one relevant factor. Is it worse erroneously to up-
hold a policy and thereby wrongly to permit an intrusion on the 
freedom of speech, or, is it worse erroneously to invalidate a 
policy and thereby wrongly prohibit the electorate from enforc-
ing the policy that its representatives have determined should 
govern? 
Relying on this normative factor to justify a decision allo-
cating the burden of proof in constitutional adjudication must 
always be difficult. Constitutional values restricting legislative 
discretion are, by definition, important constitutional values. 
But valid electoral discretion is an important and foundational 
constitutional value as well. Whether a judicial decision 
wrongly intrudes on the freedom of speech or wrongly intrudes 
on legislative discretion, a foundational constitutional value 
has been wrongly compromised. Whatever difficulty judges and 
scholars have identifying constitutional values (e.g., whether 
"the freedom of speech" is predicated on values of democratic 
self-governance only or concerns of personal fulfillment as well) 
is compounded when the focus must be refined and the weight 
(as opposed to the mere existence) of the putative value must 
be identified. 
The difficulty in weighing the relative significance of a con-
stitutional value limiting democratic discretion and the value of 
valid democratic discretion is particularly acute with respect to 
the freedom of speech. Indeed, to the extent that the freedom of 
speech is protected to promote effective democratic self 
nocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 790, 835 n.153 (1991). 
2000] SELLING THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE 565 
government, wrongly intruding on legislative discretion im-
pinges the very object of the First Amendment's concern. If a 
court wrongly upholds a law against a First Amendment chal-
lenge, then the freedom of speech-which exists to make de-
mocratic processes work-is wrongly compromised. If, how-
ever, a court wrongly invalidates a law against a First 
Amendment challenge, then valid democratic discretion, which 
the First Amendment is designed to promote, has been compro-
mised. 
This difficulty is even further compounded when the par-
ticular regulation at issue reflects a legislative judgment as to 
how the democratic processes can be improved. Under such 
circumstances, an erroneous invalidation of a regulation 
wrongly denies the electorate a policy which its representatives 
have determined would improve democratic processes, in the 
name of a constitutional provision itself concerned with ensur-
ing the proper operation of democratic processes. How difficult 
it must be to declare that the erroneous invalidation of the elec-
torate's choices in the Fairness in Broadcasting Act, 266 for ex-
ample, would be worse, or better, than erroneously failing to 
invalidate that policy would be. 
But another consideration can be helpful in thinking about 
allocating the burden of proof in constitutional adjudication. 
For an issue of fact that is legally significant for proving uncon-
stitutionality, if one can make a judgment that in a certain 
category of circumstances, it is more likely than not that this 
fact has occurred, it would make sense, in cases where such cir-
cumstances exist, to place the burden of disproving that fact on 
the government. Conversely, if one can identify a category of 
circumstances in which it seems more likely than not that this 
fact has not occurred, it would make sense, in cases where such 
circumstances exist, to place the burden of proving that fact on 
the challenger. 
Consider one context in which this probabilistic perspective 
for allocating the burden of proof with respect to a constitution-
ally relevant fact has been dispositive. Racial classifications 
challenged under the Equal Protection clause are presump-
tively unconstitutional. The government bears a heavy burden 
to rebut that presumption. Part of the rationale for this pre-
sumptive unconstitutionality of racial classifications is (1) the 
normative understanding that if a law was enacted because of 
266. S. 7 42, lOOth Cong. (1987); see supra text accompanying note 50. 
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racial prejudice, it is unconstitutional; and (2) the procedural or 
predictive understanding that laws using racial classifications 
more likely than not were enacted because of racial prejudice. 
As Chief Justice Burger explained in Palmore v. Sidoti, racial 
classifications are presumptively unconstitutional because they 
are "more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate pub-
lic concerns."267 
Consider whether one might employ this predictive, prob-
abilistic kind of analysis in determining how to allocate the 
burden of proof with respect to the question of fact that is con-
stitutionally relevant under the market-driven message prin-
ciple. One may ask: Did a putative speaker disseminate what 
purports to be protected speech primarily with an intent to 
enlighten with speaker-driven self-expression or primarily with 
an entrepreneurial intent to sell a market-driven message? In 
addressing this question, one might identify indicia suggesting 
a probability of an actor's pedagogical purposes as well as indi-
cia suggesting a probability of entrepreneurial purposes. Such 
indicia would ideally involve matters of fact that are easily 
proved or about which there is unlikely to be dispute. When 
indicia suggest a probability that an actor seeks to sell a mar-
ket-driven message, the actor would bear the burden of proving 
otherwise by reference to other evidence. 
Suppose, for example, that the government can establish 
the following facts, by clear and convincing evidence, about a 
broadcaster subject to the free primetime political advertising 
provisions of the Fairness in Broadcasting Act: 
1. The broadcaster is a profit-seeking corporation. This 
factor does not by itself suggest anything about the like-
lihood that a given message is pedagogically or entre-
preneurially motivated but could help to suggest such 
motivation in conjunction with other factors. 
2. The product from which the broadcaster seeks to make 
a profit is the sale of advertising time during its pro-
gramming. This factor implies that the broadcaster 
views its programming as a J>roduct that must be made 
appealing to advertisers and, ultimately, to consumers. 
Because advertisers are looking for the maximum audi-
ence, they would want to purchase commercial time dur-
ing popular programs. In order to ensure that their pro-
gramming is popular with the viewing audience and, 
therefore, appealing to advertisers, the broadcaster 
would act reasonably by tailoring its programming to 
the anticipated desires of the viewing audience. AB it 
267. 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). 
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makes sense to suppose that broadcast corporations be-
have in a reasonable, profit-seeking fashion (as do other 
profit-making corporations), it makes sense to infer a 
likelihood that profit-making broadcast corporations 
that sell commercial time to advertisers construct or se-
lect their programming as market-driven messages. 
3. The broadcaster charges the highest rates for, and 
makes the Zar/lest profits from, the sale of advertising 
time during primetime" hours-i.e., hours in which 
more people watch television than during another other 
daily time period. The higlier the rates charged for ad-
vertising time, the more likely that the broadcaster is 
concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with making a 
profit. The greater the profit motive, the more likely 
that the broadcaster has constructed or selected its 
primetime programming as market-driven messages for 
sale. 
4. The broadcaster selects programming to present by 
reference to predicted audience ratings, market research, 
and other bases from which to anticipate popularity. 
When the broadcaster relies specifically on fuformation 
concerned with predicting audience demand in selecting 
pro~amming, it is reasonable to infer its concern with 
selling a market-driven message. 
5. The broadcaster selects programming to retain, and to 
cancel, by reference to measured audience rati!l:gs, mar-
ket research, and other indicia of popularity. When the 
broadcaster relies specifically on mformation concerned 
with predictin~ audience demand in retaining or cancel-
ing programmmg, it is reasonable to infer its entrepre-
neurial concern with selling a market-driven message. 
If the government can establish these facts about a broad-
caster that challenges regulatory intrusion on "editorial discre-
tion" (such as through the Fairness in Political Advertising 
Act26B), it is reasonable for an adjudicating court to erect a pre-
sumption that the broadcaster is primarily concerned with sell-
ing a market-driven message and, therefore, engaged in 
commercial activity for which the First Amendment should be 
deemed to provide no special protection. The broadcaster 
would remain free to rebut this presumption, and assert a con-
stitutional immunity from regula,tion, by proving that its gen-
eral approach to primetime programming, or its approach to 
particular primetime programs, is primarily to enlighten with a 
speaker-driven self-expression.269 One might expect such re-
268. H.R. 84, 105th Cong. (1997). 
269. On the other hand, suppose that the following facts are established 
about an actor who claims to be engaged in the protected dissemination of 
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buttal to be a difficult task and, I suggest, one that is appropri-
ately so. 
Indeed, it is not self-evident that the government should 
bear the burden of proving these indicia of market-driven moti-
vation. If one asserts a constitutional privilege, one arguably 
bears some sort of burden to establish that the privilege has 
been infringed. Yet perhaps the fact that the actor is engaged 
in the dissemination of words and pictures justifies a pre-
sumption that he is engaged in protected "speech." Lawyers, 
judges, politicians, and ordinary people surely have always as-
sumed as much. From a predictive perspective, it perhaps 
makes sense to suppose that, in general, people who are en-
gaged in using words and pictures are probably doing so to en-
gage in "the freedom of speech"-that is, to engage pedagogi-
cally in self-expression. To the extent that this prediction does 
make sense, it is reasonable to place the burden on the gov-
ernment to prove the existence of circumstances in which that 
prediction is untrue or in which a contrary prediction is war-
ranted. Such is the point of placing the burden on the govern-
ment to prove the five indicia of market-driven entrepreneurial 
motivation. Where the state can meet this burden, it makes 
sense to presume that the actor, more likely than not, is en-
gaged in predominantly entrepreneurial activity. Thus, based 
on a probabilistic perspective, where the government proves the 
existence of these five indicia of market-driven motivation, the 
burden should shift to the actor asserting a First Amendment 
privilege to prove that it was acting predominantly with a pro-
tected purpose of enlightening with speaker-driven self-
expression. 
market-driven messages: 
1. The actor is expending money to disseminate the putative speech, 
without receiving profit-making compensation in return for the dis-
semination of that speech. See supra note 182. 
2. The actor does not conduct market surveys before deciding what 
to say. 
3. If the actor is an organization, its membership has been drawn 
together by a common idea, and the putative speech in question is an 
expression of that common idea. 
These facts would tend strongly to support an inference that the actor was en-
gaged in speaker-driven self-expression. 
For a discussion of categories of evidence from which reckless disregard 
for truth may be inferred in the analogous context of defamation, see, e.g., 
Gyong Ho Kim, Evidentiary Behaviors Constituting Reckless Disregard for the 
Truth, 20 COMM. & LAW 39, 48-50 (1998). 
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V. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNPROTECTED 
DECISION TO SELL THE MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE 
A. CONTENT-MOTIVATED REGULATION OF THE UNPROTECTED 
MARKET-DRIVEN MESSAGE 
Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson invalidated a state scheme 
requiring that a film be licensed before it could be exhibited "for 
pay or in connection with any business."270 One might take the 
foregoing analysis to suggest that if a distributor or movie 
house presents a film as a market-driven message for sale, it 
should be deemed not to warrant special solicitude under the 
First Amendment and could be subject to such a licensing pro-
vision, as well as a wide array of other regulations. 
But the market-driven message principle should not neces-
sarily be taken so far. Indeed, even if one accepts the notion 
that decisions to sell the market-driven message should not be 
deemed to be part of "the freedom of speech," the government 
should not be free to regulate such decisions in a content-
motivated way. This part will first examine how this notion re-
lates to existing judicial doctrine, and then explore why the 
regulation of unprotected activity-i.e., sale of the market-
driven message-for content-motivated reasons nevertheless 
should be viewed as constitutionally problematic.271 
1. Unprotected Speech and Content-Motivated Regulation: 
Doctrinal Considerations 
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court considered 
a First Amendment challenge to a state statute that imposed 
criminal penalties for displaying a symbol '"which one knows or 
has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or re-
sentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or 
gender.'"272 The Minnesota Supreme Court had determined 
270. 343 U.S. 495, 497 (1952) (quotations omitted). 
271. This Article's analysis will likely be of interest to those supporting-
and opposing-Al Gore, Joseph Lieberman, and William Bennett in contem-
plating the regulation of media portrayals of violence based on concerns about 
the effects of such speech on children and others. See, e.g., Gore Takes Tough 
Stand on Violent Entertainment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000, at Al. This sec-
tion should be a caution, however, that any contemplated regulations must not 
be motivated by disagreement with the content perceived in market-driven 
messages, even though manufactured as products for sale. 
272. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (quoting ST. PAUL. 
MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)). 
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that this statute applied only to "expressions that constitute 
'fighting words' within the meaning of Chaplinsky''273-and, as 
such, "not within the area of constitutionally protected 
speech.''274 
Justice Scalia determined, however, that even with respect 
to such categories of unprotected speech, the government may 
not engage in discriminatory regulations motivated by the con-
tent of ideas expressed: 
[T]hese areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, 
be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (ob-
scenity, defamation, etc.) .... [T]hey may [not] be made the vehicles 
for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable 
content. Thus, the government may proscribe libel; but it may not 
make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel criti-
cal of the government.275 
Scalia identified two circumstances in which a selective 
regulation of "unprotected speech" is permissible. First, the 
government may regulate when the basis for the regulation 
"consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at 
issue is proscribable."276 Under such circumstances, he sug-
gests, there is "no significant danger of idea or viewpoint dis-
crimination. "277 Second, the government may regulate a "con-
tent-defined subclass of proscribable speech" when that 
subclass is "associated with particular 'secondary effects' of the 
speech, so that the regulation is 'justified without reference to 
273. Id. at 381 (paraphrasing In re Welfare ofR.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510-
11 (Minn. 1991)). 
· 274. Id. at 383 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)). 
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court identified "fighting 
words" as one of several categories of speech that are unprotected by the First 
Amendment: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to 
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and ob-
scene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" 
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed 
that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit 
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social in-
terest in order and morality. Resort to epithets or personal abuse is 
not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion 
safeguarded by the Constitution. 
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (quotation omitted). 
275. R.A V., 505 U.S. at 383-84. 
276. Id. at 388. 
277. Id. 
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the content of the ... speech.'"278 Again, Scalia says, such a ba-
sis "for distinction refute[s] the proposition that the selectivity 
of the restriction is 'even arguably conditioned upon the sover-
eign's agreement with what a particular speaker may intend to 
say.'''279 
Thus, if a court were to embrace the suggestion that deci-
sions to sell the market-driven message should be deemed un-
worthy of the First Amendment's special solicitude, it would 
not follow, at least as a matter of established doctrine, that the 
government could regulate programming decisions in a content-
motivated way. Rather, finding that an actor is engaged in 
selling a market-driven message would simply eliminate con-
cerns that a content-motivated regulation displacing that ac-
tor's "editorial discretion"-such as the Fairness in Political 
Advertising Act280_would involve, in the words of Buckley v. 
Valeo, "restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society 
in order to enhance the relative voice of others.''281 
2. Unprotected Speech and Content-Motivated Regulation: 
Normative Considerations 
Justice Scalia has noted why the First Amendment has 
been deemed to prohibit content-motivated regulations of 
speech. "The rationale of the general prohibition . . . is that 
content discrimination 'raises the specter that the Government 
may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the mar-
ketplace."'282 Such a concern about the government's purpose-
ful policing of public discourse emerges from two very different 
scenarios. First, government officials might seek to suppress 
criticism of themselves or their policies and thereby separate 
themselves from the majority of the electorate by undermining 
the processes of accountability. Second, government officials 
might respond to the community's conventional values and seek 
to effectuate prevailing impulses to purge public discourse of 
unpopular minority viewpoints. 
278. Id. at 389 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 
(1986)). 
279. Id. at 390 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555 
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (citation omitted)). 
280. R.R. 84, 105th Cong. (1997). 
281. 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam). 
282. R.A V., 505 U.S. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of 
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)). 
572 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:451 
Both scenarios of content motivation contradict the impli-
cations of a First Amendment designed to protect speech for the 
sake of democratic self-government. For government officials 
to seek to short circuit the processes of democratic accountabil-
ity transforms them into a minority faction, to use Madison's 
framework, and prevents the operation of the otherwise avail-
able cure for minority faction-that is, the principle of majority 
rule inherent in "the republican principle."283 
When government policy reflects the censorship impulses 
of the broader community, the problematic nature of content-
motivated regulation is somewhat more complex. From a re-
publican perspective, all viewpoints about "the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community'' should be heard. In 
Meiklejohn's words, purposefully purging public discourse of 
such viewpoints about which to deliberate is a "mutilation of 
the thinking process of the community.''284 From a pluralist 
perspective, purposefully denying people a right to express 
their viewpoints, no matter how unpopular, contradicts the 
proposition that each voter is entitled to an equal political 
status and a right to express her earnestly held views toward 
endeavoring to test her own views and to shape the views of 
others.285 
Yet, one might ask how these concerns are implicated if the 
government were to pursue a content-motivated regulation of 
decisions to sell market-driven messages. After all, the forego-
ing analysis has suggested that entrepreneurial decisions to 
sell the market-driven message warrant no special constitu-
tional protection, in part because its disseminators lack a pur-
pose of participating in public discourse. So long as those who 
wish to engage in self-expression by disseminating speaker-
driven messages remain free to do so, how is democracy with 
either a republican or pluralist emphasis compromised by the 
content-motivated suppression of activity that does not qualify 
as protected speech? 
Although the market-driven message does not contain the 
ideas and priorities of its disseminator, it does contain ideas. If 
the government were to determine which market-driven mes-
283. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); see supra text accompanying note 163. 
284. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 26, at 26. 
285. See supra notes 163-81 and accompanying text. For an illuminating 
discussion of difficulties in justifying protection for unpopular extremist 
speech, see generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986). 
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sages could not be disseminated, according to the values and 
priorities of government officials, the government will be en-
gaging in censorship for the purpose of shaping public values. 
Indeed, whether the values underlying the censorship are con-
cerned with insulating officials from electoral accountability or 
with vindicating the communities mores against unpopular 
views, content-motivated censorship of broadcasters' market-
driven messages involve governmental efforts to shape public 
opinion. To be a bit more precise, content-motivated censorship 
of broadcasters' market-driven messages would reflect govern-
mental efforts to prevent public opinion from being influenced 
in certain ways-to channel, through the placement of ideologi-
cal barriers, the evolution of public values.286 
Thus, the fact that the government might limit its content-
motivated censorship to (unprotected) market-driven speech 
does not dispose of concerns about the potential for a dominat-
ing control of the ideas to which people are exposed. Ifmarket-
driven messages constitute most of the messages that are dis-
seminated through the mass media, and if government were 
free to shape the ideology of television entertainment in a con-
tent-motivated way, the risk that the government could effec-
tively "drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace" 
would seem to exist, even though the regulations would not in-
trude upon protected speech interests of either the broadcasters 
or the audience.287 Given the nature of the mass media-its 
command of the public's attention in a persistent quest for en-
tertainment-the risk remains that through purposeful ma-
nipulation of programming content, government could become, 
essentially, a behemoth participant in public discourse-
displacing a group of entrepreneurially motivated private gate-
keepers by a politically motivated public gatekeeper.288 
286. To censor, in a content-motivated way, Murphy Brown's criticism of 
Dan Quayle (arguably a content-motivated action of the sort that seeks to cir-
cumvent processes of accountability) would be an exercise of purposeful con-
trol by the government over ideas to which people are exposed. Similarly, to 
censor, in a content-motivated way, Murphy Brown's celebration of unmarried 
motherhood (arguably a content-motivated action of the sort that seeks to ef-
fectuate the community's favored values) would be an exercise of purposeful 
control by the government over ideas to which people are exposed. 
287. RA. V., 505 U.S. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of 
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)). 
288. For a discussion of the dangers of government domination of public 
discourse, see generally MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GoVERNMENT SPEAKS: 
POLITICS, LAW, AND GoVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983). 
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*** 
In contrast to these hypothetical efforts to discriminate 
among market-driven messages for content-motivated reasons, 
one can understand a proposal like the Fairness in Political 
Advertising Act289 as quite a different enterprise. First, the Act 
does not distinguish between programming that is to be dis-
placed by free advertising time for political candidates by any 
reference to content. Rather, broadcasters are directed to pro-
vide air time during primetime hours. This sort of selectivity 
focuses on a factor indicating a likelihood that the program-
mers whose discretion would be displaced intended to create a 
market-driven message, and to sell it. As such, the regulatory 
intrusion on primetime programming satisfies Justice Scalia's 
notion that the government may select which subcategories of 
unprotected speech to regulate by reference to the factor which 
renders the "speech" unprotected. In other words, the element 
that renders the market-driven message unprotected is its un-
derlying motivation. Programming disseminated during prime-
time hours is more likely than programming disseminated at 
other times to have been shaped and selected because of mar-
ket-driven factors. It is more likely to reflect decisions to sell 
the market-driven message for profit rather than to enlighten 
through self-expression. 
Second, the government can justify its choice to focus on 
primetime programming by reference to "particular 'secondary 
effects' of the speech, so that the regulation is 'justified without 
reference to the content of the ... speech."'290 The "secondary 
effect" of primetime programming is its potential to reach the 
maximum possible audience. It is presented at times when 
many people have the opportunity, and have developed the 
· habit, to watch television. A desire to present the speech of po-
litical candidates, by displacing the market-driven speech of 
television broadcasters, at a time when the largest possible au-
dience is available does not suggest an effort to censor the pro-
gramming that otherwise would be presented in a content-
motivated way. As Justice Scalia noted, when the government 
justifies a regulation of "unprotected speech" by reference to 
such "secondary effects," it "refute[s] the proposition that the 
selectivity of the restriction is 'even arguably conditioned upon 
289. H.R. 84, 105th Cong. (1997). 
290. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 389 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 
475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)). 
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the sovereign's agreement with what a speaker may intend to 
say."'291 
Third, the Fairness in Political Advertising Act does not 
raise either of the two normative concerns about content-
motivated regulation. By displacing popular (primetime) enter-
tainment programming, it cannot readily be understood as re-
flecting an effort to silence minority dissent. Furthermore, by 
providing time for political candidates to communicate with the 
public, it can facilitate, rather than undermine, the processes of 
electoral accountability. 
Fourth, unlike the content-motivated censorship of entre-
preneurial decisions to sell market-driven messages, the Fair-
ness in Political Advertising Act envisions replacing activity 
that is not part of "the freedom of speech"-i.e., the broadcast-
ers' sale of market-driven programming-with activity at the 
core of concerns for democratic self-government. The protected 
speech of the broadcaster has not been impinged, because the 
broadcaster was not engaged in protected speech. But the 
quantity of speech, of purposefully persuasive communication, 
has been enhanced, as political candidates use the opportunity 
to express their views to the voters-their potential constitu-
ents. Thus, Buckley's admonition that the government may not 
"restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to 
enhance the relative voice of others" is not violated. 292 Fur-
thermore, by augmenting the amount of protected speech, by 
replacing entertainment through which people seek to escape 
life's difficult realities with speech about the issues of the day~ 
the Act would facilitate opportunities for the voters to deliber-
ate about their own interests and values and those of their fel-
low citizens. 
B. CULTURAL CRITIQUES OF CO:Ml\IBRCIAL TELEVISION 
Ronald Collins and David Skover have argued that uses of 
modern telecommunications media, both by those who control it 
and by its audience, are alien to the classical, Madisonian First 
Amendment's conception of a responsible citizenry actively en-
gaged in deliberative discourse. They give several reasons for 
this proposition. 
291. Id. at 390 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555 
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (citation omitted)). 
292. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam). 
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First, they suggest, the content of television programming 
is rooted in entrepreneurial motives. ''With profit maximiza-
tion as the governing norm, television distorts traditional First 
Amendment values by associating the lowest passions with the 
highest ideals."293 Second, "the economics and aesthetics of 
commercial television have profound influence" on political 
speech.294 Political candidates employ the methods of commer-
cial advertising, and "the gulf between important political ex-
pression and pure amusement nearly vanishes."295 Third, ad-
vertising on television exploits and promotes the public's 
pervasive pursuit of pleasure and entertainment.296 Commer-
cial television thrives in our culture of "self-indulgent ... con-
sumption."297 
Collins and Skover see modern American culture as posing 
a new threat to the First Amendment, entirely different from 
the classical fear of governmental manipulation. It is a threat 
of a disengaged, unthinking, passive, pleasure-pursuing citi-
zenry to whom reasoned discourse is unappealing and irrele-
vant. Based on this proposition, they frame a First Amend-
ment "paradox": "To save itself, the traditional First 
Amendment must destroy itself." The government must be al-
lowed to regulate commercial television-"governmental 
'abridgment' of expression"-to address the cultural threat to 
the classical version of free speech. But with such governmen-
tal abridgment, they say, First Amendment protection collapses 
into First Amendment tyranny. 298 
They propose a different response to the paradox: abandon 
the classical understanding of the freedom of speech as a start-
ing point, in favor of an understanding rooted in modern 
American cultural values and practices. 
The animating spirit of the cultural approach is that, once we con-
front the reality of First Amendment hypocrisy, we will no longer 
wish to perpetuate it. On the one hand, we may restructure life, law, 
and discourse in order to actualize Madisonian ideals. On the other 
hand, we may give up all Madisonian pretenses and romp in a de-
bauched dystopia.299 
293. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 37, at 16-17 (quotation omitted). 
294. Id. at 16. 
295. Id. at 17. 
296. Id. at 22. 
297. Id. at 27. 
298. Id. at 4 (quotations omitted). 
299. Id. at 215. 
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Under the former, they see American culture as transformed. 
Under the latter, they see the First Amendment as trans-
formed, protecting all sorts of "communication" enthusiastically 
and without apology: 
When we feed on TV and video soma for an average of some forty-
seven hours weekly, consume the fruits of a yearly advertising budget 
of $149 billion, splurge some $10 billion annually to gorge our insa-
tiable sexual appetites, and more, we are unlikely to tolerate a First 
Amendment regime that is intolerant of such pleasurable practices. 300 
Collins and Skover have suggested exploration of a "cul-
tural approach" to the First Amendment.301 The "cultural ap-
proach" would look not to scholars' views of history for giving 
meaning to the First Amendment; rather, it would look to 
scholars' views of popular culture to determine the meaning 
that the practices of the American masses give to "the freedom 
of speech." ''The cultural approach recognizes that First 
Amendment values are to be determined as much by what We 
the People practice as by what they, the elite, preach."302 Thus, 
they explore-but do not (quite yet) advocate-a new concep-
tion of the First Amendment that would replace the classical 
approach and that would embrace as valuable (and constitu-
tionally protected) the commercial cuJture that the masses em-
brace as valuable. 
Collins and Skover present a powerful critique of American 
culture and demonstrate how far we are from a republican con-
ception of political community. But consider two objections to 
their suggestion that the classical First Amendment is incom-
patible with, and irrelevant to, modern American culture. 
First, their notion of the classical, Madisonian First 
Amendment is republican. As this piece has also suggested, 
republican ideals of deliberation about the public good are in-
deed offended by the commercialism and escapism that charac-
terize modern mass media. Like Cass Sunstein and his analy-
sis of commercial television, however, Collins and Skover 
disregard the less normatively demanding pluralist strains in 
American constitutional tradition. They do not explore 
whether a more modest version of classical First Amendment 
theory, rooted in democracy with a pluralist emphasis, would 
also view most mass communications activity as unprotected 
and, if so, which aspects, and why. 
300. Id. at 213. 
301. See id. at xxi. 
302. Id. at 214. 
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The founders' republican view was always aspiration. 
They recognized that in everyday behavior, citizens would not 
pursue "the permanent and aggregate interests of the commu-
nity" and that government would be beset by faction. The na-
tional legislative structure and the supremacy of constitutional 
law were structural devices to approach the republican ideal 
better than unvarnished political behavior otherwise would. 303 
Our modern pleasure-seeking culture deviates far less from 
the pluralist reality that The Federalist No. 10 recognized than 
from the republican ideal to which it aspired. Furthermore, the 
freedom of speech was to be pursued, and protected, in politics 
as practiced-in other words, in democracy with all its pluralist 
shortcomings. The freedom of speech necessary for pluralist 
self-government empowers each member of the community to 
pursue self-interest through persuasion, to deal with the prob-
lems posed by disagreement, or to take advantage of the oppor-
tunities provided by agreement and cooperation. Thus, this 
classical pluralist understanding of politics and the First 
Amendment does not deviate from the realities of American po-
litical behavior so much as does republicanism. 304 
Of course, so much of what is presented on television has 
nothing to do with political behavior or even, more broadly, 
with the pursuit of self-interest through persuasion. And this 
leads to a second objection to the Collins and Skover analysis: 
in a circular way, they assume that the pervasive telecommuni-
cations pleasure and entertainment practices of Americans are, 
and must be, popularly understood as "speech" protected by the 
First Amendment. A First Amendment that denied protection 
to so much of what Americans understand to be "speech," they 
argue, would be so alien to American culture as to be incom-
patible with and irrelevant to our culture. 
One might acknowledge that interpreting a constitutional 
provision in a way that starkly deviates from prevailing values 
303. See supra notes 163-63. 
304. Indeed, our government is still a representative democracy. This, in 
itself, is a republican characteristic that recognizes the distinction between 
private impulse and public action. Beyond this, our government is still a rep-
resentative democracy circumscribed by constitutional limits and judicial re-
view. These are republican characteristics that recognize the distinction be-
tween short-sighted public action and public actions in pursuit of "the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community." See supra notes 163-
63. If one is to question whether classical notions of the First Amendment are 
inconsistent with popular American culture, then one must question whether 
constitutionalism in general is inconsistent with popular American culture. 
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is perilous in practice and questionable as a matter of interpre-
tive theory. But, as just suggested, Americans remain commit-
ted to electoral democracy, at least of the pluralist variety. A 
First Amendment whose reach is limited to protecting those ac-
tivities relevant to pluralist democracy-including self-
expressive efforts to persuade in private transactions-would 
hardly be alien to American norms. It might give a legal mean-
ing to the word "speech" different from an ordinary or lay un-
derstanding. But that is true of the words used in many legal 
provisions. 
Thus, the second reason for rejecting the enterprise of em-
ploying the values of mass culture as the exclusive basis for 
generating the meaning of the First Amendment reflects, per-
haps, a more conventional notion of law than Collins and 
Skover may have. This perspective does not surrender the 
meaning of law-especially constitutional law-entirely to the 
practices of mass culture. The legal meaning of words and the 
popular meaning of words may well be different. Simply be-
cause people might understand television broadcasts or porno-
graphic pictures to be speech should not necessarily determine 
that such broadcasts and pictures should be deemed speech for 
specific legal purposes. Similarly, even without reference to 
law, simply because people may find certain activities enjoyable 
does not necessarily mean that those activities are valuable for 
all purposes, at all times, in all contexts. There is a time and 
place for everything. This truth is acknowledged even in mass 
culture. 
Thus, if Collins and Skover were to assert that the classical 
First Amendment-understood not as republican, but with a 
pluralist emphasis-deviates too far from prevailing cultural 
understandings about what is valuable and what is "speech," 
they would need to posit that ordinary Americans are unable to 
understand that words can have different meanings in different 
contexts and, indeed, that activities can be differently valuable, 
depending on the context in which one is acting. Yet, the peo-
ple surely are capable of making a distinction among valuable 
activities. The people surely are capable of understanding that 
even though playing basketball, for example, might be enjoy-
able, it is not necessarily part of the First Amendment's free-
dom of speech, simply because it has that sort of value; that 
even though watching a basketball game on television may be 
enjoyable, it is not necessarily part of the First Amendment's 
freedom of speech, simply because it has that sort of value; that 
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even though watching ER on television may be enjoyable, it is 
not necessarily part of the First Amendment's freedom of 
speech, simply because it has that sort of value. 
The "First Amendment paradox" that Collins and Skover 
see is too stark. The First Amendment need not "destroy itself 
to save itself." There need not be draconian regulation, such as 
a politically impossible Prohibition of television that some 
urge,305 to forge republican citizens from pleasure-seeking zom-
bies. Republican citizens were never possible, as Madison rec-
ognized. Pluralist citizens were possible, and remain so. Fur-
thermore, on the other side, the pursuit of pleasure during our 
ever-expanding leisure time need not overwhelm the realm of 
politics, persuasion, and self-interested discourse. Simply be-
cause Americans spend so much time on entertainment, simply 
because entertainment interests compete with interests rooted 
in competitive or cooperative interaction, need not mean that 
the interest in pluralist self-governance must be destroyed. Af-
ter all, people had daily concerns that diverted them from poli-
tics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Those di-
versions might have been work, or family, or religion, or 
whiskey, rather than leisure and self-conscious entertainment. 
But they were diversions from politics nevertheless. 
These diversions, however, unlike watching television, 
were not popularly conceived as speech. They did not present a 
danger of overwhelming our understanding of "the freedom of 
speech" protected by the Constitution. The danger to "the free-
dom of speech" comes not jui::;t from the popular mindset, but 
from a failure of the leadership that the trained legal mindset 
exists to provide. Most of our fellows steeped in modern Ameri-
can culture, it seems, can still comprehend the differences be-
tween expressing personal values, and playing to an audience. 
They still can understand the differences between pursuing 
persuasion and pursuing entertainment. And if informed of it, 
they could comprehend-even embrace-a principle, and its 
underlying rationale, that the First Amendment protects self-
expression intended to persuade, but does not protect entrepre-
neurial decisions to sell designed to play to an audience. 
Thus, the First Amendment need not destroy itself to save 
itself. The First Amendment need only define itself to save it-
305. See, e.g., George Anastoplo, Self-Government and the Mass Media: A 
Practical Man's Guide, in THE MAsS MEDIA AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 161, 
223-24 (Harry M. Clor ed., 1974) (arguing for the abolition of television as a 
means of enlarging the freedom of speech). 
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self. More precisely, those charged with responsibly interpret-
ing constitutional provisions need to define "the freedom of 
speech" that warrants special constitutional protection. Schol-
ars, lawyers, and judges need to reveal the option to the elec-
torate and their representatives that the people might, if they 
choose, command the use of mass communications technologies 
for self-expression and other activities relevant to democratic 
self-government. Those who define the terms of the constitu-
tional order must acknowledge that the people might choose to 
create space for speech that is protected by the First Amend-
ment, by displacing entrepreneurial market-driven activities 
that are not; that reform might start on a small scale, by man-
dating free time for political candidates; that these choices, if 
made carefully, can be constitutionally permissible. For if 
scholars, judges, and, ultimately, political leaders fail in this 
definitional responsibility, those who control the channels on 
our television sets-by exercising entrepreneurial discretion, 
rather than the "editorial discretion" that they claim-can long 
control the channels through which the freedom of speech oth-
erwise might flourish. 
CONCLUSION 
Proponents of economic deregulation argue that television 
programmers should be treated both as are other businessmen 
in the regime of consumer sovereignty and as are other speak-
ers under the First Amendment. Some argue further that 
property rights under the Fifth Amendment are just as funda-
mental as are speech rights under the First Amendment, and 
should be protected just as vigorously. This latter argument 
has not shaken the conventional wisdom that political rights-
including the freedom of speech-are constitutionally founda-
tional, whereas property rights are politically derivative. Al-
most all who adhere to this conventional view about the rela-
tionship between speech and property-as well as those who 
urge the "parity" of markets-accept the proposition that tele-
vision programmers exercise "editorial discretion" protected by 
the First Amendment. 
This Article has challenged this point of agreement that 
connects those who assert the constitutional parity between 
speech and property and those who assert the constitutional 
primacy of speech over property. It has suggested that the pro-
gramming decisions of commercial television businesses should 
not qualify as "editorial discretion" protected by the First 
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Amendment to the extent that they involve entrepreneurially 
motivated decisions to manufacture and to sell market-driven 
content. 
The significance of human actions is often determined by 
the purposes for which they are undertaken. The rationale for 
free economic markets is predicated on notions of incentives 
and human purposes in response to those incentives. The quest 
for economic reward in exchanges with freely acting consumers 
will induce producers to create and sell products that serve the 
desires of those consumers. 
This Article has tried to show how four different normative 
frameworks relevant to the First Amendment's freedom of 
speech also elevate human purposes as the definitive factor dis-
tinguishing "speech" from other actions. It also has tried to 
show that the purposes and choices relevant to entrepreneurial 
responses to market incentives in the regime of consumer sov-
ereignty are distinct from the purposes and choices relevant to 
republican democracy, pluralist democracy, personal fulfill-
ment, and the implications for the First Amendment of eco-
nomic rationales for Congress's copyright power. For each of 
these four normative contexts relevant to defining the freedom 
of speech, choices to enlighten self and others through speaker-
driven self-expression-rather than choices to sell products 
that satisfy anticipated consumer demand-are worthy of pro-
tection under the First Amendment. 
Those who urge the constitutional parity of speech and 
property markets do not-and should not-argue that speech 
and property are the same thing. Their arguments about the 
worth of property rights and the value of human choices re-
sponding to economic incentives can stand on their own ground. 
Those who deny the constitutional parity of speech and prop-
erty markets clearly recognize that speech and property are not 
the same thing. They recognize, at least implicitly, that the 
choices relevant to economic markets are not the same as the 
choices relevant to the freedom of speech. But they have failed 
to apply this insight to the programming decisions of commer-
cial television corporations. What appears to be speech is, fun-
damentally and essentially, property-property that has been 
molded in the way that any entrepreneur molds his product. It 
is a product shaped by economic market incentives. It is a 
product governed by the behavioral pressures of consumer sov-
ereignty. Choices to create and to sell this product should be 
understood as property interests protected under the Fifth 
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Amendment, rather than as speech protected by the First 
Amendment. 
To identify choices and activities that lack special constitu-
tional protection as speech is not to determine that they lack 
special worth. It is, rather, to determine that their worth is to 
be debated and resolved in the political processes that the Con-
stitution both protects and circumscribes. An individual's de-
sire to serve in the military is widely understood to be worthy. 
But it has not been deemed a matter of special constitutional 
entitlement. A corporation's desire to pursue a policy of af-
firmative action in hiring and promotion might be viewed as 
laudable-and, not so long ago, widely praised. But that choice 
has not been deemed a matter of special constitutional enti-
tlement. Commerce is, of course, a valuable human activity. 
Consuming products for entertainment, for escapism, and for 
relaxation, are widely cherished activities. But, at least as a 
matter of conventional legal understanding, the sale and con-
sumption of products have not been deemed to be matters of 
special constitutional entitlement. The worth, desirability, and 
permissibility of most aspects of our lives are to be determined 
politically. 
And so it would be for those who wish to sell the market-
driven message under the perspective presented in this Article. 
To determine that choices to sell (and to consume) the market-
driven message lack special solicitude under the First Amend-
ment is not to determine that these choices are without value. 
It is simply to determine that they are without the kind of spe-
cial value as speech that warrants insulating them from being 
weighed in the political process against competing values. 
Self-expression, the expression of one's views, values, and 
priorities, is essential to a definition of what should qualify as 
speech for a First Amendment dedicated to the processes of 
democratic self-government or to Aristotelian self-fulfillment. 
Democratic decisionmaking, whether with a pluralist or repub-
lican emphasis, requires that voters know the views of their fel-
lows, to determine where agreement exists, where compromise 
can be found, and where concession need be made. Only self-
expression can enable others to account adequately for the ac-
tor's views. Only when the actor chooses to express his own 
views does his choice have relevance to his right to participate 
in the processes of democratic self-government, or to the special 
role speech can play in personal fulfillment, and qualify as hav-
ing claim to special solicitude under the First Amendment. 
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A desire to sell the market-driven message does not involve 
its disseminator's self-expression in a quest for truth. A deci-
sion to sell a market-driven message is a decision to respond 
entrepreneurially to the values of others. To the extent that 
the programming decisions of television broadcasters-so much 
of what today occupies the means of effective communication-
are so likely to be market-driven in an entrepreneurial way, re-
futing their claim to constitutional privilege can open a range of 
otherwise unthinkable options for reforming political cam-
paigns and for enriching public discourse. 
The "market-driven message principle" would reject the 
proposition that entrepreneurially motivated decisions to sell a 
market-driven message qualify for special solicitude as "edito-
rial discretion" protected by the First Amendment. This Article 
has pursued the implications of the market-driven message 
principle in the context of relatively modest proposals to pro-
vide free television time for political advertising. It has ex-
plored how judicial doctrine might be constructed both to serve 
the normative foundations of the market-driven message prin-
ciple and to resolve the practical difficulties of adjudicating le-
gal issues that require determination of an actor's intent. 
It is so important that our imagination be liberated from 
petrified assumptions about what qualifies as "speech" and our 
political will freed to pursue measures that go beyond providing 
free advertising time for candidates. It is important because 
democracy in America is ailing. The First Amendment, rooted 
as it is in concerns to preserve and promote the processes of 
democratic self-government, should be a vehicle for resurrect-
ing the discourse that is essential for democracy, not for bury-
ing it under mounds of commercial transactions masquerading 
as "speech." 
It is, therefore, important to think as carefully as we can 
about what "speech" should mean, to distinguish what may 
merely be politically desirable from that which is constitution-
ally essential. The production and consumption of entertain-
ment are merely desirable, and debatably so, at that. The ex-
pression of self by individuals and groups to inform their 
neighbors what they believe, and their neighbors' thoughts and 
expression of those thoughts in response, are constitutionally 
essential. The representation of views in the community by po-
litical candidates is constitutionally essential. With these dis-
tinctions drawn, the electorate, through its representatives, 
could be freed to determine that market-driven programming, 
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pleasant and entertaining though it might be, should at times 
be displaced, so that the people might yield less to the impulses 
of self-indulgence and focus more on the rights and responsi-
bilities of self-governance. 
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